Stanford v. State

Decision Date16 December 1925
Docket Number(No. 9364.)
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

Appeal from Hale County Court; Meade F. Griffin, Judge.

E. L. Stanford was convicted of swindling, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Oxford & Oxford, of Plainview, for appellant.

Sam D. Stinson, State's Atty., of Austin, and Nat Gentry, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., of Tyler, for the State.


The appellant was convicted in the county court of Hale county for the offense of swindling, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the county jail for a term of four months.

The offense grew out of the charge that the appellant drew a certain check on the First State Bank of Hale Center and passed same to Carter-Houston, when in the ordinary course of business the said check would be presented to the said bank appellant did not have sufficient funds in said bank with which to pay said check and had no good reason to believe that said check would be paid, when in the ordinary course of business it would be presented for payment; said appellant representing at the time that said check was good and would be paid.

Appellant seeks to raise the question in his bills of exception 2 and 3 of a variance between the check described in the information and that offered in evidence on the trial of the case. Said bills of exception, however, are entirely insufficient to enable us to review the question sought to be presented. Bill No. 2, after stating that the witness Carter identified a certain check as being given him by the appellant, then described said check so identified. The bill then proceeds as follows:

"And be it further remembered that the state offered said check in evidence, to which the defendant objected because there is a certain part of the description on the check not stated in the information, and because the check offered in evidence is not as described in the information and complaint. And be it remembered that counsel for defendant pointed out to the court specifically the particulars in which there was a variance at the time he made the objections, which objections were by the court overruled, and the check introduced in evidence, and read to the jury, and which check was examined by them, to which action of the court in overruling the defendant's objections, and in permitting the state to introduce said check in evidence, the defendant then and there excepted, and here and now tenders this his bill of exception No. 2 and asks that the same be examined, signed, approved, and ordered filed as part of the record in this case."

Bill No. 3 raises the same question in a different form.

These bills of exceptions are entirely insufficient to present any question for review. Robbins v. State, 272 S. W. 175, 100 Tex. Cr. R. 592, and the authorities there referred to. Our view with reference to what a bill of exception should contain is fully discussed in the above case, and each of these bills utterly and wholly fails to comply with any of the requisites stated in the above case. As illustrative, bill of exceptions No. 2 merely stated that a certain part of the description of the check offered in evidence was not found on the check described in the information. This bill does not attempt to enlighten this court as to what part of this description was referred to or in any manner enlighten us as to the alleged variance. It has been uniformly held that it is necessary for a bill of exceptions to be so full that in and of itself it will disclose all that is necessary to manifest the alleged error, and that it must contain enough of the evidence or facts proven to render intelligible the ruling involved, and that it cannot be aided either by a statement in the motion for a new trial or by the statement of facts. Of course, if a definite portion of the statement of facts is referred to in such manner as to make it practicable for this court to examine such portion without reviewing extraneous matters, such reference would be sufficient, but a mere general reference to the statement of facts is not sufficient and has been so held by the cases. This court will presume that the trial court correctly ruled on matters coming before it unless the contrary is shown, and the burden is on the appellant seeking to have the action of the trial court reviewed to make his bill of exceptions sufficiently clear to enable this court to determine the question presented. In order to do this, it is absolutely incumbent on the appellant to incorporate so much of the evidence in the bill of exception as will verify the truth of his objections. From what has been said, it follows that bills of exceptions 2 and 3 do not present error.

Various complaints are made by bills of exceptions to the action of the court in permitting the state to show that the appellant had given other checks on banks without having sufficient funds on hand to meet them. In this connection, we deem it proper to state that the appellant testified in his own behalf, and the substance of his testimony was to the effect that he had no intention of swindling the prosecuting witness, but that the check was given on the wrong bank through mistake. In view of the appellant's testimony, it was proper to admit evidence of other offense of a similar nature for the purpose of shedding light on appellant's intent in the transaction under investigation. This rule is well settled in Texas, and is no longer open to discussion. Crosslin v. State, 235 S. W. 905, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 467; Rosamond v. State, 263 S. W. 297, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 569; Id., 249 S. W. 468, 94 Tex. Cr. R. 8; Greer v. State, 222 S. W. 986, 87 Tex. Cr. R. 432.

Complaint is also made at the court's action in permitting the state to show that appellant had been charged with an offense in Floyd county. The bills fail to show the nature of the offense, and there is nothing contained in said bill showing any error.

There is no error manifested by bill No. 6, which complains of the court's action in permitting the state to show by the appellant while on the witness stand that he had pleaded guilty once or twice to charges of swindling in the county court. It is...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Sherow v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • January 19, 1927
    ...the bill of exceptions before us that there was an error in the ruling complained of. This is recently discussed in Stanford v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. R. 182, 280 S. W. 798, my brother HAWKINS writing the opinion on rehearing. The same principle is involved in all those cases in which we have ......
  • Cage v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • May 28, 1958
    ...rule evidence of similar transactions becomes admissible even though it does not show the commission of other offenses. Stanford v. State, 103 Tex.Cr.R. 182, 280 S.W. 798 and Rose v. State, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 82, 184 S.W.2d The issuance of the checks to Saunders under appellant's directions were......
  • Cox v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • June 18, 1958
    ...with the views expressed in my dissent in Ernster v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 308 S.W.2d 33, and with the holding in Stanford v. State, 103 Tex.Cr.R. 182, 280 S.W. 798. MORRISON, Presiding Judge I agree with my brethren that the failure of the trial court to charge the jury concerning the testim......
  • Salasar v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • November 16, 1927
    ...was in error. Pombo v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. R. 599, 279 S. W. 263; Quinn v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. R. 179, 279 S. W. 458; Stanford v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. R. 182, 280 S. W. 798; Murff v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. R. 617, 281 S. W. 1077; Ard v. State, 101 Tex. Cr. R. 545, 276 S. W. In bill No. 3 compla......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT