Stange v. Wilson

Decision Date14 October 1868
Citation17 Mich. 342
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesCharles W. Stange v. John B. Wilson

Heard October 9, 1868 [Syllabus Material]

Error to Wayne circuit.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought to recover the value of certain iron work made under a contract.

The declaration was upon the common counts.

Judgment was rendered for plaintiff.

In the course of the plaintiff's evidence, it appeared that said work was done under a special contract in writing, signed by both parties, and which was introduced. It was in the following words:

"This agreement, made this 18th day of September, 1866, between J B. Wilson, founder and machinist, of the city of Detroit county of Wayne, state of Michigan, of the first part, and Charles Stange, of the same place, of the second part, witnesseth,

"1. The party of the first part, for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, agrees to make, for the party of the second part, all the iron work, consisting of wrought iron and cast iron, according to plans furnished by G. W. Lloyd, architect, for Detroit & Milwaukee railway depot, for and in consideration of the sum of $ 5,000.

"2. The party of the second part, for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, agrees to pay to the party of the first part, 'for the above mentioned articles,' the sum of $ 5,000, in the manner following, to wit:

"In witness whereof the said parties have hereunto set their hands and seals, the day and year first above written."

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Levi Bishop, for plaintiff in error:

1. The contract was evidently left incomplete by the parties. They begin to express the manner in which the payments for the work shall be made, and then fail to do so. These words can not be rejected, for, in construing the contract, the whole of it must be considered: Chitty on Cont., 20; 2 Pars. on Cont., 501.

This defect of the contract ought to have been supplied by averment and proof. If the mode of payment, as understood and agreed, had been set out, it might have appeared that the payments were to be made in articles other than money, or that a credit was given which had not expired when the suit was brought, and, therefore, that the suit was premature. It is for the plaintiff to make out his case on the record and by proofs. It is quite likely that the plaintiff found himself embarrassed by the first proposition laid down by Mr. Greenleaf in 2 Greenf. Ev., § 104.

It was competent thus to remedy a defect, as an agreement may be partly in writing and partly by parol: 2 Pars. on Cont., 492, note b; 16 Penn. 43; 5 Whart. 398; 3 M. and W., 402; 2 Dallas 180.

This involved the necessity of a special count in the declaration, setting the facts out fully. It seems that the plaintiff tried to avoid the production of his written instrument, and it only came out incidentally in the course of the trial. When it thus appears in the case, it shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment on the record as it stands.

There appears to have been a blank left in the contract, which may, and even must, be supplied by parol, before the contract can be available: Chitty on Cont., 25; 1 Phillips on Ev., 540; see also note 950 to same in vol. 3; 13 Mass. 158; 2 Dallas 180.

From the words used in the agreement, there must have been a mode of payment intended, other than immediately, in money, when the work was done. That intent was for the jury to determine when the whole agreement and understanding, as shown by both verbal and written testimony, should be presented to them: 3 M. and W., 403.

2. The questions put to Chapaton and Noble ought to have been allowed. The court declare that the time for having the work done was fixed by the contract. On an inspection of the contract this appears not to be the case. The most that can be said is, that, as a conclusion of law, it was to be done in a reasonable time. It could not be immediately, for the work had to be manufactured.

We did not thus seek to vary or enlarge a written instrument, but, an agreement being part in writing and part in parol, we sought to show the parol part. In such a case, as I have argued, the whole contract may be shown by both species of evidence, and then it is for the jury to determine, from the whole evidence, what the real bargain was: 5 Whart. 598.

3. Where no time within which work is to be done is expressed in a contract, the legal effect of the instrument is that it must be done in a reasonable time; and while we can not change the terms of the instrument by parol evidence, or alter its legal effect, the question as to what is the reasonable time under it must be determined by proofs aliunde. That fact must be settled by testimony in pais: 2 Pars. on Cont., 551, and note e; 16 Pick. 227, 231; Moody and M., 300.

4. The question of reasonable time being one to be settled by testimony, the contemporaneous declarations of both parties, who understood the subject better than anybody else, and especially of the plaintiff himself, touching that very time, if not evidence of a binding contract, resting partly in parol, are certainly competent evidence as declarations and admissions of the parties bearing directly upon the question.

5. In connection with the question of time, the evidence offered was competent and very important, as bearing on the question of damages. Having done the work on a special agreement, but not in time, plaintiff was entitled to recover only the amount of benefit which, under all the circumstances, the defendant had received from the work done: 2 Greenlf. Ev., § 104.

Moore & Griffin, for defendant in error:

1. The testimony offered by plaintiff in error was properly excluded.

It was competent for either party to incorporate in their contract a limitation as to time. Not having done so, the law steps in and requires performance within a reasonable time: 11 Mich. 531.

This case is clearly within the well established rule that parol evidence is not admissible to vary a written contract.

2. A contract is not void by reason of the omission as to time of performance or payment. The legal effect of the contract is, that the work shall be performed within a reasonable time, and payment made on delivery: 7 Durnf. and East, 121; 1 East, 203; 13 Wend. 285; 1 Hill 579.

The contract was executed on the part of the plaintiff below, and he was entitled to recover, under the common counts, the price stipulated: 1 Doug. 513; 11 Wend. 417; 22 Id. 576; 2 Wall. 1.

OPINION

Campbell J.:

Wilson sued Stange for the value of certain iron work, which turned out, on the trail, to have been furnished under a written contract, containing only an agreement that Wilson should make "all the iron work, consisting of wrought and cast iron, according to plans furnished by G. W. Lloyd, architect, for Detroit & Milwaukee railway depot, for and in consideration of the sum of $ 5,000. The time for furnishing the iron was not referred to, and the time of payment was also left in blank. The only question properly presented by the record is, whether certain testimony was properly excluded, the defense resting on the claim that the work had not been furnished as soon as it ought to have been.

On the trial, the question was asked, on cross-examination of one of the plaintiff's witnesses, "When the plaintiff had agreed to have said work done?" Another witness was asked, on cross-examination, "Within what time it was that the plaintiff was to have the work in question done for the defendant?" Both of these questions were excluded, on the ground that parol proof could not be received, because the contract must speak for itself concerning the agreed time of performance.

The defendant below, in his defense, "offered to show by evidence that, at the time of making said written contract, it was agreed, by parol, that the work in question should be furnished by the plaintiff as fast as it might be required by the masons and carpenters, who should do the work on the building for which such work to be furnished by the plaintiff was intended, the defendant proposing, in making such offer, to follow up such evidence by testimony that the plaintiff had failed to furnish such work and materials as so agreed, and failed to furnish them as fast as required by said masons and carpenters," and to show consequent damage. This was also rejected.

It was...

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