Stanger v. Epler

• Decision Date: 27 June 1955
• Citation: 115 A.2d 197,382 Pa. 411
• Parties: Stanley T. STANGER v. Marie Callahan EPLER, also known as Mary Callahan Epler, and Beneficial Saving Society of Philadelphia. Appeal of Marie Callahan EPLER, also known as Mary Callahan Epler.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

115 A.2d 197

382 Pa. 411

Stanley T. STANGER v. Marie Callahan EPLER, also known as Mary Callahan Epler, and Beneficial Saving Society of Philadelphia.

Appeal of Marie Callahan EPLER, also known as Mary Callahan Epler.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

June 27, 1955

Action involving joint bank account. The Court of Common Pleas No 5, County of Philadelphia, as of December Term, 1953, No 2463, Frank Smith, J., decided that plaintiff had made a gift of the interest in the joint bank account to defendant which was conditioned upon marriage and decreed that defendant return pass book and amount she moved from account. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, at No. 124, January Term, 1955 Allen M. Stearne, J., held that finding that gift of one-half undivided interest in bank account was conditioned upon marriage was not supported by clear, precise and indubitable evidence.

Decree reversed and record remanded with instructions.

Maxwell L. Davis, J. Sydney Hoffman, Philadelphia for appellant.

John T. Curtin, Harry A. Demar, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.

ALLEN M. STEARNE, Justice.

The question raised by this appeal is whether a gift of a half interest in a fund of money by creation of a joint bank account was in contemplation of marriage and conditioned upon such marriage.

A summary of the salient facts appears in the opinion of the court below:

‘ The evidence shows that the plaintiff [Stanley T. Stanger], now a man of 70 years, a retired railroad employee living on a pension, moved into the home of the defendant [Marie Callahan Epler] as a boarder in 1933. After a short time the parties discussed marriage between them. The defendant at the time was incapable of marriage because she had a living husband. The plaintiff and defendant on July 3, 1947, opened a joint account in the Beneficial Saving Society with the funds of the plaintiff. The Saving Society had them sign a signature card reading, ‘ Stanley T. Stanger or Marie E. Callahan-Friend.’ The funds of the plaintiff so deposited was in the sum of $5,899.62. The Chancellor found that such funds were deposited by plaintiff in contemplation of marriage. With this finding we agree. In August, 1947, the defendant, with the consent of the plaintiff, withdrew from said account the sum of $1,500 to complete a settlement for the purchase of premises situate in Laurel Springs, New Jersey, title to which was taken in the name of the defendant. This sum was advanced by plaintiff for the purchase of the property to be used as a home for the parties when married, or if not married, then as a loan to defendant. When the defendant was advised in 1949 that her then husband had divorced her, she imposed such conditions on the plaintiff which were impossible for him to meet. On June 18, 1950, the defendant married Charles Epler, who was also a boarder in her home. At all times the defendant has retained the possession of the deposit book and has refused to return it or any of the money to the plaintiff. The Chancellor after a full hearing of this case, granted the prayers of the Bill and ordered the return to the plaintiff of all the funds now on deposit, and for the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of $1,850.00 plus interest.'

The hearing Judge, affirmed by the court in banc, decided that plaintiff had made a gift of an interest in the joint bank account to the defendant which was ‘ conditioned upon the marriage ’ of plaintiff and defendant; that the parol evidence of such conditional gift was ‘ clear, precise and indubitable’ ; and since defendant refused to marry plaintiff-but married another-he directed the defendant to return the amount of such conditional gift to plaintiff.

When plaintiff and defendant opened the bank account in their joint names with plaintiff's money, they executed an agreement wherein they agreed ‘ * * * that any and all sums that may from time to time stand in this account, to the credit of the undersigned depositors, shall be taken and considered as belonging to them as joint tenants and not as tenants in common; * * *.’ This written agreement constituted prima facie evidence of a valid inter vivos gift by plaintiff to defendant of an undivided one-half interest in the joint account. Culhane's Estate, 334 Pa. 124, 5 A.2d 377; In re Fell's Estate, 369 Pa. 597, 87 A.2d 310; Fuller v. Fuller, 372 Pa. 239, 93 A.2d 462. Plaintiff concedes that when he opened the bank account he was fully aware of the effect of his action. Cf. Lochinger v. Hanlon, 348 Pa. 29, 33 A.2d 1.

While such an agreement and opening of the account is prima facie evidence of ownership, parol evidence of intention may be permitted not to alter or vary the terms of the agreement, but to show that the gift was a conditional gift. Eaton v. New York Life Insurance Company of New York, 315 Pa. 68, 172 A. 121, 95 A.L.R. 462; Smilow v. Dickerson, 357 Pa. 455, 54 A.2d 883. Such evidence, however, must be clear, precise and indubitable . Mader v. Stemler, 319 Pa. 374, 379, 179 A. 719; Dempsey v. First National Bank of Scranton, 359 Pa. 177, 181, 58 A.2d 14; In re Furjanick's Estate, 375 Pa. 484, 100 A.2d 85.

It was contended by the plaintiff, and approved by the court below, that gifts to a person to whom the donor is engaged to be married, made in contemplation of the marriage, are conditional upon the marriage; and that if the donee breaks the engagement the gifts or their value may be recovered by the donor. Plaintiff-appellee relies upon Ruehling v. Hornung, 98 Pa.Super. 535, which apparently is the only reported appellate court case in this jurisdiction on this subject. There the action was in replevin to recover an engagement ring, watch and medallion. There was proof of an engagement of marriage and that plaintiff, in contemplation of marriage, gave defendant the enumerated articles. There was no evidence that defendant broke the engagement or that the gifts were made upon the express condition that they were to be returned if defendant failed to marry the plaintiff. Judge Gawthrop said in his opinion, 98 Pa.Super. at page 538:

‘ We find no case in this State directly bearing on this question, but in 28 C.J. 651, the law is stated thus: ‘ A gift a person to whom the donor is engaged to be married, made in contemplation of marriage, although absolute in form, is conditional; and upon breach of the marriage engagement by the donee the property may be recovered by the donor. But if the gift is made simply for the purpose of introducing the donor to the donee's acquaintance and to gain her favor, the property is not recoverable, although marriage does not ensue. So where a Christmas present is made by a man to his fiancée it becomes her property and the subsequent breaking of the engagement does not entitle him to recover it back.’ '

The opinion cited a text book and cases from other states which hold that in order for a donor to recover it must be shown that the gifts were either made upon an express condition that they were to be returned in case the donee failed to marry donor, or that the gifts were induced by the donee's promise to marry the donor. The judgment of the Superior Court was that an engagement ring is a symbol of a contract to marry, subject to the implied condition that if the marriage does not take place due to the fault of the donee, the ring is to be returned. This was held to be a question for the jury. The watch and medallion could not be recovered since there was no evidence that these gifts were made upon the express condition that they were to be returned if the donee failed to marry the donor. See also: Friske v. Cebula, 59 Pa. Dist. & Co. 46; Bullen v. Neuweiler, 73 Pa. Dist. & Co. 207; Preshner v. Goodman, 83 Pa. Dist. & Co. 387; Restatement, Restitution, sec. 58; Annotation, 92 A.L.R. 604.

A review of the record convinces us that the finding of fact that the gift of a one-half undivided interest in the bank account was conditioned upon the marriage, is not supported by evidence which is clear, precise and indubitable.

Doubtless plaintiff made the gift anticipatory that he was going to marry defenda...