Stanko v. Sheridan Cnty.

Decision Date13 November 2020
Docket Number8:20CV294
PartiesRUDY STANKO, individually and on behalf of other prisoners in the Sheridan and Scottsbluff County Jails; Plaintiff, v. SHERIDAN COUNTY; MARK OVERMAN, individually; JEFF BREWER, individually; and AARON CONN, individually, as a private attorney, and in his official capacity as County Attorney; Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Nebraska
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Rudy Stanko ("Stanko"), was a prisoner confined at the county jail in Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, when he filed his pro se Complaint (Filing 1) on July 23, 2020.1 Although Stanko has since been released from jail, his Complaint remains subject to initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for a determination of whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See Mister v. Obadina, No. 19-CV-00148-NJR, 2019 WL 1978343, at *1 n. 2 (S.D. Ill. May 3, 2019) ("A Section 1915A review is triggered when the plaintiff is a prisoner at the time of filing the complaint, whether or not the plaintiff is subsequently released from prison." (citing Jaros v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 669 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012)).

I. LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires the court to conduct an initial review of "a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress froma governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). On such initial review, the court must "dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint," it determines "(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

"The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.").

"A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This means that "if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980).

II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Stanko complains "the Sheridan County Jail is overcrowded in violation of Plaintiff's right not to be imprisoned under protection of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 8th Amendment," and further alleges he was retaliated against "for filing lawsuits and taking prescribed pills." (Filing 1 at 1.) Several othergrievances are also alleged. Named as defendants are: (1) the Sheriff of Sheridan County, Jeff Brewer, who is sued in his individual capacity only; (2) Sheridan County; (3) the Sheridan County Attorney, Aaron Conn, who is sued in both his official and individual capacities; and (4) the Sheriff of Scotts Bluff County, Mark Overman, who is sued in his individual capacity only. (Filing 1 at 2.)

III. DISCUSSION

Liberally construing Stanko's Complaint, this is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute, and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A. Class Action

As a pro se litigant, Stanko may not represent the interests of others.2 "Every court that has considered the issue has held that a prisoner proceeding pro se is inadequate to represent the interests of his fellow inmates in a class action." Coleman v. Newton, 2009 WL 1936265, at *1 (D. Neb. June 29, 2009) (quoting Craig v. Cohn, 80 F.Supp.2d 944, 946 (N.D.Ind. 2000)); see Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) ("[l]t is plain error to permit this imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a class action."). Thus, Stanko can only sue on his own behalf.

B. Prior Litigation Against Sheriff Brewer

On June 24, 2020, Stanko filed a pro se complaint against Jeff Brewer in the District Court of Sheridan County, Nebraska. Stanko amended that pleading on or about June 29, 2020. It was alleged in the amended complaint that Brewer interferedwith Stanko's access to counsel and the courts and subjected Stanko to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Brewer removed the action to federal court on July 29, 2020. In a memorandum and order entered on October 8, 2020, the court granted Brewer's motion to dismiss, determining that Stanko's conditions-of-confinement claims were moot insofar as he was seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and that Brewer was entitled to qualified immunity on Stanko's claims for money damages. See Stanko v. Brewer, No. 8:20CV302, 2020 WL 5982062 (D. Neb. Oct. 8, 2020).3

As the basis for his § 1983 claims in Case No. 8:20CV302, Stanko alleged that "Brewer, the sole defendant and Sheriff of Sheridan County, Nebraska, was the 'decision maker and manager of the Sheridan County Jail.'" Id., 2020 WL 5982062, at *3. Stanko "sued Brewer in his individual capacity, alleging Brewer denied [him] access to a law library, or the technological equivalent, while he was an inmate at the Sheridan County Jail." Id. Stanko "further claim[ed] that after he asked for access to a law library, Brewer 'retaliated' against [him] by: 1) 'throwing [Stanko] in ... solitary confinement and refusing to allow [him] one hour of 'outside exercise;' 2) denying [Stanko] access to his attorney; 3) disallowing [Stanko's] access to a certain book shelf; and 4) prohibiting [Stanko] from reviewing his legal files." Id. Stanko "ask[ed] the court to enjoin [Brewer] from prohibiting his access to a law library and from engaging in the alleged retaliatory actions." Id., at *4. "He also request[ed] a declaration that [Brewer's] actions violated the United States Constitution." Id. Finally, he demand[ed] a jury trial and a 'minimum of $50,000[.]' Id.

Stanko requested "an injunction that would prohibit [Brewer] from restricting [Stanko's] recreational time and that would immediately allow [him] access to legalcounsel, library resources, and his legal files." Id. Stanko also sought "a declaration that [Brewer's] restriction of [Stanko's] requested exercise and access to his legal materials is unconstitutional." Id. These claims for relief were dismissed as moot because Stanko was no longer held in the Sheridan County Jail. Id. (citing Pratt v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 267 F. App'x 482 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that claims for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment are moot when prisoner/complainant is no longer in the facility in question)). The court also held that Brewer could not be held personally liable for damages on Stanko's constitutional claims, stating:

Plaintiff cites the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as the basis of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is wholly unclear which constitutional provision Plaintiff relies on when claiming a right to recover monetary damages. But irrespective of that ambiguity, he has failed to allege a violation of any clearly established constitutional right.
a. Interference with Legal Defense
Plaintiff alleges Defendant unlawfully seized Plaintiff's legal files, failed to provide a law library within the jail, and interfered with Plaintiff's ability to communicate with counsel. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging his legal files were confiscated in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, "society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell." ... Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). The Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. Id. Thus, even if Defendant had "confiscated" Plaintiff's papers, as he apparently alleges, there has been no "clearly established" Fourth Amendment violation to support Plaintiff's § 1983 action.
Liberally construed, Plaintiff may be alleging Defendant denied Plaintiff's access to the courts.... "For prisoners, meaningful access to the courts 'requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.'" White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 679 (8thCir. 2007) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, overruled on other grounds, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996)).
... However, the right to access the courts discussed in Bounds did not create some abstract (or absolute) right. Bounds, 430 U.S at 828. A prisoner must allege prejudice arising from the lack of a sufficient law library or his legal files; that these alleged violations actually hindered his efforts to pursue his legal claims or defenses. Casey, 518
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