Stanley Svea Coal & Oil Co. v. Willimantic Sav. & Loan Ass'n

• Decision Date: 21 March 1962
• Docket Number: No. 2684,2684
• Citation: 23 Conn.Supp. 329,183 A.2d 285
• Court: Connecticut Court of Common Pleas
• Parties: STANLEY SVEA COAL AND OIL COMPANY, Inc. v. WILLIMANTIC SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION et al.

Page 285

183 A.2d 285

23 Conn.Supp. 329

STANLEY SVEA COAL AND OIL COMPANY, Inc. v. WILLIMANTIC SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION et al.

No. 2684.

Court of Common Pleas of Connecticut, Tolland County.

March 21, 1962.

Dworski & Shurberg, New Britain, for plaintiff.

Gaucher & Gaucher, Willimantic, for named defendant.

Butler, Volpe, Garrity & Sacco, Manchester, for defendants Bert G. and Judith L. Wright.

LUGG, Judge.

For the purposes of this decision the pertinent facts are as follows. On 19 June 1959 the plaintiff perfected its mechanic's lien on the premises here involved by filing a certificate thereof in the town clerk's office. Previously, on 2 June 1959, the defendants Wright had acquired title to the property, their grantor being Delta Properties Inc., who had employed the plaintiff for the services and materials which were the subject of the lien. This action to foreclose that lien was commenced 9 June 1961.

The relevant statute is § 49-39 of the General Statutes, which is as follows: 'Limitation of mechanic's lien. No mechanic's lien shall continue in force for a longer period than two years after such lien has been perfected, unless the party claiming such lien, within said period, commences an action to foreclose the same and proceeds therewith to final judgment. Each such lien, after the expiration of two years without action commenced, shall be discharged of record by the person claiming the same, upon the request of the owner of the property upon which the lien had been claimed.' The motion of the defendants Wright to erase the action for lack of jurisdiction is based on the claim that the quoted section requires that action to be reduced to judgment within two years.

The decision hence turns on the narrow issue whether the words in the statute 'within said period,' i. e. two years, modify not only 'commences an action to foreclose the same' but also 'proceeds therewith to final judgment.' The point thus stated has not been decided in the cases which have construed this section. Obviously, the action must be commenced within two years after perfection of the lien. Persky v. Puglisi, 101 Conn. 658, 666, 127 A. 351 (1925). Whether it must be reduced to final judgment within that period is another matter. The parties are, of course, opposed in their construction of this point.

'To decide between these conflicting claims, the court is called upon to determine the intent of the legislation.' Toll Gate Farms, Inc. v. Milk Regulation Board, 148 Conn. 341, 343, 170 A.2d 883, 885 (1961). The fundamental rule for the construction of statutes is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Wilson v. Miller, 144 Conn. 212, 214, 128 A.2d 894 (1957). In so doing, 'courts look not only to the wording of the legislation but also to its legislative history.' Toll Gate Farms, Inc. v. Milk Regulation Board, supra, 344; Muller v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 145 Conn. 325, 329, 142 A.2d 524 (1958); Wilson v. Miller, supra.

The quoted statute originally appeared as chapter 148 of the Public Acts of 1881. It then read: 'Section 1. No mechanics' lien shall continue in force for a longer period than two years after such lien has been perfected * * * unless the party claiming such lien shall, within said two years, commence an action to foreclose the same, and proceed therewith to final judgment. Sec. 2. Every such lien after the expiration of such two years without action commenced, shall be discharged of record by the person claiming the same, upon the request of the owner of the property upon which the lien had been claimed. * * *' Note the comma separating the phrase 'commence an action to foreclose the same' from 'and proceed therewith to final judgment.' In virtually this form, it appears as § 3030 of the 1888 revision; § 4148 of the 1902 revision; and § 5231 of the 1918 revision. As reprinted in § 5118 of the 1930 revision, the section is the same, save in one vital respect, namely, that the determinative comma is omitted, as it was in § 7223 of the 1949 revision and in § 49-39 of the 1958 revision, where the section took its present form, quoted above.

There being no amendatory acts relative to this section since the original 1881 enactment, it appears that any changes were revisers' variations. From the language of the statute as it was in its inception, i. e., including the comma, it is obvious that the present phrase 'within said period' qualified only the commencement of the action and not the proceeding to final judgment. Hence the legislative intent is completely...