Stanley v. Airgas-Southwest, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 May 2017
• Docket Number: 2016 CA 0461
• Citation: Stanley v. Airgas-Sw., Inc., 2016 CA 0461 (La. App. May 04, 2017)
• Parties: TRUMAN STANLEY, III v. AIRGAS-SOUTHWEST, INC., PRAXAIR, INC., GULF COAST HYDROSTATIC TESTERS, LLC, ENGINEERED CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, AND T.H. LABORATORIES, LTD.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana

TRUMAN STANLEY, III v. AIRGAS-SOUTHWEST, INC., PRAXAIR, INC.,GULF COAST HYDROSTATIC TESTERS, LLC,ENGINEERED CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL, LLC,AND T.H. LABORATORIES, LTD.

2016 CA 0461

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT

May 4, 2017

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

On Appeal from the Twenty-Third Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Ascension State of Louisiana

No. 104,043

Honorable Jessie M. LeBlanc, Judge Presiding

Robert E. Kleinpeter

Jay G. McMains

Hester R. Dornan

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

and

Joseph E. Ritch

Corpus Christi, Texas

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Truman Stanley, III

William B. Gaudet

Robert L. Bonnaffons

Raymond P. Ward

Jennifer L. Barriere

New Orleans, Louisiana

and

R. Ryland Percy, III

Gonzales, Louisiana

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Airgas, Inc.

BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUIDRY, AND McCLENDON, JJ.

McCLENDON, J.

The plaintiff appeals a trial court judgment finding a defendant parent company immune from tort liability. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 20, 2011, the plaintiff, Truman Stanley, III, suffered a traumatic workplace injury at the place of his employment with Airgas USA, LLC (Airgas USA),¹ when a defective oxygen cylinder exploded as it was being refilled, sending large steel fragments through the air and tragically severing Mr. Stanley's right arm below the elbow.

On June 19, 2012, Mr. Stanley filed a personal injury lawsuit seeking tort recovery against Airgas USA and several other parties.² He later amended his petition to allege a claim against Airgas USA's parent company, Airgas, Inc. (Airgas Inc.), asserting that Airgas Inc. developed, implemented, trained, audited, and insured compliance with the safety policies and procedures at the Geismar facility where the accident occurred. Mr. Stanley further alleged that Airgas Inc., by and through its employees and departments, provided and explained instructional materials to Airgas USA, pertaining to policies, procedures, and safety, as well as provided pre-employment training to the employees of Airgas USA. Mr. Stanley alleged that the policies and procedures, instructional materials, and pre-employment training were wholly inadequate, substandard, flawed, led to an unsafe workplace, and failed to ensure the safety of the workers in the workplace, therefore causing the injuries and damages sustained by Mr. Stanley and rendering Airgas Inc. liable in tort.

Airgas Inc. responded by moving for summary judgment arguing that, as a principal and sole stockholder of Airgas USA, it is immune from tort liability under the exclusive-remedy provision of the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act. Airgas Inc. also asserted that it was entitled to summary judgment because it did not affirmatively undertake and supplant its subsidiary's duty to provide a safe working environment. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment on September 24, 2015, in favor of Airgas Inc., finding that Airgas Inc. was entitled to tort immunity under LSA-R.S. 23:1032A³ and dismissing all claims against Airgas Inc. with prejudice.

Mr. Stanley appealed the trial court judgment, asserting that the trial court erred in finding Airgas Inc. immune from tort liability under Louisiana's workers' compensation law. Airgas Inc. answered the appeal, seeking to strike the affidavit of Richard L. Miller, submitted in opposition to Airgas Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. However, because Airgas Inc. has failed to brief this issue, this claim is deemed abandoned. See Uniform Rules - Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4; Freeman v. Medical Systems, Inc., 08-2372, p. 2 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/4/09) (unpublished); Carson v. Witty, 471 So.2d 1003, 1004 n.1 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, show there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966B(2)⁴; Tomaso v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 14-1467 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/5/15), 174 So.3d 679, 681. The summary judgment procedure is favored and is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966A(2). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Fournerat v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 11-1344 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/21/12), 104 So.3d 76, 80, writ denied, 12-2148 (La. 11/21/12), 102 So.3d 59.

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. In re Succession of Beard, 13-1717 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/6/14), 147 So.3d 753, 759-60. Because the applicable substantive law determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Jackson v. City of New Orleans, 12-2742, 12-2743 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d 876, 882.

DISCUSSION

In his appeal, Mr. Stanley seeks to avoid the exclusive remedy set forth in LSA-R.S. 23:1032. He initially argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding Airgas Inc. immune from tort liability as a "principal" and "stockholder" based solely on Airgas Inc.'s status as the parent corporation of Mr. Stanley's employer, Airgas USA. He asserts that stockholder immunity applies only when the stockholder causes injury through acts that are in the normal scope of the stockholder's duties, and the creation and implementation of safety rules are not within the normal course and scope of Airgas Inc.'s stockholder duties.⁵ See LSA-R.S. 23:1032C(1). To the contrary, Airgas Inc. maintains that, as a matter of law, providing a safe workplace is within the course and scope of every employer's business, and if Airgas Inc. stepped into the shoes of Airgas USA to perform these duties, then Airgas Inc., as Airgas USA's stockholder, has the same tort immunity as Airgas USA.

Because Airgas Inc. was seeking to avail itself of the immunity from tort liability granted under the Workers' Compensation Act, it had the burden of proving entitlement to such immunity. See Champagne v. American Alternative Ins. Corp., 12-1697 (La. 3/19/13), 112 So.3d 179, 182-83. Additionally, Airgas Inc. filed for summary judgment on the issue of statutory immunity and thus had the burden of proof on the motion for summary judgment, as well as the burden of proof on the issue of immunity. Id; LSA-C.C.P. art. 966D.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 sets forth the "[e]xclusiveness of rights and remedies" under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act and provides, as follows:

A. (1)(a) Except for intentional acts provided for in Subsection B, the rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account of an injury, or compensable sickness or disease for which he is entitled to compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights, remedies, and claims for damages, including but not limited to punitive or exemplary damages, unless such rights, remedies, and damages are created by a statute, whether now existing or created in the future, expressly establishing same as available to such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or relations, as against his employer, or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal, for said injury, or compensable sickness or disease.

(b) This exclusive remedy is exclusive of all claims, including any claims that might arise against his employer, or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal under any dual capacity theory or doctrine.

(2) For purposes of this Section, the word "principal" shall be defined as any person who undertakes to execute any work which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the injury, or which he had contracted to perform and contracts with any person for the execution thereof.

B. Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer, or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal to a fine or penalty under any other statute or the liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an intentional act.

C. The immunity from civil liability provided by this Section shall not extend to:

(1) Any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal who is not engaged at the time of the injury in the normal course and scope of his employment; and

(2) To the liability of any partner in a partnership which has been formed for the purpose of evading any of the provisions of this Section.

The exclusiveness provision of LSA-R.S. 23:1032A(1) extends not only to direct employers, but also to "any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal." Immune parties are the employer and those who may stand in the employer's shoes, so to speak, due to their relationship under which they must act on behalf of the employer. Brown v. Adair, 02-2028 (La. 4/9/03), 846 So.2d 687, 689. Further, the tort immunity provided by the Workers' Compensation Act operates as an affirmative defense; it is not a law evaluating conditions of legality of defendant's conduct but, rather, serves as a vehicle for asserting a substantive defense that defeats an otherwise viable claim. Those which are specifically named in LSA-R.S. 23:1032 may assert this defense. Brown, 846 So.2d at 690. The immunity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act derogate from the delictual rights of injured workers existing in the Louisiana Civil Code and,...