Stanley v. COMMISSIONERS, US CIVIL SERV. COM'N

• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
• Writing for the Court: Judith M. Strong, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for defendants
• Citation: Stanley v. COMMISSIONERS, US CIVIL SERV. COM'N, 505 F. Supp. 63 (W.D. Mo. 1980)
• Decision Date: 08 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 78-0387-CV-W-5.,78-0387-CV-W-5.
• Parties: Leo E. STANLEY, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONERS, U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary, Health and Human Services, Defendants.

505 F. Supp. 63

Leo E. STANLEY, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONERS, U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary, Health and Human Services, Defendants.

No. 78-0387-CV-W-5.

United States District Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D.

December 8, 1980.

Galen Beaufort, Legal Aid of Missouri, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

Judith M. Strong, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for defendants.

ORDER

SCOTT O. WRIGHT, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Leo E. Stanley, has petitioned this Court to review the decision of the United States Civil Service Commission denying his request for reinstatement as a Records Analyst Clerk with the Social Security Administration of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services). The plaintiff states in his petition that the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 through 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The defendants have moved for dismissal of this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. For the reasons stated, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied, and defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

FACTS

The plaintiff was a Records Analyst Clerk with the Social Security Administration. During 1976, he began experiencing difficulties in his employment situation. After a number of conferences with his supervisors, plaintiff received a 90-day notice of unsatisfactory performance dated January 21, 1977. Following a short absence from duty, plaintiff telephoned his resignation to the Agency on February 8, 1977. Later that same day, the Agency called plaintiff to determine the effective date of his resignation. Plaintiff's supervisor suggested an effective date of February 4, 1977 because that was the last date plaintiff had been to work and because it would simplify bookkeeping. Plaintiff agreed to designate February 4, 1977 as the effective date of his resignation. On February 9, 1977, the plaintiff attempted to withdraw his resignation. The Agency agreed to consider plaintiff's withdrawal, provided he obtain medical evidence to show that he was not capable of making a rational decision to resign. Plaintiff never provided this evidence to the Agency. On February 23, 1977, plaintiff called the Agency and requested the Agency to consider his earlier resignation effective. On February 28, 1977, plaintiff wrote a letter to the Agency which confirmed and restated his earlier resignation.

By letter dated April 24, 1977, the plaintiff appealed for reinstatement to the Federal Employee Appeals Authority (FEAA) of the Civil Service Commission. On June 16, 1977, the FEAA concluded that the plaintiff had voluntarily resigned and denied his appeal for reinstatement. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Commission's Appeals Review Board, which on October 4, 1977 denied his request to reopen the case. The plaintiff then sought to have his case reopened and reviewed by the Commissioners. This request was denied on November 8, 1977, and the plaintiff filed this suit seeking judicial review of the FEAA's decision.

JURISDICTION

The defendants argue that under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over this action because plaintiff's incidental claim for back wages involves a claim for money damages against the United States in excess of $10,000. In support of their argument, defendants cite Polos v. United States, 556 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1977), in which the Eighth Circuit held that when an action for review of an administrative decision is essentially a claim against the United States for the payment of money damages in excess of $10,000, the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction.

Plaintiff argues that his claim is essentially one for reinstatement rather than money damages, and, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit. Plaintiff's argument was accepted by the Eighth Circuit in its recent opinion, Giordano v. Roudebush, 617 F.2d 511, 515 (8th Cir. 1980). In Giordano, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Polos on the basis that the plaintiff's claims in Giordano were primarily nonmonetary, even though his incidental claim for back wages would exceed $10,000. The Court indicated that it would be proper for the district court to transfer the monetary claim to the Court of Claims, while retaining jurisdiction over all equitable claims.

Jurisdiction over the issue of reinstatement properly lies with this Court, and defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. The transfer of plaintiff's monetary claim to the Court of Claims is unnecessary in this instance because this Court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement, and, therefore, he is not entitled to back wages.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The standard for judicial review of an administrative action was set forth in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). A reviewing court must set aside an agency action if the action was "`arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' or if the action failed to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements ... or if the action was...