Stanley v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 16 December 2014
• Docket Number: Record No. 0652-13-3
• Parties: TRAVIS DEON STANLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia

TRAVIS DEON STANLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 0652-13-3

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

DECEMBER 16, 2014

UNPUBLISHED

Present: Judges Petty, Huff and Senior Judge Annunziata Argued at Lexington, Virginia

MEMORANDUM OPINION^* BY JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE

G. Carter Greer, Judge

Caitlin Reynolds-Vivanco, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Travis Deon Stanley, appellant, appeals his convictions for grand larceny from the person, malicious wounding, abduction, and conspiracy to commit robbery. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred "by denying [his] motion to question an empanelled juror about her relationship with the alleged victim in the case after the juror notified a bailiff that she knew the alleged victim" and by denying the motion for a mistrial based on the same grounds. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

"On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)).

At the beginning of the jury trial on the offenses charged, the trial court explained the jury selection process to the venire, stating that the procedure is designed to determine whether there is any reason why any potential juror should not serve on the jury. The trial court "ask[ed] that [the venire] pay attention as the clerk read[] the list of witnesses who [were] expected to testify." The trial transcript states, "CLERK READS LIST OF WITNESSES." At oral argument, appellant's counsel acknowledged that Saunders' name was on the witness list. The record does not indicate that any potential jurors reacted to this list. The trial court did not ask if any of the venire knew or recognized the names of any of the witnesses.

The trial court then asked a series of questions to the entire venire with this explanation: "If you do not raise your hand [to indicate a question applies to you], then the court will assume that the question does not apply to you." Among other inquiries, the trial court asked:

• "Do any of you know or are any of you related by blood or marriage to the defendant, Mr. Stanley?

• "Are any of you friends, clients, or former clients of either of the [d]efense attorneys . . . or former clients of any staff member of the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office . . . ?"

• "Have you expressed or formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant?"

• "Are you aware of any bias or prejudice that you may have for or against the Commonwealth or the accused?"

• "Do you understand that the defendant is presumed to be innocent?"

• "Do you understand that the Commonwealth must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?"

• "[D]o you know of any reason whatsoever why you cannot give a fair and impartial trial to both the Commonwealth and the defendant based solely on the law and evidence?"

No affirmative responses were given.

The trial court also allowed the prosecutor and defense counsel to question the venire. Neither party specifically asked if any potential juror knew or had any relationship with any of the witnesses who were to testify in the case. However, defense counsel asked several questions designed to elicit any bias for or against a victim of a criminal offense or for or against a defendant, viz.,:

• "Has anyone here been a victim of a violent crime or have you known anyone, someone close to you that was a victim of a violent crime?"

• "Would anyone in here believe a victim based on their testimony just because they were a victim?"

• "Would anyone in here just not believe the defendant at all based off the victim's testimony or just because he's the defendant today?"

No affirmative responses were elicited from this series of questions.

The parties exercised their peremptory strikes, and the jurors for the trial were empaneled and sworn. Shortly thereafter and before opening statements, the court recessed and brought counsel for the parties to the court's conference room where the trial court reported an issue involving a juror that had been brought to his attention. The trial court stated, "[J]ust moments ago the bailiff brought it to the court's attention that as the jury was being excused, one of the jurors mentioned that she knows a witness, and I am told that that is a material witness for the Commonwealth." During the colloquy that followed, it became known that the material witness at issue was the victim, Marcquise Saunders. The Commonwealth's Attorney stated she would object to releasing the jury because "there is nothing to say that [the juror] is bias[ed] for or against." Defense counsel requested the opportunity to question the juror further, explaining

the court had asked her whether there was any reason why she could not be impartial and she said, "No" at the time. Then we come later to find out that she knows one of the material witnesses for the Commonwealth's case so we're asking that she be questioned further about the bias.

The Commonwealth's Attorney raised no objection to the defense request. However, in response to defense counsel's request, the trial court noted that the jury had been sworn and appellant was in jeopardy. Continuing, the trial court noted it did "not recall any question being asked that would have required [the juror] in good faith to respond that she knew this particular witness." The trial court also pointed out that it had not asked if any of the potential jurors "knew any of the witnesses" and, although it asked the jury "to pay attention to the list of witnesses that w[as] read by the clerk," it "typically leaves it up to the attorneys to follow up on that if there are any questions." The trial court denied the defense motion stating, "Since there was no question in which [in] the court's view would have required [the juror] to respond that she knew or knows Mr. Saunders, then the court doesn't see any basis to call her back at this point." Appellant's counsel noted his objection for the record and moved for a mistrial, proffering no new grounds. The trial court denied the motion "[f]or the same reasons," finding no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial.

Two months later, at the sentencing hearing, appellant's counsel requested a continuance in order to research the issue "concerning a juror, who after the jury panel was sworn, . . . then realized that she knew the victim in the case." Counsel stated he needed the opportunity to have an investigator speak with the juror and "determine whether the fact that she knew that victim didn't bias her decision during the trial." The Commonwealth opposed a continuance, stating appellant had the opportunity to explore the matter previously. The prosecutor also stated that, based on a conversation with the bailiff who was working at the trial, she understood the juror "merely recognized one of the witnesses."

The trial court recalled that "the precise statement made by the juror was something to the effect that she recognized a victim or the victim" and it pointed out that no question was asked during voir dire as to whether any of the prospective jurors recognized the victim. Thetrial court recalled it had denied appellant's motion for a mistrial on the basis that "the jury had been fairly impaneled and that we had a fair and impartial panel." The trial court denied the motion for continuance, ruling that the testimony of the juror would not be admissible in order to impeach the verdict.

Appellant appeals to this Court the trial court's denial of his motion to examine the juror and the denial of his motion for a mistrial.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

When a challenge to a juror's impartiality arises midtrial, we "'will reverse the trial court's decision only for an abuse of discretion,' applying the 'same standard' of review appropriate to appellate consideration of a decision to seat a venireperson." Nelson v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 716, 731, 589 S.E.2d 23, 30-31 (2003) (quoting Green v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 394, 401, 494 S.E.2d 888, 891 (1998)), aff'd, 268 Va. 665, 604 S.E.2d 76 (2004).

A party has no right, statutory or otherwise, to propound any question he wishes, or to extend voir dire questioning ad infinitum. The court must afford a party a full and fair opportunity to ascertain whether prospective jurors "stand indifferent in the cause," but the trial judge retains the discretion to determine when the parties have had sufficient opportunity to do so.

LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983).

Similarly, a ruling on a motion for a mistrial will stand unless the trial court abuses its discretion. See Haddad v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 325, 330, 329 S.E.2d 17, 20 (1985) (recognizing that the trial court is bound by "the exercise of a sound discretion").

A court abuses its discretion "when a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those factors, commits a clear error of judgment."

Turner v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 198, 206, 726 S.E.2d 325, 329 (2012) (quoting Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2011)).

"In evaluating whether a trial court abused its discretion . . . 'we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Rather, we consider only whether the record fairly supports the trial court's action.'" Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009) (quoting Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 385, 484 S.E.2d 898, 906 (1997)).

III. ...