Stanley v. Darlington County School Dist., Civil A. No. 4:62-7749-22.

Decision Date22 February 1996
Docket NumberCivil A. No. 4:62-7749-22.
Citation915 F. Supp. 764
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
PartiesTheodore Whitmore STANLEY, Jesse Barber, Joyce Franklin, J.W. Mack, et al., Plaintiffs, United States of America, Intervenor-Plaintiff, v. DARLINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Public Body Corporate; The State of South Carolina; The Department of Education for the State of South Carolina; the Board of Education for the State of South Carolina; William P. Beckham, III, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Samuel M. Greer, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Joseph Peeler Stabler, Colonel, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Cleveland L. Sellars, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Austin Floyd, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Julian B. Wright, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Brenda K. Vernon, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Earl Bostick, Sr., In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Maxie Duke, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Laura M. Fleming, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Frank M. Hart, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Beth Pinson, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; W. Gregory Horton, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Robert W. Owen, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Ruby Matthews, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Celia Gettys, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Thomas E. McInville, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; David M. Beasley, in his Official Capacity as Governor of the State of South Carolina and as Chairman of the State Budget and Control Board; and Barbara S. Nielsen, in her Official Capacity as State Superintendent of Education for the State of South Carolina; The State Budget and Control Board for the State of South Carolina; Grady L. Patterson, Jr., Earle E. Morris, James M. Waddell, Jr., and William D. Boan, In Their Official Capacities as Members of the State Budget and Control Board for the State of South Carolina, Defendants. DARLINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Cross-Claimant, v. The STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; the Department of Education for State of South Carolina; William P. Beckman, III, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Samuel M. Greer, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Joseph Peeler Stabler, Colonel, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Cleveland L. Sellars; In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Austin Floyd, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Julian B. Wright, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Brenda K. Vernon, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Earl Bostick, Sr., In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Maxie Duke, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Laura M. Fleming, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Frank M. Hart, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Beth Pinson, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; W. Gregory Horton, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Ruby Matthews, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Robert W. Owen, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Celia Gettys, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; Thomas E. McInville, In Official Capacity as Member of the State Board of Education; David M. Beasley, in his Official Capacity as Governor of the State of South Carolina and as Chairman of the State Budget and Control Board; Barbara S. Nielsen, in her Official Capacity as State Superintendent of Education for the State of South Carolina, Cross-Defendants.

Gary Haugen, Michael S. Maurer, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Rights Div., Washington, DC, for U.S.

Dennis D. Parker, N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., New York City, Arthur C. McFarland, Charleston, SC, for class plaintiffs.

State of S.C., J. Emory Smith, Jr., Office of Atty. Gen., Columbia, SC, for State of S.C. and all State defendants except State Dept. of Educ.

George C. Leventis, Office of General Counsel, Columbia, SC, for State of S.C. Dept. of Educ.

John M. Milling, Darlington, SC, Alfred A. Lindseth, Sutherland, Asbill and Brennan, Atlanta, GA, for defendant, Darlington County School Dist.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

CURRIE, District Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 3, 1994, the parties entered into a Consent Order stipulating, among other things, that Mayo High School was a racially identifiable school and a vestige of the prior dual school system in the Darlington County School District and that remedial measures were needed. Consent Order at 2 (6/3/94). Under the Consent Order, Mayo and St. John's High Schools were to be consolidated on the St. John's campus into Darlington High School beginning with the 1995-96 school year. After a two-week trial on the question of the future status of Mayo High School, this court, on June 23, 1994, issued a preliminary order finding that "(1) a desegregation remedy which simply closes the Mayo High School facility places a disproportionate share of the burden of desegregation on the black community; and (2) the most appropriate manner in which to share the burdens of desegregation and to remedy the racial stigma suffered by the Mayo community is to establish a county-wide, dedicated magnet school for grades nine through twelve at the Mayo High School to be named `Mayo School.'" Order at 1-2 (6/23/94).1

On March 1, 1995, this court set forth detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, holding in part that the District had engaged in widespread discriminatory activities against the Mayo community and had "stigmatized Mayo as an inferior black school." Stanley and United States v. Darlington County Sch. Dist., 879 F.Supp. 1341, 1377 (D.S.C.1995). This court found, for example, that the District had "carved out an exception to its own attendance zone lines" to allow white children in the Country Club area to avoid the Mayo attendance zone, id. at 1375-76; failed to enforce its own attendance zone lines, particularly for white students attempting to avoid historically black schools, id. at 1376-77; assigned a disproportionate number of black teachers, administrators and support staff to Mayo, id. at 1381-82; assigned a disproportionate number of less competent or problem teachers to Mayo, id. at 1381; allowed "dramatic deterioration" in Mayo's physical plant, id. at 1375; failed to provide adequate and comparable resources for Mayo (computers, textbooks, and library materials), id. at 1375, 1377-79; at times failed to provide Mayo students the same curriculum offered to other District high school students, id. at 1379-81; and at times failed to provide basic maintenance needs for Mayo, id. at 1377.

This court then fashioned a remedy to redress these specific constitutional violations, ordering the District to implement a dedicated magnet program at the Mayo facility, "to be named `Mayo School', to further desegregate the District, remedy past stigma and injury, and equitably distribute the burdens of desegregation." Id. at 1389. This court noted that the magnet school "will be just one tool used to remove the vestiges of the dual system in Darlington County, and will supplement the other remedial measures set forth in the June 3, 1994 Consent Order...." Id.

There was no appeal filed from this court's order requiring the District to establish a magnet school at Mayo.2 Thus, the parties agree that a magnet school is to be established for the purposes of further desegregating the District, remedying past stigma and injury, and equitably distributing the burdens of desegregation.

In keeping with these goals, this court ordered the District to file "a magnet proposal, including but not limited to ... projected enrollment, by race and area of residence; .... and proposed criteria for selection to the magnet program that insure that selections will not have a disparate impact on black students or on the desegregation of the county's other high schools...." Id. This court further ordered that the District file, among other things, data showing the race and residence area of every participating student; the number of applicants, by race and residence area; and the selection criteria and results. Id. at 1390.

At a hearing held April 27, 1995, on the District's motion to delay implementation of the magnet school for one year, this court reiterated the need for and purpose of the magnet school. This court stated that the magnet is intended "to remedy the stigma that has been caused by the many years of action and inaction that has been suffered by Mayo." TR at 8, 20 (4/27/95). At the same hearing, counsel for the United States stated that the District's proposed selection criteria that were to be submitted to the U.S. Department of Education had only recently been provided to counsel and that more time would be needed to review them. The United States wished to insure that the selection criteria served to remedy the unlawful discrimination found by this court. After suggesting some minor modifications, the United States subsequently approved the District's proposed selection and admission process that included, as stated in the proposal, a 50/50 student racial composition requirement hereinafter "District's 50/50 plan" and a reservation of ten seats per grade level for students from...

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