Stanley v. McSwain
| Decision Date | 03 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:13 CV 1760 RWS (ACL) |
| Parties | ROLLAN STANLEY, Petitioner, v. ELLIS McSWAIN, JR., Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
ROLLAN STANLEY, Petitioner,
v.
ELLIS McSWAIN, JR.,1 Respondent.
Case No. 4:13 CV 1760 RWS (ACL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION
August 3, 2016
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on the Petition of Rollan Stanley for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This cause was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b).
At the time of the filing of the Petition, Stanley was incarcerated at Boonville Correctional Center in Boonville, Missouri, pursuant to the Sentence and Judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri. (Respt's Ex. B at 55-58.)
On April 15, 2009, a jury found Stanley guilty of one count of first degree burglary, and one count of misdemeanor stealing. (Respt's Ex. A at 245.) The court sentenced Stanley as a prior and persistent offender to fifteen years imprisonment for the burglary count, and to time served for the misdemeanor stealing count. (Respt's Ex. B at 56.)
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In his single point on direct appeal of his convictions, Stanley argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for burglary in the first degree. (Respt's Ex. C.) On September 28, 2010, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed Stanley's convictions. (Respt's Ex. E.)
Stanley filed a timely motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15. (Respt's Ex. F at 3-10.) After appointment of counsel, an amended post-conviction relief motion and request for evidentiary hearing was filed. Id. at 15-32. The amended motion alleged the following ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) trial counsel failed to investigate the scene of the crime; (2) trial counsel refused to permit Stanley to participate in jury selection; (3) trial counsel failed to investigate and call as a witness a detective whose name is unknown; (4) appellate counsel failed to raise a point on direct appeal that the trial court erred in admitting State's Exhibit 2; (5) appellate counsel failed to raise a sufficiency point based on the theory of destructive contradictions; and (6) trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress Stanley's statement. Id. The motion court denied Stanley's amended motion and his request for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 33-41.
In his sole point on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Stanley argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the scene of the crime. (Respt's Ex. G.) The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the motion court. (Respt's Ex. I)
Stanley filed the instant Petition on September 3, 2013. (Doc. 1.) Although Stanley lists three grounds for relief, he alleges four additional sub-claims within these grounds for relief. Stanley's combined claims are as follows:2 (1) Ground One (labeled Ground One): he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate the crime scene; (2)
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Ground Two (sub-claim of Ground One): he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate any witnesses; (3) Ground Three (sub-claim of Ground One): he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel filed a motion to suppress without arguing his statements contained prior bad acts; (4) Ground Four (sub-claim of Ground One): he received ineffective assistance of counsel because appellate counsel failed to raise a sufficiency of the evidence argument under a theory of destructive contradictions; (5) Ground Five (labeled Ground Two): the trial court erred in admitting Exhibit 2; (6) Ground Six (labeled Ground Three): there was insufficient evidence presented to support the verdict as to the burglary in the first degree charge; and (7) Ground Seven (sub-claim of Ground Three): he was not allowed to participate in the jury selection procedure, which violated his right to a fair and impartial jury. (Doc. 1.)
On November 1, 2013, Respondent filed a Response to Order to Show Cause, in which he argues that five of Stanley's seven grounds for relief are procedurally defaulted, and all of Stanley's claims fail on their merits. (Doc. 9.) Stanley has filed a Traverse, in which he provides further argument in support of his claims. (Doc. 12.)
Timothy Stilwell ("Stilwell") is the manager of American Pulverizer Company at its facility on Macklind Avenue in the City of St. Louis. On March 14, 2008, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Stilwell checked and locked the warehouse behind the office. The shipping and receiving business located in the warehouse closed at 3:30 p.m., but the office was open until 5:00 p.m.
At about 3:45 p.m., Stilwell saw Stanley in the warehouse. He approached Stanley and saw what he believed was the company's air nailer sticking out from Stanley's bag. Stillwell removed the air nailer from Stanley's bag and asked Stanley where he had gotten the item.
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Stanley pointed to the shelf where the air nailer was usually kept. Stilwell noticed that the company's air nailer was missing from the shelf, and he called the police.
Officer Clark responded to the call. After talking with Stilwell, Officer Clark placed Stanley under arrest for burglary first-degree and read him his Miranda rights. Stanley told Officer Clark that he was out of work and was planning to sell the air nailer to a pawn shop. At the police station, Detective Funk interviewed Stanley, after again advising him of his Miranda rights. Stanley waived his rights and made a written statement admitting to the burglary.
Stanley's signed statement provides as follows:
"I, Rollan Stanley, want to make the following statement: A business off of Manchester I remove a airgun. I plan on selling at a pawn shop. I have frequently entered businesses an remove tools from them to sell at pawn shop. I have frequently done this in order to get money to buy clothes to sell. This is usually done on the South side of St. Louis."
(Doc. 12-4 at p. 2.)
A federal court's power to grant a writ of habeas corpus is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
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The Supreme Court construed Section 2254(d) in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). With respect to the "contrary to" language, a majority of the Court held that a state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law" or if the state court "decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 405. Under the "unreasonable application" prong of § 2254(d)(1), a writ may issue if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme Court's] cases but unreasonably applies [the principle] to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case." Id. Thus, "a federal habeas court making the 'unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 410. Although the Court failed to specifically define "objectively unreasonable," it observed that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Id. at 410.
Respondent contends that Grounds Two, Three, Four, Five, and Seven are procedurally defaulted. Respondent states that Stanley properly exhausted Grounds One and Six.
To avoid defaulting on a claim, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review must have fairly presented the substance of the claim to the state courts, thereby affording the state courts a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing on the claim. Wemark v. Iowa, 322 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (per curiam) and Anderson v. Groose, 106 F.3d 242, 245 (8th Cir. 1997)). Specifically, a state prisoner must fairly present each of his claims in each appropriate state court before seeking federal habeas review of the claim. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). A claim has been fairly presented when a petitioner
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has properly raised the same factual grounds and legal theories in the state courts that he is attempting to raise in his federal petition. Wemark, 322 F.3d at 1021 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1240 (8th Cir. 1996)). Claims that are not fairly presented to the state courts are procedurally defaulted. See id. at 1022.
In cases of procedural default, federal courts are barred from reaching the merits of the defaulted ground absent a showing of both 'cause' and 'actual prejudice' resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). A petitioner must "show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel [or petitioner's] efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule" in order to show "cause" for procedural default. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). "Cause" can be demonstrated by either "a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel" or by a showing that interference...
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