Stanley v. Smith, 6:16-CV-264-REW-HAI
| Decision Date | 30 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 6:16-CV-264-REW-HAI,6:16-CV-264-REW-HAI |
| Parties | BILL STANLEY, Administrator of the Estate of Brandon Stanley, Plaintiff, v. BOBBY JOE SMITH, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
This case is about a constable that ignored the peace aspect of being a peace officer. Kentucky's Constitution requires the elective position of county constable, and the General Assembly regulates the duties of the office. Constables are long on power but short on required training and qualifications. State law makes the constable a "peace officer," with resultant authorities, but does not require the certification and training most other such Kentucky officers mandatorily undergo. In March 2016, Bobby Joe Smith, a constable elected in Laurel County, tried to arrest Brandon Stanley at an East Bernstadt convenience store. Stanley, on bond and evidently awaiting state sentencing, had failure-to-appear warrants and had recently run from Smith after a traffic stop. The tragic store encounter, days later, resulted in Smith shooting the unarmed Stanley to death in the front aisle of the crowded A&B Market. This Court is the second to have a say in the events. Previously, a Laurel Circuit jury convicted Smith of reckless homicide in the death of Stanley, and the Laurel Circuit Court sent Smith to prison for the felony. The state jury's verdict gets respect here and goes far in resolving this case, a constitutional and state tort action by Stanley's estate against Smith and the Laurel judge-executive.
Each party seeks summary judgment. Plaintiff Stanley1 seeks "partial" summary judgment, moving the court to preclude Defendant Smith, the former Laurel County constable, from denying his state reckless-homicide conviction and liability for Brandon's wrongful death. DE 69. Defendant Westerfield, Laurel County's judge-executive, having previously prevailed on several claims at the 12(b)(6) stage, see DE 25 (Order), now moves the Court for summary judgment on the two remaining claims against him: the § 1983 official-capacity claim and the state-law personal-capacity claims based on a failure to supervise or train. DE 67. Defendant Smith seeks summary judgment on all2 claims against him, which include personal- and official-capacity § 1983 claims based on excessive force, Kentucky constitutional claims, a state-law wrongful-death claim, and a punitive-damages claim. DE 71. Westerfield argues that, as a constitutionally elected position, a constable answers to no one other than his constituents, and that the County Executive has no ability, and thus no duty, to supervise or train the office. Smith focuses his efforts on arguing that his conduct did not violate an established right. Both Defendants also argue various applications of immunity.
As a matter of housekeeping, the Court acknowledges the disagreement between Stanley and Smith regarding the propriety of Smith's surreply (and Stanley's reply to the surreply). DE 100; DE 101; DE 103; DE 105; DE 106. "Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do notexpressly permit the filing of surreplies, such filings may be allowed in the appropriate circumstances, especially '[w]hen new submissions and/or arguments are included in a reply brief, and a nonmovant's ability to respond to the new evidence has been vitiated.'" Key v. Shelby Cty., 551 F. App'x 262, 265 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Seay v. TVA, 339 F.3d 454, 481 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, Stanley acknowledges that his offensive motion lacks record citations, and he relies on documentary evidence and argument first raised in his reply. See DE 91. For example, Stanley attaches to his reply the jury instructions from Smith's criminal trial. DE 91-1. Thus, the Court considers Smith's surreply (DE 101). The Court does not allow or consider Stanley's proposed reply to Smith's surreply (DE 103), an excessive and unwarranted argument pathway.
For the following reasons, the Court grants Stanley's partial motion for summary judgment. Coupling that decision with Stanley's responses to Smith's motions, the Court grants Stanley summary judgment against Smith as to the § 1983 individual-capacity and wrongful-death claims. The Court grants Smith summary judgment on the claims under the Kentucky Constitution. The Court grants Westerfield summary judgment on the state-law individual-capacity claims (relating to supervision and training) and the § 1983 official-capacity claim. Accordingly, punitive damages are not available against Westerfield, but may be recovered—if awarded by a factfinder—against Smith.
On March 1, 2016, Brandon fled arrest by Smith, a Laurel County Constable. Three days later, Smith received a tip about Brandon's whereabouts and went to the location—the A&B Market in East Bernstadt, Kentucky—to investigate. In attempting to arrest Brandon onoutstanding warrants3 for failing to report to his probation officer in relation to a state drug-trafficking conviction, Smith ultimately shot and killed Brandon. A grand jury charged Smith with Second-Degree Manslaughter, and, after a two-day trial, a Laurel Circuit jury, in April 2017, convicted Smith of reckless homicide, a felony. DE 91-1 (Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Bobby Joe Smith, 16-CR-49). Video surveillance captured the shooting and much of the interaction, but still, the parties dispute how the events unfolded. Despite the state conviction, Smith maintains that his use of deadly force was justified. Stanley argues that it was not. He blames Smith but also Westerfield, the judge-executive, faulting his lack of oversight and control.
A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A reviewing court must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2009). Additionally, the court may not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter" at the summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact initially rests with the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (); Lindsay, 578 F.3d at 414 (). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to produce "specific facts" showing a "genuine issue" for trial. Celotex Corp., 106. S. Ct. at 2253; Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1044 (6th Cir. 1999). However, "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 2552; see also id. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ( .
A fact is "material" if the underlying substantive law identifies the fact as critical. Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2510. Thus, Id. A "genuine" issue exists if "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. at 2511; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 1356 () (citation omitted). Such evidence must be suitable for admission into evidence at trial. Salt Lick Bancorp v. FDIC, 187 F. App'x 428, 444-45 (6th Cir. 2006). In the cross-motion scenario, as here, each motion must pass through the analytical prism. The Court issues the relief justified by the record under the Rule 56 rubric.
Judge Bunning previously summarized Plaintiff's claims as follows:
DE 25 at 2-3 & n.3. After Westerfield's 12(b)(6) efforts, two claims remain against him: the § 1983 official-capacity claim and the state-law personal-capacity claims for negligent supervision and training. Id. at 20. Smith...
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