Stanley v. Southwestern Community College Merged Area (Merged Area XIV), in Counties of Adair, et al.

• Decision Date: 09 February 1971
• Docket Number: No. 54181,54181
• Citation: 184 N.W.2d 29
• Parties: Byron B. STANLEY and C. H. Mannasmith, for Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Who May Come, and Join in a Class Action, Appellants, v. SOUTHWESTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGE MERGED AREA (MERGED AREA XIV), IN the COUNTIES OF ADAIR, ET AL., State of Iowa, and Robert J. Beecher, A. Jay Gantz, Harold Condit, Austin Turner, R. D. Brown, D. E. Mitchell, W. J. Kopp and John Kolterman, Members of the Board of Directors of said Merged Area, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 29

184 N.W.2d 29

Byron B. STANLEY and C. H. Mannasmith, for Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Who May Come, and Join in a Class Action, Appellants, v. SOUTHWESTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGE MERGED AREA (MERGED AREA XIV), IN the COUNTIES OF ADAIR, ET AL., State of Iowa, and Robert J. Beecher, A. Jay Gantz, Harold Condit, Austin Turner, R. D. Brown, D. E. Mitchell, W. J. Kopp and John Kolterman, Members of the Board of Directors of said Merged Area, Appellees.

No. 54181.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 9, 1971.

G. F. Hoffman, of Hoffman, Hoffman & Stewart, Leon, for appellants.

Arnold O. Kenyon, Kenyon & Platt, Creston, for appellees.

STUART, Justice.

Plaintiffs, residents, voters and taxpayers of Southwestern Community College Merged Area, hereinafter referred to as Merged Area XIV, brought this class action in equity, including a prayer for injunctive relief, challenging the validity of an election for the issuance of bonds to construct and equip buildings for such community college. The trial court held all proceedings legal and valid and denied plaintiffs relief. Plaintiffs appeal, assigning 42 errors. We affirm. We will refer to the errors as assigned by plaintiff for clarity and consistency, although they will not necessarily be considered in the order presented on appeal. We have in some instances 'borrowed' from the trial court's opinion without acknowledging this by quotation marks.

Many of the asserted errors challenge the constitutionality of certain statutes. Others claim statutory requirements were not met. Therefore, we shall, at the outset, state the general rules which will guide our consideration.

'Regularly-enacted statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and courts exercise the power to declare such legislation unconstitutional with great caution. It is only when such conclusion is unavoidable that we do so.' Goreham v. Des Moines Met. Area Solid Waste Agency (Iowa, 1970), 179 N.W.2d 449, 455, and citations.

The result of a school election is presumptively valid. Mere irregularities in the conduct of an election do not affect the result, but substantial material defects are fatal. It is the duty of the court to sustain an election if it has been so conducted as to give a free and fair expression of the popular will. Widmer et al. v. Reitzler et al., 182 N.W.2d 177, Iowa, filed December 15, 1970; Harney v. Clear Creek Community School District (1967), 261 Iowa 315, 318--319, 154 N.W.2d 88, 90; Headington v. North Winneshiek Community School District (1962), 254 Iowa 430, 438, 117 N.W.2d 831, 836.

'An election which has resulted in a fair and free expression of the will of the legal voters upon the merits will not be invalidated because of a departure from the statutory regulations governing the conduct of the election, except in those cases where the legislature has clearly and unequivocally expressed an intent that a specific statutory provision is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite and that a departure therefrom shall have the drastic consequences of invalidity.' Turnis v. Board of Education in and for Jones County (1961), 252 Iowa 922, 927, 109 N.W.2d 198, 201.

I. Appellants contend that Chapter 280A of the Code of Iowa is unconstitutional under Art. XI, section 3 of the State Constitution in that, (Error 1), it is an attempt to evade the debt limitation provisions by superimposing an artificial entity over traditional municipal corporations; (Error 2) it authorizes the issuance of bonds without providing that a proportionate share of such bonded indebtedness must be attributed to the underlying municipalities; and (Error 3) it does not provide for the creation of a corporate entity capable of issuing bonds and levying taxes.

The short answer to these contentions is found in the clear and unambiguous language of section 280A.16:

'A merged area formed under the provisions of this chapter shall be a body politic as a school corporation for the purpose of exercising powers granted under this chapter, and as such may sue and be sued, hold property, and exercise all the powers granted by law and such other powers as are incident to public corporations of like character and are not inconsistent with the laws of the state.'

The applicable principles of law in support of our determination that these allegations are without merit are stated in McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, section 41.13:

'Unless the contrary is expressed, a constitutional limitation concerning corporate indebtedness usually applies to each municipal corporation separately, and where one corporation embraces in part the same territory as another or others, each may contract corporate indebtedness up to the constitutional limit without reference to any other corporation embraced wholly or in part within its area. This rule applies where a board of education is a distinct corporation from the municipality, and is also true concerning an independent school district wholly or partially in the municipal area.'

Goreham v. Des Moines Met. Area Solid Waste Agency, supra, 179 N.W.2d 449, 455, also involved an overlaying type of municipal corporation. Although no specific findings were made on the issue presented here, our discussion of related issues and the acceptance of the 'new body corporate and politic' gave tacit approval to such corporation.

II. Appellants allege that since the merged area is under the direct regulation and control of the state, acting through the State Board of Public Instruction, it is a mere agency of the state and for the merged area to incur indebtedness and pledge the credit of the State of Iowa is contrary to sections 1, 2 and 5 of Art. VII of the State's Constitution. (Errors 4 and 5)

Again we refer to the language of section 280A.16 to show that the legislature intended to create and did create a separate and independent public corporation. 'A merged area formed under the provisions of this chapter shall be a body politic as a school corporation for the purpose of exercising powers granted under this chapter * * *.' There is no indication in Chapter 280A that the legislature intended to create a 'mere agency' of the state.

The fallacy in appellants' state agency argument can best be recognized by the fact that the state exercises similar control over the traditional municipalities such as cities, towns, and ordinary school districts. This control has never been challenged as making these bodies 'mere agencies' incapable of incurring indebtedness. Accordingly, we decline to apply this theory to Merged Area XIV.

III. Section 280A.17, as amended, provides: 'It is the policy of this state that the property tax for the Operation of area schools shall not in any event exceed three-fourths mill, and that the present and future costs of such operation in excess of the funds raised by such three-fourths mill levy shall be the responsibility of the state and shall not be paid from property tax * * *.' (Emphasis supplied)

Appellants contend the three-quarter mill limit prescribed by section 280A.17 is intended to include debt service in the cost of operation and that expenditures in excess of the amount so raised would be a state responsibility and thus create a state debt, contrary to Art. VII, sections 2 and 5 of the Iowa Constitution. It would also constitute a lending of the state's credit, contrary to Art. VII, section 1. Appellants further claim the tax levy to pay off the merged area XIV bonds will exceed the three-quarter mill limitation of section 280A.17 and this levy together with the levy for operation will exceed this limitation. (Errors 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10)

Did the legislature mean for debt service to be considered as part of the cost of 'operation'? We cannot say that it would never be reasonable to suppose that debt service was included within the meaning of this term. However, 'Where a statute is fairly subject to differing constructions, one of which will render it constitutional, the other unconstitutional or of doubtful constitutionality, that construction by which it may be upheld will be adopted.' State ex rel. Fulton v. Scheetz (Iowa, 1969), 166 N.W.2d 874, 877, and citations. We conclude the legislature did not intend for debt service expense to be considered as a part of the cost of operation. This conclusion is buttressed by other provisions of Chapter 280A. The authority to acquire sites and erect and equip buildings, to issue and pay off bonds, and to levy a tax to pay these bonds is found in sections 280A.19 through .21. These sections contain no reference to section 280A.17. Failure of the legislature to include a limitation either by reference to section 280A.17 or directly in these sections indicates no limitation was intended.

IV. Appellants challenge the constitutionality of Chapter 280A of the Code and Chapter 247 of the laws of the 61st General Assembly, alleging they embrace more than one subject. They also challenge sections .19 and .20 of Chapter 280A and Chapter 244 of the laws of the 62nd General Assembly, alleging that they embrace matters not expressed in the title. (Errors 11, 12, 13 and 14)

Art. III, section 29 of the Iowa Constitution provides, 'Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title.'

All that is necessary to satisfy the one subject requirement is that 'the act should embrace some one general subject, and by that it is meant, merely, that all matters treated therein should fall under some one general idea and be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be part of or germane to one general subject'. Long v. Board of Supervisors (1966), 258 Iowa 1278, 1283, 142 N.W.2d 378, 381. A review of the challenged sections convinces us that they clearly dealt with 'one general subject.'

The more serious challenge is based on the fact that the title here did not specifically refer to the...