Stanley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-cv-00996-NYW-NRN
• Decision Date: 13 March 2023
• Parties: PEGGY STANLEY, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

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PEGGY STANLEY, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-00996-NYW-NRN

United States District Court, D. Colorado

March 13, 2023

ORDER

Nina Y. Wang United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) (“Rule 12(c) Motion”), [Doc. 23, filed April 29, 2022], and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (collectively, the “Motions”), [Doc. 24, filed April 29, 2022]. Upon review of the Motions and corresponding briefing, the entire docket, and applicable legal standards, the Court finds that oral argument would not materially assist in the resolution of these matters. For the reasons set forth herein Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is respectfully GRANTED, and the Rule 12(c) Motion is DENIED as moot.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from a motor vehicle collision on July 5, 2020 (the “Collision”) between Plaintiff Peggy Stanley (“Ms. Stanley” or “Plaintiff”) and non-party Christine Hannahs (“Ms. Hannahs” or the “tortfeasor”). Plaintiff settled with Ms Hannahs's insurer, Progressive, for her liability limit of $25,000, and also sought underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits through her insurer, Defendant State Farm (“Defendant” or “State Farm”). After State Farm denied Plaintiff's request for UIM benefits, she initiated this action by filing a Complaint against State Farm in Summit County District Court on February 16, 2021. See [Doc 5].^[1]In the Complaint, Ms. Stanley asserts three claims against State Farm: (1) breach of contract (Count I); (2) statutory unreasonable delay or denial under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1116 (Count II); and (3) common law bad faith breach of insurance contract (Count III). [Id. at 4-5]. On April 8, 2021, State Farm removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado based on diversity jurisdiction. See [Doc. 1].

Following the close of discovery, on April 29, 2022, State Farm filed the instant Motions. [Doc. 23; Doc. 24]. Plaintiff responded to both Motions on May 20, 2022, [Doc. 26; Doc. 27], and State Farm replied on June 13, 2022, [Doc. 28; Doc. 29]. Thereafter, this action was reassigned to the undersigned United States District Judge upon her appointment. [Doc. 34]. The Motions are thus ripe for disposition.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) may be filed only “[a]fter the pleadings are closed.”^[2] Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) Motion is evaluated under the same standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2009). The Rule 12(b)(6) standard tests “the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations as true.” Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994). “[T]o state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to him or her; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed him or her; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The Court must ultimately “determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.” Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007). However, the Court considers a broader factual record when evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion; the Court is not limited to the well-pled allegations contained in the Complaint but instead considers “the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Hall v. District of Columbia, 867 F.3d 138, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“A Rule 12(c) motion considers the defendants' answers together with the complaint[.]”); Hous. Auth. Risk Retention Grp., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 378 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court considers the pleadings alone, which consist of the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits.”).

A court should not grant a Rule 12(c) motion unless “the moving party clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ciber, Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 261 F.Supp.3d 1119, 1125 (D. Colo. 2017) (quoting Park Univ. Enters., Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co., 442 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006)). Indeed, a motion for a judgment on the pleadings “only has utility when all material allegations of fact are admitted or not controverted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain to be decided by the district court.” 5C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1367 (3d ed., Apr. 2019 update). However, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Benzor v. Geico Cas. Co., No. 21-cv-00282-PAB-NRN, 2021 WL 4439789, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if there is sufficient evidence so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way. A fact is material if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim.” Crowe v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 649 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It is the movant's burden to demonstrate that no genuine dispute of material fact exists for trial, whereas the nonmovant must set forth specific facts establishing a genuine issue for trial. See Nahno-Lopez v. Houser, 625 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 2010). At all times, the Court will “view the factual record and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably to the nonmovant.” Zia Shadows, L.L.C. v. City of Las Cruces, 829 F.3d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir. 2016).

To satisfy its burden at summary judgment, the nonmovant must point to competent summary judgment evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact; conclusory statements based on speculation, conjecture, or subjective belief are insufficient. See Bones v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004); see also 10B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (4th ed. 2022) (explaining that the nonmovant cannot rely on “mere reargument of a party's case or a denial of an opponent's allegation” to defeat summary judgment). In considering the nonmovant's evidence, the Court cannot and does not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1165 (10th Cir. 2008). Further, the Court may consider only admissible evidence, see Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1541 (10th Cir. 1995), though the evidence need not be in a form that is admissible at trial-only the substance must be admissible at trial. See Brown v. Perez, 835 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2016). For instance, “if evidence is presented in the form of an affidavit, the Rules of Civil Procedure specifically require a certain type of admissibility, i.e., the evidence must be based on personal knowledge.” Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 432 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005). Indeed, “[t]o determine whether genuine issues of material fact make a jury trial necessary, a court necessarily may consider only the evidence that would be available to the jury.” Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006).

ANALYSIS

As a preliminary matter, Defendant seeks the same relief, albeit on different grounds, in its Rule 12(c) Motion and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-that is, dismissal of Plaintiff's statutory unreasonable delay or denial claim under Count II and common law bad faith breach of insurance contract claim under Count III. [Doc. 23; Doc. 24]. In the latter Motion, Defendant contends that the Court should review its Rule 12(c) Motion first, “which would render [the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment] unnecessary.” [Doc. 24 at 1]. However, Defendant acknowledges the different legal standards used to evaluate each motion, noting that its Rule 12(c) Motion focuses on the operative pleading and argues that “Plaintiff's Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” [Id.]. Thus, it is unclear why Defendant waited to raise its Rule 12(c) Motion until the same day it moved for partial summary judgment-well after the close of discovery-nor does Defendant cite any authority explaining why this Court should consider the Rule 12(c) Motion before the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which was filed with supporting evidence. The Tenth Circuit has explained that “[a]lthough a motion for judgment of the pleadings can be filed at any time before trial, nothing in the language of the rule implies that the motion must be disposed of prior to other pending motions, including a motion for summary judgment.” S.E.C. v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249 1264 (10th Cir. 2008). Nor does it promote judicial efficiency for this Court to be focused upon...