Stanley v. Sullivan

• Decision Date: 31 October 2014
• Docket Number: 109,390.,109,388,109,389
• Citation: 336 P.3d 870,300 Kan. 1015
• Parties: Billy J. STANLEY, Appellant, v. Shawn SULLIVAN, Secretary of the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

300 Kan. 1015
336 P.3d 870

Billy J. STANLEY, Appellant
v.
Shawn SULLIVAN, Secretary of the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, Appellee.

109,388
109,389
109,390.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Oct. 31, 2014.

Gerald E. Wells, of Jerry Wells Attorney–at–Law, of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

Corrine E. Johnson, litigation counsel, of Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, argued the cause, and Kimberly M.J. Lynch, special assistant attorney general, was with her on the briefs for appellee.

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by ROSEN, J.:

Billy J. Stanley is a persistent sex offender who is involuntarily committed to Larned State Security Hospital. He

300 Kan. 1016

seeks review of a published Court of Appeals opinion affirming a district court order dismissing his three petitions for writs of habeas corpus. The courts below agreed that Stanley's failure to

336 P.3d 872

exhaust administrative remedies precluded habeas corpus relief.

In August 2012, Stanley filed a petition seeking habeas corpus relief in district court case number 12CV71. He alleged that five documents, which are not included in the pleadings, were posted on resident computers in violation of his constitutional right to remain free from unlawful restraint, an asserted liberty interest.

He also filed a petition in district court case number 12CV74, seeking relief through habeas corpus from an asserted condition of confinement involving keeping bright lights shining on inmates' beds during normal sleeping hours. He alleged that the condition constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and also violates a liberty interest.

Finally, he filed a petition in district court case number 12CV85, in which, as in the first petition, he challenged a document posted on resident computers. He contended that a document captioned RIGHT–106 changed disciplinary procedures in a manner that violated his constitutional right to due process.

In all three cases, without requiring responses from the Secretary of the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services (Secretary) and without conducting hearings, the district court dismissed the petitions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Stanley appealed, and the Court of Appeals, after consolidating the three cases, affirmed the district court. This court granted Stanley's petition for review.

This appeal addresses the manner in which patients who are involuntarily committed to sexual predator treatment programs may seek relief from the conditions of their confinement. Both the legal mechanism for confinement of such patients and the mechanisms for seeking relief from the conditions of the confinement are statutory creations. Interpreting and construing statutes raise questions of law subject to unlimited review on appeal. State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, Syl. ¶ 2, 327 P.3d 425 (2014).

The portion of the statutory scheme on which the district court and the Court of Appeals relied in the present cases is found in

300 Kan. 1017

K.S.A.2013 Supp. 59–29a24, governing civil actions and the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies. That law, which became effective on July 1, 2012, reads in its entirety:

“(a) Any patient in the custody of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services pursuant to K.S.A. 59–29a01 et seq., and amendments thereto, prior to filing any civil action naming as the defendant pursuant to the rules of civil procedure, the state of Kansas, any political subdivision of the state of Kansas, any public official, the secretary of social and rehabilitation services or an employee of the department of social and rehabilitation services, while such employee is engaged in the performance of such employee's duty, shall be required to have exhausted such patient's administrative remedies, established by procedures adopted pursuant to subsection (d) of K.S.A. 59–29a22, and amendments thereto, concerning such civil action. Upon filing a petition in a civil action, such patient shall file with such petition proof that the administrative remedies have been exhausted.

“(b) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that:

(1) The allegation of poverty is untrue, notwithstanding the fact that a filing fee, or any portion thereof has been paid; or

(2) the action or appeal:

(A) Is frivolous or malicious;

(B) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(C) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

“(c) In no event shall such patient bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if such patient has, on three or more prior occasions, while in the custody of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services pursuant to K.S.A. 59–29a01 et seq., and amendments thereto, brought an action or appeal in a court of the state of Kansas or of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim

336 P.3d 873

upon which relief may be granted, unless the patient is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

“(d) The provisions of this section shall not apply to a writ of habeas corpus. ” (Emphasis added.)

The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the intent of the legislature is dispositive if it is possible to ascertain that intent. Looney, 299 Kan. at 906, 327 P.3d 425. This court deems the language of a statute to be the primary consideration in ascertaining the intent of the legislature because the best and only safe rule for determining the intent of the creators of a written law is to abide by the language that they have chosen to use. Looney, 299 Kan. at 906, 327 P.3d 425. The courts therefore look to the plain and unambiguous language

300 Kan. 1018

of a statute as the primary basis for determining legislative intent. State v. O'Connor, 299 Kan. 819, 822, 326 P.3d 1064 (2014).

Although the Court of Appeals superficially acknowledged this rule of statutory construction, it proceeded to set out an extensive history of cases that led it to conclude that inmates and others seeking relief through writs of habeas corpus are under a common-law requirement to exhaust whatever administrative remedies are available. Se...