Stanley v. Town Square Co-op., Docket No. 139783
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
Writing for the Court | CONNOR; MICHAEL J. KELLY; WAHLS |
Citation | 203 Mich.App. 143,512 N.W.2d 51 |
Parties | Bettye STANLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. TOWN SQUARE COOPERATIVE and Allison and Associates, Inc., jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants. |
Docket Number | Docket No. 139783 |
Decision Date | 29 December 1993 |
Page 51
v.
TOWN SQUARE COOPERATIVE and Allison and Associates, Inc.,
jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees,
Cross-Appellants.
Decided Dec. 29, 1993, at 9:00 a.m.
Released for Publication March 4, 1994.
Page 53
[203 Mich.App. 145] Charfoos & Christensen by David R. Parker, David W. Christensen, and Mary Pat Thomas, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.
Paskin, Nagi & Baxter, P.C. by Jeannette A. Paskin, Patricia J. Battersby, and Daniel J. Seymour, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.
Before WAHLS, P.J., and MICHAEL J. KELLY and CONNOR, JJ.
CONNOR, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals as of right, and defendants cross appeal, the trial court's summary judgment entered for defendants with respect to plaintiff's premises liability claim. We affirm.
Shortly before 1:00 a.m. on Saturday, December 12, 1987, plaintiff drove into the parking lot of defendant cooperative to visit a friend. After leaving her car, she was confronted by a man with a gun. He took her back to her car and then robbed and brutally raped her.
Plaintiff brought this action against the cooperative and its management agent, claiming that they [203 Mich.App. 146] had breached a duty owed her to keep the common areas of the cooperative reasonably safe. In response to defendants' motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court ruled that defendants owed plaintiff no duty that had been breached, and dismissed plaintiff's claim.
Plaintiff argues on appeal that defendants had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect her from the foreseeable criminal attacks of third parties in the parking lot.
As a preliminary matter, we must decide whether prior judicial decisions discussing the duty owed in the landlord/tenant context are applicable in this case. Because a landlord exercises exclusive control over the common areas of the premises, the landlord is the only one who can take the necessary precautions to ensure that the common areas are safe for those who use them. Similarly, a cooperative association has exclusive control over the common areas of the cooperative, and the association is the only one that can act to make the common areas safe. We are satisfied that with regard to premises liability, the duty a cooperative association owes those who come on the premises is the same as the duty a landlord owes those who come on its premises.
The duty a possessor of land owes to those who come upon the land turns on the status of the visitor. Thone v. Nicholson, 84 Mich.App. 538, 544, 269 N.W.2d 665 (1978). The law has developed a three-tiered approach to defining the duties owed.
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[203 Mich.App. 147] Courts speak of the differing duties owed to "invitees," "licensees," and "trespassers," but these labels are somewhat confusing. Invitees are entitled to be present on the land because of a license extended to them, and so are actually just a special class of licensees. See Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 514, 19 N.W. 257 (1884). Some people actually invited onto the land are not considered invitees, but mere licensees. See Preston v. Sleziak, 383 Mich. 442, 175 N.W.2d 759 (1970). In determining duty, it is not critical whether a licensee has actually been invited onto the land. The distinguishing characteristic that fixes the duty depends upon whether the licensee's visit is related to the pecuniary interests of the possessor of the land. See id. at 449-450, 175 N.W.2d 759.In this case, plaintiff was an invitee. Because her use of the parking lot was related to the pecuniary interests of the defendants, the possessors of the land on which she was attacked, it is irrelevant whether she visited the property as her friend's social guest or as a business invitee. See Petraszewsky v. Keeth (On Remand), 201 Mich.App. 535, 506 N.W.2d 890 (1993).
The landlord grants to tenants rights of exclusive possession to designated portions of the property, but the landlord retains exclusive possession of the common areas. The landlord grants to tenants a license to use the common areas of the property. Tenants pay for this license as part of their rent. Therefore, tenants are invitees of the landlord while in the common areas, because the landlord has received a pecuniary benefit for licensing their presence.
A landlord generally grants to the tenants the right to invite others to use the common areas of the property in order that they might gain access to the property under the tenants' control. Because[203 Mich.App. 148] the tenants do not receive any pecuniary benefit from the visits of their social guests, those invited as social guests of the tenants are licensees for the purpose of defining the duty their hosts owe them. See Preston, supra. However, the landlord does receive some pecuniary benefit. Part of the rent paid to the landlord is the consideration for giving to the tenants the right to invite others onto the property. Thus, the same duty that a landlord owes to its tenants also is owed to their guests, because both are the landlord's invitees. See Aisner v. Lafayette Towers, 129 Mich.App. 642, 341 N.W.2d 852 (1983).
The cooperative is in sole possession of the common areas of the property, and association members have paid the cooperative for the right of their invited guests to utilize the common areas while visiting their residences. Consequently, whether plaintiff was visiting the cooperative on business as she contends, or was merely a social guest of an association member, she was an invitee with respect to the duty defendants owed her.
Courts have said that landlords have a duty to protect their invitees from the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties in the common areas of the landlord's premises. See Aisner, supra. The parties dispute the effect our Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 429 Mich. 495, 418 N.W.2d 381 (1988), had on...
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