Stanley v. Tucker

Decision Date18 July 2012
Docket NumberCase No. 4:09cv164/SPM/MD
PartiesSCOTT A. STANLEY, Petitioner, v. KENNETH S. TUCKER, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

SCOTT A. STANLEY, Petitioner,
v.
KENNETH S. TUCKER1, Respondent.

Case No. 4:09cv164/SPM/MD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

Date: July 18, 2012


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case is before the court on Scott A. Stanley's ("Mr. Stanley") March 25, 2009 petition for habeas corpus (doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent filed an answer (doc. 8) and relevant portions of the state court record (doc. 15). Mr. Stanley filed a response to the answer (doc. 12). The matter was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B). After careful consideration of all issues raised by petitioner, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. It is further the opinion of the undersigned that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that Mr. Stanley is not entitled to relief, and the petition should be denied.

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BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 3, 2006, Mr. Stanley was charged by second amended information with count 1 resisting officer with violence and count 2 battery on law enforcement officer in violation of Sections 843.01 and 784.07(2)(b) respectively, Florida Statutes, in the Circuit Court of Leon County, Florida in case number 05CF03352 (doc. 15, ex. A)2. The charges stemmed from an incident on September 13, 2005 at the Leon County Courthouse where Mr. Stanley, while being moved to a different cell, grabbed Deputy Bobby D. Phillips ("victim") causing him to fall and then kicked him in the leg. Id. On October 4, 2006, Mr. Stanley was found guilty by a jury of count 1 and as to count 2 the lesser included offense of battery, Section 784.03 of Florida Statutes (ex. B, pp. 138-139 and C). The court declared him a habitual violent felony offender, and sentenced him to three years in prison for count 1 to run consecutively with any prior sentences that he was currently serving, and time served on count 2 (ex. B, pp. 139-159 and ex. C).

Mr. Stanley filed a motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (ex. D), and then addenda to the motion (ex. E and Ex. F). The Rule 3.850 court held an evidentiary hearing on July 12, 2007 (ex. G). On July 26, 2007, Mr. Stanley then filed another addendum to his Rule 3.850 motion, which summarized his prior arguments and added additional ones (ex. H). The Rule 3.850 court ruled on all of Mr. Stanley's arguments and denied post-conviction relief in a written order issued on October 5, 2007 (ex. I).

Mr. Stanley filed a Notice of Appeal with the Florida First District Court of Appeal ("First DCA") (ex. J). He raised seven issues in his initial brief: (1) "The [Rule 3.850] court erred by denying relief for [his] claim that prejudice was caused by the state failing to disclose numerous favorable witness statements until

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approximately one year after said statements had been obtained;" (2) "The [Rule 3.850] court erred by denying [his] claim that the state prejudiced the defense and committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose a video recording of the incident that resulted in the lower tribunal case;" (3) "The [Rule 3.850] court erred by failing to properly address the fact that state witness Alfred Carter claimed the state made an agreement with him in exchange for his testimony, which was not disclosed to the defense prior to trial for impeachment purposes;" (4) "The trial court committed fundamental error by denying [his] motion for self-representation prior to trial;" (5) "The trial court committed fundamental error by knowingly appointing counsel with conflict;" (6) "The trial court committed fundamental error by failing to give proper jury instructions, resulting in a defective verdict;" and (7) "The [Rule 3.850] court erred by refusing to allow [him] to submit to a computerized voice-stress analysis, which is admissible evidence, to confirm the truthfulness of his statements." Ex. K, pp. 2-4. The state filed its answer (ex. L). On November 17, 2008, the First DCA issued a per curiam opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the Rule 3.850 court's denial of post-conviction relief (ex. M). In its opinion the First DCA reversed only the ground referring to the testimony of Alfred Carter and remanded to the lower court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Id.

On February 9, 2009, the Rule 3.850 court held another evidentiary hearing pursuant to the First DCA's mandate (ex. N). After the trial prosecutor testified and evidence was entered into the record, Mr. Stanley withdrew his claim in open court. Id. at 17. The Rule 3.850 court denied the claim in a written order dated February 17, 2009 (ex. O).

Mr. Stanley filed the instant petition for federal writ of habeas corpus on March 25, 2009 (doc. 1), and respondent concedes its timeliness (doc. 8, p. 6).

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts may issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Pub. L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (1996). In relevant part, Section 2254 provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).

The Supreme Court explained the framework for Section 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).3 Section 2254(d)(2) must be divided into two separate inquiries:

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

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governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Id. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The federal habeas court "determining whether [it] should overturn the state courts' [sic] rejection of the claim at issue" should "review the highest state court decision disposing of the claim." Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 173 L. Ed. 2d 251(2009).

Following the Williams framework, on any issue raised in a federal habeas petition upon which there has been an adjudication on the merits in a formal state court proceeding, the federal court should first ascertain the "clearly established Federal law," namely, "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The law is "clearly established" only when the Supreme Court's holding embodies the legal principle; dicta in opinions is not controlling. Thaler v. Haynes, _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1173, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (2010); Bowles v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 608 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010). Furthermore, a federal court of appeals decision, "even a holding directly on point," cannot clearly establish federal law for Section 2254 purposes. Bowles, 608 F.3d at 1316 (citing Renico v. Lett, _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1866, 176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010)).

After identifying the governing legal principle, the court determines whether the state court adjudication is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court case law, either because the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or because it "confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court but reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 161 L. Ed. 2d 334 (2005); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The state court does not need to cite to Supreme Court

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cases or even be aware of them, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S. Ct. 362, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2002). If the state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law, the federal habeas court must independently consider the merits of petitioner's claim.

If the state court decision is not contrary to clearly established federal law, the federal habeas court must then determine whether the state court "unreasonably applied" the governing legal principles set forth in the Supreme Court's cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The federal court defers to the state court's reasoning unless the state court's application of the legal...

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