Stanley v. White

• Decision Date: 28 March 1896
• Citation: 160 Ill. 605,43 N.E. 729
• Parties: STANLEY et al. v. WHITE et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

160 Ill. 605

43 N.E. 729

STANLEY et al.

v.WHITE et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 28, 1896.

Appeal from circuit court, Iroquois county; C. R. Starr, Judge.

Bill for partition by Stanley R. White and others against John Stanley and others. From the judgment of partition, defendant John Stanley appeals. Reversed in part.Morris & Hooper and Robert Doyle, for appellant.

Kay & Kay, for appellees.

BANKER, J.

This was a bill for partition, filed by Stanley R. White, against John Stanley and others, in the circuit court of Iroquois county. The cause was heard upon the original and amended bills of Stanley R. White, the answers thereto, and the cross bills of Jane S. Talliaferro, Mark A. Stanley, and Dicie A. Warren, and the answers and replications thereto. The testimony was taken before the master in chancery, and, upon the filing of his report, the court found all the allegations in complainant's bills and in the cross bills to be true, and that partition and division ought to be made as prayed in complainant's bills, and rendered a decree accordingly. From that decree defendant John Stanley prosecuted this appeal.

He objects to that part of the decree awarding partition of the N. E. 1/4 of the S. W. 1/4 of section 33, township 27 N., range 12 W. of the 2d P. M. His contention is that Jane Talliaferro, Mark Stanley, and Dicie Warren have no rights in said land, and are not entitled to the one-sixth interest, each, therein ordered by said decree to be set off to them. He claims that their interests therein they had conveyed to him by a good and sufficient deed, prior to the institution of this suit, and he asks that the decree, as to that part of it awarding to said Jane Talliaferro, Mark Stanley, and Dicie Warren a one-sixth interest, each, in said land, be reversed. The evidence shows that appellant and Jane Talliaferro, Dicie Warren, Mark Stanley, and Joseph Stanley, children, and Stanley R. White, grandchild, of Micajah Stanley, who died intestate, are his sole surviving heirs. Among other lands of which he died seised was that above described. After his father's decease, appellant desired to obtain a conveyance to himself of the interests of the other heirs in said land. To that end he had prepared for him the deed here in controversy, which bears the date of March 15, 1889, and was signed by Mark A. Stanley, and Jennie E., his wife, Jane S. Talliaferro, widow, and Dicie A. Warren, and George E., her husband, all of whom admit that they signed the deed with a full knowledge of its contents. Mark A. and Jennie S. Stanley and Jane S. Talliaferro duly acknowledged the deed on July 25, 1889; and it was acknowledged by Dicie A. and George E. Warren on November 1, 1892. The evidence shows that all of the grantors did not sign the deed at the same time, but that some signed at one time and others at other times, and that, after the several signings, the deed was each time returned either to appellant or to his mother, who was acting for him. The deed has remained under his control ever since the day it bears date. The grantors do not contend that there was any fraud, duress, or undue influence used to induce them to sign the deed. Their only claim is that it was the understanding between them and appellant, at the time the deed was executed, that it was not to be operative unless signed by all the heirs of Micajah Stanley. The question to be decided is, was there, or was there not, a delivery of this deed by the grantors to appellant?

The answer depends upon the answer to the further question, what was the intention of the parties at the time the transaction took place? If the parties intended that a present title should pass, then, plainly, there was a delivery. If, after appellees had signed and acknowledged the deed, they had merely handed it to appellant for the purpose, solely, of having him get the signatures of the other heirs thereto, that would not have constituted a delivery, but would have been a mere manual transfer of possession, and would not have passed the title. If, however, the deed being ready for delivery, they had given it to him, intending, at the time, to pass a present title, but with the mutual verbal understanding that the deed should subsequently become inoperative and void if the other heirs should refuse to sign it when requested so to do, then there would have been a delivery, and the title would have passed; and the grantors could not thereafter set up the nonperformance of the condition in order to defeat the deed, but would be concluded by its terms. Stevenson v. Crapnell, 114 Ill. 19, 28 N. E. 379;McCann v. Atherton, 106 Ill. 31;Weber v. Christen, 121 Ill. 91, 11 N. E. 893. The latter hypothesis presents the facts shown by the record in this case. The deed, absolute on its face, was properly signed and acknowledged. The grantors were acquainted with its contents, and they deposited it with the grantee, and under his control it has remained ever...