Stannard v. Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Mach. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 May 1912
• Citation: 84 A. 335,118 Md. 151
• Parties: STANNARD v. WILCOX & GIBBS SEWING MACH. CO. et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

84 A. 335

118 Md. 151

STANNARD v. WILCOX & GIBBS SEWING MACH. CO. et al.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

May 10, 1912

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City; Carroll T Bond, Judge.

Action by Harry Stannard against the Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Company and another. From a judgment for defendants, for costs, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, BURKE, THOMAS, and STOCKBRIDGE, JJ.

Henry H. Dinneen, for appellant.

Charles McH. Howard, for appellees.

STOCKBRIDGE J.

In the year 1911 Harry Stannard was the local manager in the city of Baltimore of the Holmes Electric Protective Company, a corporation having its main office in the city of New York. In July of that year that company received a letter, over the signature of "Wilcox & Gibbs S. M. Co., R. G. Best Mgr.," which read as follows: "Gentlemen: On July 15, 1910, Mrs. H. S. Stannard, wife of your local manager here, purchased from us, on the installment plan, a sewing machine valued at $60. After paying four months' installments, they declined to make any further payments, and requested us to remove the machine; this after they had had some six months. We, of course, refused to accept the return of the machine, as we do not do business that way, and have made several requests of Mr. Stannard to pay what was owing. As long ago as last December he promised the writer he would do this, since which time, however, we have not received a penny from him, and we are writing him to-day that unless all back payments are in this office within one week from today the matter will be placed in the hands of our attorneys for settlement. If this is of any interest to you, and you do not desire to see one of your managers brought up in a civil suit for goods purchased on the installment plan, we would suggest that you communicate with him to the effect that he take some steps towards meeting a just obligation incurred by his wife, and which he is legally responsible for. Thanking you in advance for whatever you may determine to do in the matter, we are, yours truly, Wilcox & Gibbs S. M. Co., R. G Best, Mgr." Not unnaturally, Mr. Stannard, upon being made aware of the writing of this letter, felt aggrieved, and accordingly in September instituted an action against the Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Company and Royal G. Best to recover damages for an alleged libel. The defendants demurred, the demurrer was sustained, and a judgment of non pros. entered, in default of a sufficient declaration, and judgment for defendant for costs, and the case now comes to this court in that shape for review.

The narr. makes no claim of any special damage caused the plaintiff by reason of the writing and sending of the foregoing letter, but insists that it is actionable per se. It is perfectly apparent that the purpose of this letter was simply to aid the defendant in the collection of a debt claimed to be due and owing it; that the writer was not prompted by any desire to make an application of the Golden Rule, nor was he so far interested in the employer of the plaintiff that there was any altruistic motive behind the sending of the communication. But, however reprehensible or disingenuous the communication may have been, this court is only concerned in the narrow, legal proposition: Is the letter, dated July 26, 1911, and written by one of the defendants in the name of both, libelous per se, so as to make either or both of the defendants liable in damages to the plaintiff?

In the case of Weeks v. News Publishing Co., 83 A. 162, decided in January of the present year, all of the earlier decisions in this state were carefully reviewed, and the general principle stated as to what constituted a libelous publication, as follows: "A false and malicious printed or written publication, which imputes conduct or qualities tending to disparage or degrade the plaintiff, or expose him to contempt, ridicule, or public hatred, or prejudice his private character or credit, are libelous per se"--adopting the language of Judge Burke in Goldsborough v. Orem, 103 Md. 681, 64 A. 40. Substantially the same rule has been laid down in a large number of cases in various states of the country. It is practically conceded that the letter which forms the basis of the action in this case would not have afforded a sufficient ground of action for the plaintiff merely as an individual; but what is claimed for it is that the alleged libel was one tending to affect the plaintiff in his business, and that for that reason this action may be maintained.

The appellant has cited a large number of authorities, with regard to a number of which a mere statement will show their inapplicability. Thus, in Arrow Steamship Company v. Bennett, 73 Hun, 81, 25 N.Y.S. 1029, special damage was alleged in the declaration, and because of that fact the demurrer was overruled. In the case of Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33, 64 N.W. 869, it was alleged that by reason of a letter which the defendant had written the plaintiff had lost a certain valuable contract, which loss was set up as matter of special damage, and by reason of that fact a recovery was permitted. In the case of Fowles v. Bowen, 30 N.Y. 20, evidence was adduced to show special damage, and therefore the action was held maintainable. In Hardy v. Williamson, 86 Ga. 551, 12 S.E. 874, 22 Am. St. Rep. 479, recovery was had for a publication charging the engineers of a contracting company with an overvaluation of property, but the recovery was allowed largely on account of the phraseology of the Georgia statute. And in Barron v. Smith, 19 S.D. 50, 101 N.W. 1106, a recovery was had because of the express provision of the South Dakota statute.

Numerous cases were cited where suit had been brought against commercial agencies. In Windisch-Muhlhauser Brewing Company v. Bacon (Ky.) 53 S.W. 520, a false report that the plaintiff in that case had failed to pay a debt was held not to be actionable per se, but any special damage which could be shown as the result would afford a ground for recovery. In McDermott v. Union Credit Co., 76 Minn 86, 78 N.W. 967, 79 N.W. 673, a publication that a certain man was slow pay was held, in an action for libel, to afford a good ground for such an action; but upon a reargument in that case the court reversed its original holding and held it not liable. In two Texas cases, Sanders v. Hall, 22 Tex.Civ.App. 282, 55 S.W. 594, and Sanders v. Edmondson, 56 S.W. 611, a letter was written in each case to a creditor of the plaintiff, saying substantially that the plaintiff was about to leave the country, that he was unable to pay his debts, and that, if he did leave, the creditor's claim would be worthless, and in each of these cases the letters were held not libelous per se, but, if special...