Stansbury v. Bond
Decision Date | 16 August 1973 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 8902. |
Citation | 179 USPQ 88,482 F.2d 968 |
Parties | Thomas A. STANSBURY, Appellant, v. Donald S. BOND, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Penrose Lucas Albright, Arlington, Va., Thomas A. Stansbury, Chicago, Ill., attorneys of record, for appellant.
George J. Seligsohn, Princeton, N. J., attorney of record, for appellee; J. L. Whittaker, A. Russinoff, Princeton, N. J., of counsel.
Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and ALMOND, Senior Judge.
This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Patent Interferences awarding priority of invention to the senior party, Bond,1 on two grounds: (1) that the junior party Stansbury,2 had shown neither an actual reduction to practice of the invention prior to the date Bond constructively reduced the invention to practice by filing his patent application nor shown reasonable diligence from a time prior to conception of the invention by Bond, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g); and (2) the ancillary ground that the disclosure of the invention in the Bond application supports the language of the counts. We affirm.
The invention of the counts relates to what the board termed "systems for apprising airplane pilots as to whether or not they are on a hazardous course."
The counts, which correspond to claims 63 and 58 of the Stansbury patent, are as follows (emphasis ours):
By way of background, the Stansbury patent explains:
There are five parameters which may be utilized in determining a collision hazard. They are the relative altitudes of two aircraft, their relative courses or headings, their relative velocities, the range between them, and the bearing of one aircraft from the other. All the systems that have been proposed in the past require the utilization of a particular set of parameters selected from these five parameters to determine whether two aircraft are a collision hazard to each other. Under prior systems, every aircraft operating in the system which was expected to have the capability of avoiding another aircraft would carry equipment which required the use of each and every parameter in the preselected set of parameters to determine whether a possible collision hazard existed. * * * The present invention, on the other hand, provides for the availability of all five parameters, but makes it possible for the equipment in any given aircraft to be designed to take advantage of only so many of the parameters as are required for that aircraft to obtain sufficient collision warning information. Thus, for the first time, a system is available wherein one aircraft can utilize up to all five parameters in estimating a collision hazard, and, therefore, make only a few deviations from its course to avoid other aircraft, while another aircraft can use only one or two of these parameters to provide it with sufficient collision hazard information to avoid all other aircraft, which it is capable of avoiding by virtue of its performance capability in relationship to the performance of the other aircraft.
The computer to which count 2 is drawn utilizes only two of these parameters, altitude and range, to provide it with sufficient navigational hazard information to avoid other aircraft. Count 1 utilizes only one parameter, distance, to provide it with sufficient navigational hazard information to avoid other aircraft.
Stansbury moved to dissolve the interference on the ground that Bond had no right to make the counts. The motion was denied by the Primary Examiner and renewed at final hearing before the board, where it was again denied.
Stansbury asserts that the Bond application does not show support for the limitations of counts 1 and 2 that there be a "computer * * * means for indicating that said first craft is a navigational hazard to said second craft" and of count 1 of "said means requiring no other input than an input signal from said distance determining means."
Stansbury maintains that the counts containing the limitations are "ambiguous," or rather, in his words, "of necessity so worded that reference to the specification of the respective parties becomes necessary to ascertain the meaning of certain language therein." Stansbury quotes the following from this court's principal opinion in McCutchen v. Oliver, 367 F.2d 609, 611, 54 C.C.P.A. 756, 759 (1966):
As to "Navigational Hazard"
That the gist of his invention is a collision avoidance system which determines for the pilot whether there is a navigational hazard is apparent, Stansbury maintains, from the prosecution history of claim 24 in his parent application, the predecessor of claim 58 of his patent, which count 2 duplicates. As Stansbury states in his brief:
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