Stansell v. International Fellowship, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 September 1974
• Docket Number: No. 59475,59475
• Citation: 318 N.E.2d 149,22 Ill.App.3d 959
• Parties: Fred W. STANSELL, etc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL FELLOWSHIP, INC., etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 149

318 N.E.2d 149

22 Ill.App.3d 959

Fred W. STANSELL, etc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL FELLOWSHIP, INC., etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 59475.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Sept. 19, 1974.

Wachowski & Wachowski, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey & Witous, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

McGLOON, Justice:

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County quashing service of summons on Mildred Brown and dismissing her as a party defendant from this action. Brown was served with summons at her residence in Erie County, New York. She filed a special appearance in the circuit court of Cook County challenging the court's jurisdiction over her person. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 110, par. 20.) The trial court upheld her position and dismissed plaintiff's action as to her. The other defendant in this action filed a general appearance and submitted to the court's jurisdiction. Defendant Brown now appears pursuant to the express finding of the court that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 110A, par. 304(a).

This appeal involves the Illinois 'longarm' statute, namely section 17(1)(b) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, Ch. 110, par. 17(1)(b)) and its application to Mrs. Brown. The only issue presented is whether the trial court correctly decided that it did not have the power to obtain personal jurisdiction over her.

We affirm.

The relevant information before the trial court was as follows. Plaintiff, acting as administrator of the estate of Leslie Ann Stansell, brought a wrongful death action (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 70, pars. 1, 2) in the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois against International Fellowship, Inc. (International), a corporation, and Mildred M. Brown, as president of International and in her individual capacity. According to the allegations of plaintiff's amended complaint International was a New York not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in New York. Its business was arranging foreign exchange programs whereby students of one country visited another country for a period of foreign study. The complaint further alleged that International and Mrs. Brown solicited Leslie Ann Stansell at her high school in Illinois to participate in one of their programs. Pursuant to an agreement between Leslie's mother and father, the plaintiff in this action, on the one hand, and International, on the other hand, Leslie was enrolled in the foreign exchange program. The complaint alleged that by virtue of this agreement International and Brown owed a duty to provide decedent with a reasonably safe means of transportation. The complaint further alleged that Brown, as president of International, was in charge of selecting the airlines used for transportation of the students. Plaintiff's theory was that Brown breached this duty by selecting an unsafe airline, L.A.N.S.A., to transport decedent between Lima and Cuzco, Peru and Brown knew or should have known that the selection of L.A.N.S.A. would expose decedent to an unreasonable risk to her safety. The plane crash and decedent's resultant death took place in Peru. The complaint alleged that the breach of duty proximately caused decedent's death.

Brown and International were served with summons in New York pursuant to the Illinois 'long-arm' statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 110, pars. 16, 17.) International filed a general appearance, thereby submitting to the circuit court's jurisdiction. In her special and limited appearance Brown moved to quash the service of summons on her and to dismiss the action as to her. She submitted an affidavit which stated that she did no act in Illinois, either individually or in her capacity as president of International, which could serve as the basis of the court's jurisdiction over her. Plaintiff filed a counter-affidavit. Paragraph No. 6 of that affidavit recited 'that the defendant, Mildred M. Brown, president of International, was in charge of the transportation program arranged by International and also in charge of the representations made inter alia by International as to its expertise in the field of transportation as shown by a letter addressed to all parents and students, marked Exhibit 'B' and made a part hereof; that said letter was distributed to the decedent and her parents in the State of Illinois.' The attached copy of an orientation letter purportedly sent to the Stansells boasts of an 'enviable record over the past years in the area of transportation of our students.' The copy of the letter does not show a signature. The name of Mildred M. Brown and other names appear on the letterhead under the heading 'Board of Directors' where she is listed as president.

In this appeal plaintiff contends that jurisdiction over Mrs. Brown rests on section 17(1)(b) of the Civil Practice Act. He argues that the acts of Brown which form the basis of the cause of action against her constitute 'the commission of a tortious act within this State.'

In Nelson v. Miller (1957) 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, a case upholding the constitutionality of sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act, the court held that sections 16 and 17 reflect a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause. However, there are limits, circumscribed by the due process clause, to the exercise of personal jurisdiction. (Gray v. Amer. Radiator & Sanitary Corp. (1961), 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761.) In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 'However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.' 357 U.S. at 251, 78 S.Ct. at 1238.

We must evaluate each case of contested jurisdiction on its particular facts and circumstances. There is no mechanical test. (Gray v. Amer. Radiator & Sanitary Corp., supra.) While we are mindful of the expansive reach of section 17(1)(b), nevertheless there has not been a showing of sufficient '...