Stanton v. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC

• Decision Date: 06 January 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:14–CV–00231–EJL–CWD.
• Citation: 83 F.Supp.3d 937
• Parties: Jodi STANTON, Plaintiff, v. BATTELLE ENERGY ALLIANCE, LLC, organized in Deleware, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho

83 F.Supp.3d 937

Jodi STANTON, Plaintiff

v.BATTELLE ENERGY ALLIANCE, LLC, organized in Deleware, Defendant.

Case No. 4:14–CV–00231–EJL–CWD.

United States District Court, D. Idaho.

Signed Jan. 6, 2015.

Lowell N. Hawkes, Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered, Pocatello, ID, David J. Whedbee, MacDonald Hoague & Bayless, Seattle, WA, Ryan Scott Lewis, Pocatello, ID, for Plaintiff.

Eric M. Barzee, Kimberly D. Evans Ross, Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, Idaho Falls, ID, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

EDWARD J. LODGE, District Judge.

Before the Court in the above-entitled matter is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The parties have filed their responsive briefing and the matter is ripe for the Court's consideration. Having fully reviewed the record herein, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court conclusively finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, this Motion shall be decided on the record before this Court without oral argument.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (Battelle) has been the day-to-day operator of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) facility since 2005. Battelle employed Ralph Stanton as a nuclear operator at the INL's Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) in the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR).¹ Plaintiff Jodi Stanton is the spouse of Ralph Stanton.

The facts underlying the claim in this case involve a release of radioactive contaminants on November 8, 2011 at the ZPPR. On that day, Mr. Stanton and others were packaging plutonium reactor fuel plates in the ZPPR. Mr. Stanton was instructed by his supervisors and managers to open two fuel storage containers that had unusual labels which indicated there were potential abnormalities with the fuel plates located inside the packaging. Upon opening the containers, radioactive contaminates, plutonium and americium, were released resulting in the contamination of sixteen workers at the facility including Mr. Stanton.²

Battelle's Health Physicist, Steve Braase, used a hand-held alpha-radiation detector to take radiation readings of Mr. Stanton which detected radiation on his person. Mr. Stanton was told to remove his gauntlets and gloves and his hands were sealed in a plastic bag. He was then taken through a series of security stations and surveyed for radiological contamination. Several measurements for radiation exposure were taken including nasal swabs

, a lung count, and urine and fecal bioassay samples. Mr. Stanton was then allowed to leave after having only been “wiped down,” not showered. Some of the exposure test samples taken following the release were later destroyed and, Mrs. Stanton alleges, Battelle denied the exposure and generally delayed, withheld, and/or misrepresented the level of exposure to radiation that resulted from the November 8, 2011 release.

Mrs. Stanton has brought this action against her husband's employer, Battelle, raising a cause of action for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. 1.) The allegations giving rise to the claim are that 1) Battelle allowed Mr. Stanton to leave the ZPPR facility without adequately decontaminating him and without accurately measuring the plutonium, americium, and other potential contaminants to which he was exposed and 2) Battelle failed to undertake comprehensive testing for radiation exposure and delayed, misrepresented, and denied the existence of any contamination. These acts, Mrs. Stanton alleged, caused her severe emotional distress because she feared the risk of radioactive contamination from Mr. Stanton's exposure on November 8, 2011. Battelle has filed the instant Motion to Dismiss which the Court takes up in this Order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a party's claim for relief. When considering such a motion, the Court's inquiry is whether the allegations in a pleading are sufficient under applicable pleading standards. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) sets forth minimum pleading rules, requiring only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).

A motion to dismiss will only be granted if the complaint fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted). Although “we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Therefore, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Caviness v. Horizon Comm. Learning Cent., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 811–12 (9th Cir.2010) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Battelle argues the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Mrs. Stanton has failed to plead a viable claim for either negligent or intentional emotional distress. (Dkt. 6.) Specifically, Battelle contends it does not owe a legal duty to Mrs. Stanton and the allegations are insufficient to show Mrs. Stanton has suffered a compensable emotional injury. Mrs. Stanton responds that the Complaint has stated proper claims for damages and, alternatively, that the Court should grant her leave to amend the Complaint if necessary.

1. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The tort of negligence includes a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress which requires the same elements as a common law negligence action. See Nation v. State Dep't of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953, 965–66 (2007) ; Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900, 904–06 (1991) ; Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 801 P.2d 37, 44 (1990). The elements for this claim are: (1) a duty recognized by law requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 210 P.3d 563, 574 (Idaho Ct.App.2009) (citing Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 903 P.2d 73, 78 (1995) ). Negligent infliction of emotional distress also requires there to be some physical manifestation of the plaintiff's emotional injury. Frogley v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 155 Idaho 558, 314 P.3d 613, 624 (2013) ; Sommer v. Elmore Cnty., 903 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1075 (D.Idaho 2012).

A. Duty

Battelle argues it had no duty to Mrs. Stanton to protect her from fear of second-hand radiation exposure from her spouse. (Dkt. 6, 16.) Mrs. Stanton counters that Battelle owed her a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others. (Dkt. 11 at 6.) Moreover, Mrs. Stanton argues her risk of harm in this case was reasonably foreseeable given Battelle should have known she would be exposed to radiation when her husband came home following the November 8, 2011 release. Battelle counters that the potential harm in this case was not sufficiently foreseeable to give rise to a duty. (Dkt. 16 at 4.)

“Every person, in the conduct of his business, has a duty to exercise ordinary care to ‘prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others.’ ” Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443, 337 P.3d 602, 604 (2014) (quoting Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999) ) (citations omitted). Stated differently, “one owes a duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury.” Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 961 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1998). In determining whether a duty is owed in a particular context, Idaho courts employ the “balancing of the harm” analysis. Beers v. Corporation of Pres. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter–Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 316 P.3d 92, 97 (2013) (citing Doe, supra ). This analysis considers policy and weighs several factors including:

[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved (citations omitted).

Beers, 316 P.3d at 98 (quoting Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 908 P.2d 143, 148 (1996) ).

In support of its Motion, Battelle points to Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 131 Idaho 254, 953 P.2d 1363, 1364 (1998) where the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed a spouse's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress brought against her husband's employer holding that the employer did not owe a duty to the spouse of an employee who was terminated. (Dkt. 6 at 6–8). In that case, the plaintiff claimed the defendant's actions against her spouse caused her emotional distress. The court considered the Rife factors in determining...