Stanton v. Catron
| Decision Date | 05 August 1896 |
| Parties | STANTON v. CATRON. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Appeal from district court, Bernalillo county; before Justice N. C Collier.
Bill by M. W. Stanton against T. B. Catron. Demurrer to bill sustained, and plaintif appeals. Affirmed.
A. B McMillen, for appellant.
N. B Field, for appellee.
This cause comes to us by appeal from the Second judicial district, where a decree was entered sustaining a demurrer and dismissing the bill of complaint. The allegations contained in the bill, to which a demurrer was sustained, are substantially as follows: That on the 12th day of August, 1893, the complainant, M. W. Stanton, obtained a judgment in the district court in and for the county of Valencia, in the territory of New Mexico, against one Roman A. Baca, for the sum of $1,793, damages, and $23.57, costs of suit; that on the 15th day of August, 1893, said judgment was duly docketed by the clerk of said district court, in a book kept in his office for that purpose, and on the same day a certified transcript of the docket of said judgment was duly filed with the probate clerk and ex officio recorder of Bernalillo county, in said district, which said transcript was by said recorder duly filed and recorded in a book kept in his office for that purpose, by which record of said transcript of said judgment in said county of Bernalillo the said complainant acquired a lien on all the real estate of said Roman A. Baca in said Bernalillo county, from the date of the filing of said transcript; that on the 8th day of September, 1893, said complainant caused an execution to be duly issued out of said district court of Valencia county, and delivered the same to the sheriff of said county; that the said sheriff afterwards, to wit, on the 27th day of October, 1893, returned said execution nulla bona, said Valencia county being where said Roman A. Baca resided. It is then charged in the bill, in paragraphs 7 and 8, that, at the time of the rendition of said judgment and the filing of the transcript in the county of Bernalillo, the said Roman A. Baca was the owner of an interest in certain land in said bill mentioned, known and called the "Bartolome Fernandes," or "San Miguel Spring Grant," which land is fully described in the bill. It is further charged in the bill, in paragraph 9, that on the 8th day of May, 1894, the said complainant caused to be issued out of the district court in and for the county of Valencia another execution, and on said day delivered the same to the sheriff of the county of Bernalillo; that said sheriff thereupon, on said day, levied said execution on all of the right, title, and interest of the said Roman A. Baca in and to the said above-described real estate; and the said sheriff, under said execution, proceeded to advertise said land for sale to satisfy the said execution. It is further charged in said bill, in paragraph 10, that "your orator further represents that thereafter, to wit, on the 26th day of May, A. D. 1894, the defendant Thomas B. Catron caused to be filed with the probate clerk and ex officio recorder of the county of Bernalillo a deed of bargain and sale from the said Roman A. Baca to the said Thomas B. Catron, being dated the 18th day of April, 1894. wherein and whereby the said Roman A. Baca conveyed to the said Thomas B. Catron all his right, title, and interest in and to the land herein before described; and the said Catron gives it out and claims that he holds the said land free from the judgment lien of your orator, and that his claim to said premises is superior thereto." It is also charged in said bill (paragraph 11): "Your orator further shows that if said land might be sold upon said execution, that the remedy thereby would be inadequate; that said conveyance to said Catron would be a cloud on the title of a purchaser under said execution, and said land cannot be sold for its reasonable value, except under an order of this court, adjusting the rights of the respective parties herein." Then follows a prayer that the several liens of the said complainant and the said defendant be marshaled, and the amounts thereof ascertained, and that the lien of the complainant be decreed by the court to be a superior and prior lien to the claim of the defendant Catron, and that the property be sold, and the proceeds thereof brought into court for distribution, according to the several priorities of the parties litigant herein. To this bill, the defendant Catron filed a demurrer in the court below, upon the ground--First, "that the said complainant has an adequate remedy at law for the redress of the grievances, if any, set out in said bill of complaint; and, second, that the said complainant has not, in and by his said bill, made or stated such a case as entitles him in a court of equity to any relief from or against this defendant, touching the matters contained in said bill, or any of such matters." This demurrer was sustained by the court below, and the complainant declining to amend his bill, but electing to stand upon the sufficiency thereof, the court entered a decree dismissing the bill, from which an appeal has brought the case to this court.
The complainant assigns as a ground for the reversal of the decision of the court below--First, "that the district court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the bill of complaint; second, that the district court erred in dismissing complainant's bill of complaint." The question is presented for our consideration as to whether the ruling of the district court was correct in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill. Courts of equity entertain jurisdiction at the suit of a judgment creditor in those cases where the bill discloses a state of facts showing that the remedy at law is inadequate to accomplish the relief. In those cases where a discovery of assets is sought to be obtained, or where it is desired to reach equitable or other interests in property not subject to levy and sale under an execution at law, or where a fraudulent or collusive conveyance has been made, with the view of placing the property of the debtor beyond the reach of levy and sale under an execution, a court of equity will lend its aid to the creditor in securing to him that relief which he could not otherwise obtain.
It may be said, therefore, that there are at least three classes of cases in which the creditor may successfully appeal to a court of equity for aid in the enforcement of his demands against a debtor:
First. In those cases where he seeks the satisfaction of his debt out of a trust fund, which is not subject to the demands of a judgment and execution at law. In this class of cases it is said that he may come directly into a court of chancery without first resorting to a judgment and execution at law. As stated by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Russell v. Clarke's Ex'rs, 7 Cranch, 87: "If a claim is to be satisfied out of a fund which is accessible only by the aid of a court of chancery, application may be made in the first instance to that court which will not require that the claim should be first established in a court of law." The jurisdiction in this class of cases is based upon the peculiar right of a court of chancery to decree and enforce a trust. It is not pretended by the complainant in the case at bar that he comes within this class of cases. He is not seeking satisfaction out of a trust fund belonging to his debtor which is beyond the power of a court of law to reach.
Another class of cases is where the creditor, after having obtained his judgment at law, seeks to set aside and remove a fraudulent conveyance made by the debtor, by which the property of the debtor has been placed beyond the reach of an execution. In a case like this, it is said, the creditor may come into a court of chancery as soon as he obtains his judgment and ask to have the fraudulent conveyance set aside, without waiting for the return of an unsatisfied execution. It cannot be contended that the complainant has brought himself, by the allegations of his bill, within this class of cases. It is not stated or pretended in any of the allegations of the bill that the deed from Baca to Catron was fraudulent and void, or that it was made collusively, or with the intention to defraud the complainant or any of the creditors of Baca. There is not a line or a word in the bill that charges the deed to have been made fraudulently and without consideration. For aught that appears on the face of the bill, Catron may have bought this land in the atmost good faith, and for a valuable consideration paid by him to Baca. Indeed, we must assume, in the absence of an allegation in the bill to the contrary, that Catron bought this land in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, subject only to the rights of the complainant under his judgment lien.
Another and a much larger class of cases in which the creditor more frequently calls upon a court of chancery are those where the creditor seeks to satisfy his debt out of some equitable estate of the defendant, which is not liable to levy and sale under an execution at law,--where he seeks to remove an obstruction or a hindrance in the way of the enforcement of his levy and sale of the property. If the complainant could have any standing in a court of chancery for the enforcement of his demands in this case, it must be that he intends to bring himself under this latter class of cases. Do the allegations of the bill show a state of facts which entitles the complainant to the aid of a court of equity in the enforcement of his demands under his execution? It is a proposition too well settled by a line of decisions, both state and federal, to admit of controversy, that in this latter class of c...
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