Stanton v. Graham

• Decision Date: 05 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2011AP515.,2011AP515.
• Citation: 820 N.W.2d 155,2012 WI App 97,344 Wis.2d 123
• Parties: Thomas D. STANTON, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Alfonso GRAHAM, William Rankin, David Braithwaite, Kenneth L. Lund and Peter F. Mannenbach, Defendants–Respondents, Quala Champagne, Brent Boehlke, Joe Longueville, Rose Ann Bisch, Amy Lang and Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision, Defendants.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

344 Wis.2d 123

820 N.W.2d 155

2012 WI App 97

Thomas D. STANTON, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v. Alfonso GRAHAM, William Rankin, David Braithwaite, Kenneth L. Lund and Peter F. Mannenbach, Defendants–Respondents,Quala Champagne, Brent Boehlke, Joe Longueville, Rose Ann Bisch, Amy Lang and Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision, Defendants.

No. 2011AP515.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

July 5, 2012.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREAppeal from orders of the circuit court for Dane County: Shelley J. Gaylord, Judge. Affirmed.

Before VERGERONT, HIGGINBOTHAM and SHERMAN, JJ.¶ 1PER CURIAM.

Thomas Stanton appeals several orders dismissing the defendants named in his civil complaint. We affirm.

¶ 2 Stanton first argues that Minnesota officials violated his right to due process by declining to accept his parole transfer from Wisconsin for “false, insufficient or capricious reasons.” We reject the argument as inadequately developed. The circuit court dismissed the claims against the Minnesota defendants on the grounds that Stanton did not have a constitutional right to parole transfer. Stanton's brief does not develop an argument on that point, and therefore does not persuade us that the circuit court erred. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis.2d 627, 646–47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct.App.1992). While we make some allowances for the failings of parties who, as here, are not represented by counsel, “[w]e cannot serve as both advocate and judge.” Id., 171 Wis.2d at 647, 492 N.W.2d 633.

¶ 3 Stanton's second argument is that Wisconsin officials violated Stanton's due process rights and rules governing the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender supervision, and abused their discretion by not pursuing mediation, arbitration, and dispute resolution with Minnesota authorities. This argument is also not sufficiently developed. The only legal provisions Stanton cites are general ones in the compact that relate to establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism. SeeWis. Stat. § 304.16(8)(f)10. and (9) (2009–10). ¹ He does not point to any specific provision that required a Wisconsin official to do any particular act on the facts Stanton has alleged. Furthermore, although the circuit court rejected these claims on the ground that prisoners do not have standing to bring actions to enforce the compact's provisions, Stanton has not cited any legal authority showing that prisoners have such standing.

¶ 4 Stanton's third argument is that his due process rights were violated at the parole rescission hearing. We treat this argument as relating to two separate claims: a certiorari claim for reversal of the rescission decision, and a tort action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money damages or other relief. As to Stanton's claims under § 1983, the circuit court dismissed these in part on grounds of judicial immunity for certain decisionmakers, and qualified immunity as to a State Public...