Stanton v. Jarvis Christian Coll.

• Decision Date: 11 March 2022
• Docket Number: 20-40581
• Parties: Akia Stanton, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jarvis Christian College, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Akia Stanton, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jarvis Christian College, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-40581

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

March 11, 2022

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:18-CV-479

Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Clement and Higginson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: ^[*]

Akia Stanton was the head women's basketball coach at Jarvis Christian College until the college fired her in June of 2018. She sued, and her Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claims went to a jury, which found in her favor and awarded her $12, 500 in compensatory damages. After

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the jury returned its verdict, the college filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) or, alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59. The district court denied the motion and the college appealed, challenging the sufficiency of Stanton's evidence and several jury instructions. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I.

Stanton's FMLA claims derive from events spanning a few weeks in the summer of 2018.^[1] Stanton, like other employees, was required to help with the college's student recruitment efforts during the summer. Frustrated with the staff's (lack of) productivity on that front, the President of Jarvis called an all-hands meeting at which he threatened to terminate employees for absenteeism. This coincided with a worsening of Stanton's anxiety and depression; she was suffering panic attacks, chest and stomach pains, and had bouts of uncontrollable crying at work. Stanton scheduled an appointment with a nurse practitioner who, after evaluating her for anxiety and depression, referred her for psychiatric treatment, prescribed medication, and wrote a note on her behalf excusing her from work from June 8 to June 25.

Jarvis's Director of Human Resources was not satisfied with the note, so she emailed Stanton an FMLA medical certification form for the provider to complete. Stanton sent it to the nurse practitioner promptly, who completed it and faxed it back to Jarvis later the same day. On the form, the nurse indicated Stanton's conditions as "anxiety" and "depression," that she had been prescribed medication, and that she was referred to "psych, "

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which would determine the nature and duration of future treatments. The HR Director was still not satisfied, though. The nurse practitioner had indicated that the answers to certain questions were "unknown" and would need to be determined by a psychiatrist. On June 21, the HR Director told Stanton that, within seven days, the nurse practitioner needed to provide specifics "in the areas where she answered the questions by stating 'unknown,' 'as determined by,' and/or 'to be determined by.'" On the seventh day, Stanton emailed back that she had "notified" her doctor of "the 7 day request," and that they were working together to "ensure [HR would] receive the proper information."

In the meantime, a security video taken on June 15 had recorded Stanton removing various items from her office and loading them into her car. The video showed Stanton taking chairs, a couch, athletic and teaching equipment, and various boxes. As the district court summarized the trial evidence, the ownership of the items was "hotly disputed" at trial. Jarvis's athletic director testified that at least some of the items belonged to the college. Stanton testified that everything she removed was her own property. "Jarvis reported the incident to law enforcement on June 19, but testimony at trial established that the case was subsequently closed due to lack of prosecutable evidence."

On June 29, the day after Stanton responded that she was working to provide a corrected certification form, Jarvis denied Stanton's FMLA leave and terminated her. The college's theory of the case was that Stanton had already secured a coaching position at another college out of state, and that her FMLA leave was a sham. Stanton argued that the college fired her for exercising her right to FMLA leave. The jury found for Stanton and awarded her $12, 500 in damages.

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II.

We first consider the sufficiency of the evidence. Ordinarily, we review sufficiency de novo. Duvall v. Dallas Cnty., 631 F.3d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). But if the defendant fails to move for judgment as a matter of law "before the case is submitted to the jury," our review is for plain error. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2); McKenzie v. Lee, 259 F.3d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Here, the district court found that Jarvis had failed to do so.

We recognize certain exceptions to the strict requirements of Rule 50 when the "purposes of the rule are satisfied." Scottish Heritable Tr., PLC v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 81 F.3d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 1996).

As we have often recited, the two basic purposes of this rule are to enable the trial court to re-examine the question of evidentiary insufficiency as a matter of law if the jury returns a verdict contrary to the movant, and to alert the opposing party to the insufficiency before the case is submitted to the jury.

Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

For instance, we have recognized that an "objection to proposed jury instructions on grounds pertaining to the sufficiency of evidence issues it seeks to appeal may satisfy these purposes." Id. (citations omitted). And although we are dubious of Jarvis's suggestion that it raised a Rule 50(a) motion per se, the record certainly reflects its objection on those grounds. Even so, the district court's finding that Jarvis deprived Stanton of "an opportunity to cure any claimed insufficiency before the case was submitted to the jury" might have been significant.

Yet, we have also said that a nonmoving party's "fail[ure] to raise this forfeiture claim in opposition to the Rule 50(b) motion . . . precludes raising

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the forfeiture claim on appeal." Arsement v. Spinnaker Expl. Co., 400 F.3d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Thompson & Wallace of Memphis, Inc. v. Falconwood Corp., 100 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir. 1996); Horton v. Bank One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2004)). Stanton did not object; indeed, in her opposition to Jarvis's Rule 50(b) motion she expressed her understanding that Jarvis had "orally moved the Court for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2), which the Court denied."

Rather than rush headlong into this sui generis exception-to-an-exception, we merely assume without deciding that Jarvis preserved its challenge and proceed de novo. Accordingly, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1); see WickFire, L.L.C. v. Woodruff, 989 F.3d 343, 352 (5th Cir. 2021), as revised (Mar. 2, 2021). We "draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all credibility determinations" in Stanton's favor. Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 2016).

Jarvis renews the arguments it made to the district court that Stanton failed to present evidence that she: (1) was covered by the FMLA, (2) cured deficiencies in her medical certification form, or (3) suffered harm from any alleged violation. Like the district court, we find that the jury had "a legally sufficient evidentiary basis" to find for Stanton on these issues. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1).

The crux of Jarvis's argument is that the nurse practitioner's referral of Stanton for further psychiatric evaluation rendered the certification inadequate. But Jarvis's cited authority involves medical professionals who said the opposite of the nurse practitioner here. In Boyd v. State Farm Insurance Companies, physicians testified that the plaintiff "was not incapacitated within the meaning of the Act." 158 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1998).

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And in Comeaux-Bisor v. YMCA of Greater Houston, the plaintiff's medical certification form inadequately said that she "was able to work and would require only routine prenatal care" during her pregnancy. 290 Fed.Appx. 722, 725 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Stanton's nurse certified and testified to the opposite.

Contrary to Jarvis's suggestion that Stanton did not suffer "a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of [her] position," 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D), the district court catalogued "substantial evidence" adduced at trial and ignored by Jarvis. The nurse practitioner who evaluated Stanton and certified her medical form wrote that Stanton's anxiety and depression could cause "episodic flare-ups periodically preventing the employee from performing [her] job functions," that she prescribed medication, and that Stanton would need time off for a psychiatric appointment. The nurse also testified that Stanton presented at her evaluation with symptoms consistent with those diagnoses, and that she would not have certified the form otherwise. Moreover, Stanton herself testified that her anxiety and depression had been worsening at work, that she was suffering chest and stomach pains, that she had been crying at work, and that she sought medical treatment as a result.

Similarly, we see no obvious deficiency in the form here. See Urban v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 393 F.3d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b)) (listing requirements), clarified on denial of reh'g, 398 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2005). The uncertain prognosis was the "probable duration of the condition," 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b)(2), but even that is misleading because the nurse practitioner informed Jarvis how long Stanton would need to be absent from work. Moreover, we agree with the district court's assessment that "the evidence at trial showed that Stanton was attempting to cure any problems when Jarvis denied her leave request and fired her." See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c) ("The employer must provide the employee with seven

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