Stanton v. Joyner, Case No. 3:19-cv-00270
| Decision Date | 06 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-00270 |
| Parties | DUSTIN STANTON, Plaintiff, v. RUBY JOYNER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
This civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises out of pro se Plaintiff Dustin Stanton's pretrial detention at the Davidson County Maximum Correctional Center (MCC). (Doc. No. 1.) Stanton, who appears in forma pauperis, alleges that MCC officials violated his constitutional rights by failing to protect him from a violent assault by another inmate. (Id.) Defendants Officer Jennifer Cobbs, Lieutenant Kevin Cole, and Sergeant Nicholas Pallak have filed a motion to dismiss Stanton's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. No. 15.) Cobbs, Cole, and Pallak invoke the doctrine of qualified immunity and argue that Stanton's claims fail as a matter of law because he has not adequately alleged that they violated his clearly established constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 16.) Stanton has responded in opposition (Doc. No. 23); Cobbs, Cole, and Pallak have filed a reply (Doc. No. 24); and Stanton has filed a sur-reply (Doc. No. 25). For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge will recommend that the Court deny Cobbs, Cole, and Pallak's motion to dismiss.
Stanton alleges that, on January 23, 2019, an officer at MCC gave Stanton's bag of commissary items, worth $45.15, to an inmate on Stanton's list of "incompatibles[.]" (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 7.) Stanton filed a claim and was reimbursed for the commissary items. (Doc. No. 1.) On January 24, 2019, "fear[ing] for [his] safety[,]" Stanton asked to be placed in protective custody. (Id. at PageID# 7.) His request was granted. (Doc. Nos. 1, 5.)
A month later, on February 24, 2019, Stanton was attacked and beaten unconscious in the recreation yard by inmate Josh Raines. (Doc. No. 1.) Stanton was still in protective custody at the time of the attack. (Id.) Raines was "a disruptive inmate serving disciplinary time with a 15[-year] sentence waiting on [a] T.D.O.C. bus to take him to prison[.]" (Id. at PageID# 9.) When Stanton was attacked, he was wearing full restraints, including leg irons and a belly chain with handcuffs; Raines was not wearing leg irons, and the handcuffs attached to his belly chain were "loose enough to easily take off." (Id. at PageID# 7.) Raines told Stanton, "'I got you [ ]now you check in bit--,' meaning protective custody inmate, and started throwing blow after blow" to Stanton's face and body. (Id. ().) Stanton tried to duck his head but could not defend himself because of his restraints. (Doc. No. 1.) Raines knocked Stanton unconscious for a few seconds, injured his face and body, and chipped his teeth. (Id.)
Stanton alleges that, "since November 2018[,] . . . numerous inmate[-]on[-]inmate assaults have occurred . . . at MCC . . . ." (Id. at PageID# 9.) He states that MCC policies and procedures require officers to separate inmates with different security statuses during recreation. (Doc. No. 1.)In fact, the MCC recreation yard is designed to implement this policy—it has several "split cages" to segregate inmates with different security statuses, and no more than five inmates are supposed to be in each cage for recreation at one time. (Id. at PageID# 8.) But on the day Stanton was attacked, Lt. Cole and Sgt. Pallak, who were working security operations, and Officer Cobbs, who was the recreation officer, "let[ ] ALL status inmates rec together[,]" including inmates serving disciplinary time, like Raines, and inmates in protective custody, like Stanton. (Id.) Cobbs also "put[ ] more than 5 inmates" together in the same cage (id. at PageID# 9); there were "at least 13 inmates on 1 side of the fence" (id. at PageID# 8) that day with "plainly . . . different [security] status[es]" (id. at PageID# 9). According to Stanton, "they run recreation like that because it gets done faster and easier" (id. at PageID# 8), but they are "not following policies and procedures" (id. at PageID# 9).
The Court received Stanton's complaint, request for appointment of counsel, and application to proceed in forma pauperis on April 3, 2019. (Doc. Nos. 1, 1-2, 2.) His complaint seeks $250,000.00 in damages from each defendant and injunctive relief allowing him to undergo an MRI and to see a dentist for his injuries. (Doc. No. 1.)
The Court granted Stanton's application to proceed in forma pauperis, denied his request to appoint counsel without prejudice to refiling, and screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. (Doc. Nos. 5, 6.) The Court found, for purposes of initial review, that Stanton's complaint states colorable claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Cobbs, Cole, and Pallak in their individual capacities for deliberate indifference to his safety in violationof the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. (Doc. No. 5.) However, the Court dismissed Stanton's claims against all other defendants.2 (Doc. Nos. 5, 6.)
Cobbs, Cole, and Pallak moved to dismiss Stanton's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 15.) They argue that they are entitled to dismissal under the doctrine of qualified immunity "because it was not clearly established that their conduct, as alleged, amounted to a 'failure to protect'" Stanton. (Doc. No. 16, PageID# 71.) Stanton responds that all three defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety and violated established policies and procedures for segregating inmates during recreation time, that the attack he suffered "could have and should have been prevented[,]" and that Raines's disciplinary record and other evidence will support his claims. (Doc. No. 23, PageID# 90.) Cobbs, Cole, and Pallak reply that Stanton has failed to "provide any support for the notion that any of [them], individually, was subjectively aware of a substantial risk to [Stanton] and disregarded that risk . . . ." (Doc. No. 24, PageID# 96.) Stanton filed a sur-reply without leave, attaching MCC disciplinary records regarding the assault. (Doc. Nos. 25, 25-1.)
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, "[t]he factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead 'sufficient factual matter' to render the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely possible." Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)).
"The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). A plaintiff must plead more than "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
Because Stanton proceeds pro se, the Court construes his filings "'liberally'" and holds his complaint "'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). There are limits to liberal construction, however, and "courts are not required to conjure up unpleaded allegations or guess at the nature of an argument." Brown v. Cracker Barrel Rest., 22 F. App'x 577, 578 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
"Section 1983 provides a civil enforcement mechanism for all inmates [and pretrial detainees] who suffer constitutional injuries at the hands of '[a]ny person acting under color of state law.'" Ford v. Cty. of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483, 494 (6th Cir. 2008) () (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). A plaintiff alleging claims under § 1983 must make two showings to survive a motion to dismiss: "one, 'a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acted under color of state law'; and two, 'a plaintiff must allege that the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured under federal law.'" Bright v. Gallia Cty., 753 F.3d 639, 653 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012)). Here, Stanton alleges that Davidson County employees Cobbs, Cole, and Pallak showed deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment right to be free from violence perpetrated by other inmates. (Doc. No. 1.) Cobbs, Cole, and Pallak have raised qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to Stanton's claims. (Doc. Nos. 16, 24.)
"The qualified-immunity doctrine shields government officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability unless their conduct violates clearly established rights." Quigley v. Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2013). The goal behind qualified immunity is to "'balance[ ] two important interests—the need to hold...
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