Stanton v. Lloyd Hammond Produce Farms, 58154

• Decision Date: 06 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. 58154,58154
• Citation: 253 N.W.2d 114,400 Mich. 135
• Parties: Ronald W. STANTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LLOYD HAMMOND PRODUCE FARMS and Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 114

253 N.W.2d 114

400 Mich. 135

Ronald W. STANTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LLOYD HAMMOND PRODUCE FARMS and Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 58154.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May 6, 1977.

Farhat, Burns & Story, P. C., Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee by Vittorio E. Porco, Lansing.

Munroe & Nobach, P. C., East Lansing, for defendants-appellants by Richard R. Weiser, East Lansing.

FITZGERALD, Justice.

Defendants appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals which reversed a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. 67 Mich.App. 279, 240 N.W.2d 773 (1976). The dispute involves two issues:

1. Whether plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with defendant.

2. Whether an agricultural worker is entitled to weekly benefits for a work-related injury sustained prior to our decision in Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co., 388 Mich. 654, 202 N.W.2d 786 (1972), which held that the agricultural exclusion in the Worker's Disability Compensation Act of 1969, 1969 P.A. 317, § 115(d); M.C.L.A. § 418.115(d); M.S.A. § 17.237(115)(d), was in violation of the equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions.

The Court of Appeals decided these issues in the affirmative. We affirm.

Plaintiff drove a truck for defendant Lloyd Hammond Produce Farms, delivering produce to cities in southern Michigan and Indiana. His weekly wage of $84.40 consisted of piecework and hourly earnings. On March 1, 1972, plaintiff had driven his employer's truck to Battle Creek, Kalamazoo, Jackson, and Detroit delivering potatoes. After making his last delivery in Detroit at 5 or 5:30 in the afternoon, plaintiff began his return trip on I-96 to defendant's farm in East Lansing. Plaintiff turned north on M-52 from I-96. On M-52, plaintiff's truck skidded on a patch of ice and rolled over, causing personal injuries to plaintiff.

A hearing was held in March 1973, and the referee awarded wage benefits of $56.53 per week from March 2, 1972 to May 4, 1972 and medical expenses. The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, in a three-to-two decision, reversed on the award of wage benefits, deciding against retroactive application of Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co., supra. However, the board unanimously agreed that plaintiff's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment and affirmed the award of medical expenses. Defendant Lloyd Hammond Produce Farms had the agricultural medical coverage required by M.C.L.A. § 418.115(e); M.S.A. § 17.237(115)(e). The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of medical expenses and reinstated the referee's award of weekly wage benefits.

I

Defendants argue that the injuries sustained by plaintiff did not arise out of and in the course of his employment and, therefore, are not in any way compensable. It is clear from the record that on plaintiff's return trip from Detroit to his employer's farm in East Lansing on March 1, 1972, he turned north on M-52 from I-96 for the purpose of stopping by his sister's home, where he had been staying, to tell her that he would be home that night and to inform his brother-in-law that he would need a ride home from the farm. Plaintiff's sister lived near the intersection of M-52 and M-78, and plaintiff intended to proceed southwest on M-78 to his employer's farm in East Lansing after he had made arrangements for a ride home from work. However, the accident happened on M-52 before plaintiff reached his sister's house. Ordinarily, plaintiff would have continued on I-96 past M-52 on a trip from Detroit to his employer's farm. The route taken by plaintiff on the day of the accident would have added about ten miles to the total trip, and defendants claim that this deviation was such a departure from his employment as to be a bar to plaintiff's workmen's compensation claim.

In Thomas v. Certified Refrigeration, Inc., 392 Mich. 623, 221 N.W.2d 378 (1974), this Court overruled the holding of Conklin v. Industrial Transport, Inc., 312 Mich. 250, 20 N.W.2d 179 (1945), that even a slight deviation to carry out a personal mission would preclude compensation. In Thomas this Court found that a workman's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment where plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident in his employer's truck, which he was permitted to keep at home overnight, while deviating from his normal route to work to take his daughter to school. After reviewing Nemeth v. Michigan Building Components, 390 Mich. 734, 213 N.W.2d 144 (1973); Burchett v. Delton-Kellogg School, 378 Mich. 231, 144 N.W.2d 337 (1966); and Howard v. Detroit, 377 Mich. 102, 139 N.W.2d 677 (1966), the Thomas Court said:

"We do not suggest that every authorized use of a company-owned vehicle or deviation from a business route will fall within this triad of cases. An authorized but totally private excursion such as using the company vehicle for weekend personal errands certainly is not covered because such trips lack a dual purpose required by Burchett or 'a sufficient nexus between the employment and the injury' required by Nemeth. If a personal business detour is so great that the deviation dwarfs the business portion of the trip, it no longer can be said that it is 'a circumstance of (the) employment' as required by Howard. This Court will not attempt to fix any formula, but in any case the nature of the deviation must be balanced against the clarity of authorization and effect of the activity on the employment relationship or the interests of the employer." 392 Mich. 623, 634-635, 221 N.W.2d 378, 384.

In the instant case, the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board correctly found that plaintiff's alternative route on the day of his injuries constituted a "slight deviation". Also, plaintiff testified that his sister's telephone was temporarily out of order and that the only way to tell her of his whereabouts and to make arrangements for a ride home from work was to see her personally. On the previous evening plaintiff had worked too late to get a ride home and had to spend the night in his employer's truck. In view of these circumstances, there was a sufficient nexus between plaintiff's employment and his injuries to warrant compensation.

Defendants argue that Thomas is not applicable in the instant case since there is no evidence that plaintiff's employer authorized plaintiff's deviation for personal business. Thomas avoided ruling on the "further issue whether injury is compensable which occurs off the employer's premises during a personal activity unapproved by the employer but where the activity is reasonably incidental to the employment relationship". 392 Mich. 623, 636, 221 N.W.2d 378, 385. However, there is no indication that plaintiff's employer ever gave any instructions as to what route he was to follow in making his deliveries. Thus, while plaintiff's deviation may not have been expressly authorized, it was certainly not beyond the contemplation of his employer in view of the amount of driving plaintiff did for his employer and the factual basis which necessitated plaintiff's slightly longer alternative route.

In Thomas, this Court suggested the extension of the rule in Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 91 N.W.2d 493 (1958), from its factory locale to vehicle cases. Crilly involved the issue of whether injuries resulting from horseplay at the job site arose out of and in the course of employment. In reaching his conclusion that such deviation from regular employment was part of the work environment, and thus, that resulting injuries were compensable, Justice Talbot Smith in Crilly quoted from Secor v. Penn Service Garage, 19 N.J. 315, 117 A.2d 12 (1955), as follows:

" 'An employee is not an automaton, and, even when he is highly efficient, he will to some extent deviate from the uninterrupted performance of his work. Such deviation, if it be considered minor in the light of the particular time, place and circumstance, is realistically viewed by both the employer and the employee as a normal incidence of the employment relation and ought not in this day be viewed as legally breaching the course thereof. Fulfillment of the high purposes of our socially important and ever broadening workmen's compensation act suggests this approach and nothing in the statutory terms dictates any narrower position.' " 353 Mich. 303, 314, 91 N.W.2d 493, 499-500.

In view of the foregoing, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with defendant.

II

Defendants challenge the award of wage benefits to plaintiff on the basis of M.C.L.A. § 418.115(d); M.S.A. § 17.237(115)(d). Defendants maintain that since plaintiff's accident preceded this Court's holding in Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co., supra, that decision is not applicable to the instant case. Gallegos held that M.C.L.A. § 418.115(d); M.S.A. § 17.237(115)(d) was unconstitutional because it excluded certain agricultural employees from the coverage of the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act of 1969, thus denying them equal protection of the laws. The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board agreed with defendants' argument and gave Gallegos prospective application. Plaintiff urges that Gallegos be given retroactive application, arguing that the statutory exclusion was void ab initio. The Court of Appeals consciously avoided the application of the void ab initio theory to the agricultural exclusion, but found that the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board's application of the exclusion violated plaintiff's right to equal protection and reversed the board's denial of wage benefits.

It is a general rule of statutory interpretation that an unconstitutional statute is void ab initio. This principle is stated in 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 177, pp. 402-403, as follows:

"The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law,...