Stanton v. Sullivan
| Decision Date | 07 February 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 1417.,1417. |
| Citation | 4 A.2d 269 |
| Parties | STANTON et al. v. SULLIVAN et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; G. Frederick Frost, Judge.
Proceeding in equity by Helena V. Stanton and others against Mary I. Sullivan and others, wherein Eileen Whalen, an infant, was later made a party respondent, for partition of real estate. From a decree sustaining a demurrer filed by Eileen Whalen's guardian, but without dismissing complainants' bill, complainants appeal.
Appeal dismissed without prejudice, and cause remanded for further proceedings.
Thomas L. Carty, of Pawtucket, for appellants.
Woolley, Blais & Quinn and John F. Quinn, all of Pawtucket, for appellees.
This is a bill in equity praying for the partition of certain real estate in the city of Pawtucket. By his will, James A. Whalen, late of Pawtucket, deceased, devised an undivided half interest in this property to each of his two daughters, Helena V. Stanton and Mary I. Sullivan, for life, with remainders on the death of the survivor of these daughters to their living children. The cause comes to us on the complainants' appeal from a decree of the superior court sustaining a demurrer by the guardian ad litem of an infant respondent, hereafter referred to in some instances merely as guardian for convenience.
An examination of the travel of this cause shows that the original bill did not make this infant a party respondent. The adult respondents demurred to the bill on the single ground that "the estate devised to the complainants and to the respondents is not such an estate as a court of equity can partition either by metes and bounds or sale during the joint lives of Helena V. Stanton and Mary I. Sullivan and the life of the survivor of them." This demurrer was overruled, and the adult respondents later filed an amended answer to the bill admitting all its allegations. The case was apparently then ready for hearing for final decree, but there has been no such hearing.
The complainants thereafter moved that Eileen Whalen, of the city of New York, be made a party respondent, and a decree to that effect was accordingly entered, neither the motion nor the decree showing that Eileen Whalen was an infant, or what, if any, interest she had in the real estate. No statement of such interest has since been made a matter of record or even set forth in any of the pleadings. When the fact of infancy was called to the attention of the court, it appointed the counsel for the adult respondents as guardian ad litem for the infant. The decree appointing such guardian, in addition to directing the guardian to file an answer, authorized him to "file such other motions or pleadings as he may deem proper to protect the interests of said minor respondent." (Italics ours)
A guardian ad litem is not an attorney for the infant, but an officer appointed by the court to assist it in properly protecting the interests of the infant. It is fundamental that he be an impartial person not otherwise interested in the proceeding and not an advocate for other parties whose interests may possibly conflict with those of the infant. In the instant case it is impossible for us to tell from the record whether there is such a conflict of interests; but, if such conflict should appear later, another and impartial...
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Lindsey C., Matter of
...case discussing a Colorado procedure by which either but not necessarily both officers are to be appointed. See also Stanton v. Sullivan, 62 R.I. 154, 4 A.2d 269, 270 (1939), and Dawson v. Garcia, 666 S.W.2d 254, 265 (Tex.App. 5 Dist.1984).16 Conflict can be anticipated from any matter whic......
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Dawson v. Garcia
...for the infant, but an officer appointed by the court to assist it in properly protecting the infant's interests. Stanton v. Sullivan, 62 R.I. 154, 4 A.2d 269, 270 (1939). A guardian ad litem is the personal representative of an individual subject to a disability who is appointed to protect......
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Dooling v. Overholser, 13499.
...competent." The representative, however, must be "an impartial person not otherwise interested in the proceeding." Stanton v. Sullivan, 62 R.I. 154, 4 A.2d 269, 270. See, also, Bank of United States v. Ritchie, 8 Pet. 128, 143, 33 U.S. 128, 143, 8 L.Ed. 890. Subject to these qualifications ......
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Zinni v. Zinni
...ad litem for the protection of the minor's interests. See Keenan v. Flanagan, 50 R.I. 321, 147 A. 617 (1929), and Stanton v. Sullivan, 62 R.I. 154, 4 A.2d 269 (1939). His jurisdiction in this regard, however, must be exercised sub judice to the end that the guardian thus appointed can assis......