Stapf v. United States, No. 19837

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
• Writing for the Court: BASTIAN, Senior Circuit , and WRIGHT and LEVENTHAL, Circuit
• Citation: 125 US App. DC 100,367 F.2d 326
• Parties: Edward W. STAPF, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Lester KERR, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Edward W. STAPF, Appellant, v. Nicholas deB. KATZENBACH et al., Appellees. William HOLLINGSWORTH, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Docket Number: 19976.,No. 19837,19884,19849
• Decision Date: 04 August 1966

125 US App. DC 100, 367 F.2d 326 (1966)

Edward W. STAPF, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Lester KERR, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Edward W. STAPF, Appellant,
v.
Nicholas deB. KATZENBACH et al., Appellees.
William HOLLINGSWORTH, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Nos. 19837, 19849, 19884, 19976.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 28, 1966.

Decided August 4, 1966.

367 F.2d 327

Mr. Martin J. Gaynes, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court) for appellants.

Mr. Charles L. Owen, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief for appellee.

Before BASTIAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WRIGHT and LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judges.

LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:

These cases, consolidated on appeal, present the common question whether the District Court acted lawfully when it refused to accord a convicted defendant credit against his sentence for the time he spent in custody for want of bail prior to sentence.

The facts in No. 19837 are as follows: Appellant, Edward Stapf, was arrested on May 23, 1962, and charged with interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964). Stapf was promptly admitted to bail in the amount of $1000, but was unable to secure a bail bond for this amount.¹ He was therefore committed to the District of Columbia Jail where he remained in custody for some five months. On October 19, 1962, he was convicted on a plea of guilty to the charged violation of § 2312, and he was thereupon sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1964). Subsequently, Stapf moved for resentencing. This motion was granted on May 11, 1964, at which time the District Court vacated his original sentence and resentenced him to a term of 20 months to five years, the latter being the maximum sentence authorized by § 2312. The court, in addition, ordered the new sentence to take effect retroactively from October 19, 1962, thereby crediting him with the time he had spent in custody under his original Youth Corrections Act sentence. However, by sentencing Stapf to the maximum five-year term allowable, the court refused credit for the period of five months spent in custody prior to sentencing for want of bail.² Stapf immediately filed a series of unsuccessful pro se motions under Rule 35, FED.R.CRIM.P., requesting credit against his sentence for this five-month period of detention. The denial of the latest of these motions is the subject of his appeal.

The cases of the other two appellants consolidated on this appeal, Nos. 19849 and 19976, present the same basic factual pattern: In both cases the appellant, who was admitted to bail but was unable to secure a bail bond, was incarcerated in the District of Columbia Jail for a period of about three months prior to sentencing. Each appellant was ultimately sentenced to the maximum term authorized by statute and no credit was given by the sentencing court for the time spent in jail for want of bail. Subsequently, the District Court denied appellants' pro se motions under Rule 35, which alleged that denial of such credit was illegal.

Appellants stress the fact that their total time in custody exceeds that of defendants who were likewise sentenced to the maximum term allowable by statute, but had previously been able to secure bail. Appellants conclude that the District Court's refusal to give them credit, in effect, creates two sets of maximum sentences, one for the poor (those who are unable to make bail), and one for the rich (those who are able to procure a bail bond), a distinction which denies the former equal protection of the

367 F.2d 328

law. We need not consider this argument because we find other factors present in these cases which render the court's denial of credit for presentence custody illegal.³

None of the appellants was sentenced under a statute which prescribed a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for the offense (hereafter referred to as a minimum term offense). Those sentenced for minimum term offenses automatically receive credit for their presentence custody under 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1964) which provides:

The Attorney General shall give any such person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody prior to the imposition of sentence by the sentencing court for want of bail set for the offense under which sentence was imposed where the statute requires the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence.

This provision for automatic credit was added to § 3568 by Congress in 1960. The legislative history⁴ reveals the assumptions and purposes of Congress: Congress was aware of and approved the general practice of federal courts to provide defendants credit against their sentence for time spent in jail for lack of bail. But in the absence of a statutory amendment a court did not have authority to give such credit to defendants sentenced for minimum term offenses. This situation, in the view of Congress, created an unwarranted disparity in the effective sentences of defendants convicted of minimum term offenses, in terms of total time in detention, between those who made bail and those who did not. To remove this disparity Congress amended § 3568 to provide an automatic credit for minimum term offenses. This authorization also applies to minimum term offenses under the District of Columbia Code.⁵

Congress made no provision in this amendment for defendants sentenced for offenses not carrying minimum terms of imprisonment (hereafter referred to as lesser offenses) because it assumed that a credit for presentence custody for want of bail would continue to be provided by sentencing courts as a matter of course. The failure of the District Court in the cases before us to act in accordance with that congressional assumption of credit has generated a new unforeseen disparity in treatment among defendants unable to make bail, whereby those sentenced for lesser offenses are subject to denial of the credit automatically accorded those sentenced for minimum term offenses.

This disparity in treatment constitutes an irrational and arbitrary classification. The general statutory pattern, while not entirely consistent, is that the more serious crimes require mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment while the less serious and lesser included offenses...