Staples v. Joseph Morton Co., Inc., 77 C 2357.

• Decision Date: 09 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77 C 2357.,77 C 2357.
• Parties: Stuart E. STAPLES, d/b/a 5th Avenue Concrete Mobile Service, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH MORTON CO., INC. and Merlon E. Wiggin, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

444 F. Supp. 1312

Stuart E. STAPLES, d/b/a 5th Avenue Concrete Mobile Service, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH MORTON CO., INC. and Merlon E. Wiggin, Defendants.

No. 77 C 2357.

United States District Court, E. D. New York.

February 9, 1978.

Melvin R. Cannon, Bay Shore, N. Y., for plaintiff.

Tunstead & Schecter, New York City (John R. Maguire, New York City, of counsel), for defendant Joseph Morton Co., Inc.

David G. Trager, U. S. Atty. for E. D. N. Y., Brooklyn, N. Y. (Robert L. Begleiter, Asst. U. S. Atty., Brooklyn, N. Y., of counsel), for defendant Merlon E. Wiggin.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NICKERSON, District Judge.

In this action commenced in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Suffolk County, plaintiff has sued defendant Joseph Morton Co., Inc. ("Morton") for rents due on a lease of various pieces of concrete mixing equipment for use on Plum Island, New York. Defendant Merlon E. Wiggin is Chief of Engineering and Plant Management of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center for the United States Department of Agriculture which administers Plum Island. In a second cause of action, plaintiff accuses Wiggin and Morton of conspiring to convert the equipment by refusing to release it for decontamination and delivery to the mainland.

Defendant Wiggin has removed the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Plaintiff now moves to remand the case to state court.

Plaintiff first claims that he is a "victim of subterfuge" in that defendant Wiggin "lured" the case into federal court only to assert various defenses based on sovereign immunity and the Federal Tort Claims Act. The assertion of these defenses does not render this action beyond the removal jurisdiction of this court. As indicated earlier Wiggin's petition for removal was based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which provides:

"A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:

(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting under him, for any act under color of such office . . ."

In Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406-07, 409, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 1816-17, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969), the Supreme Court held that a federal official may remove a state action pending against him and assert defenses based upon sovereign immunity:

"This section is broad enough to cover all cases where federal officers can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to enforce the law.

* * * * * *

"It was sufficient for the federal defendant to have shown that their relationship to plaintiff derived solely from their official duties."

Here, there is no doubt but that Wiggin's relation to plaintiff is based upon his duties as an employee of the Department of Agriculture on Plum Island with the responsibility for releasing materials used on the island for return to the mainland. The petition for removal properly invoked the jurisdiction of this court; the defenses asserted in defendant Wiggin's answer do not defeat that jurisdiction.

Plaintiff further claims that the petition for removal was untimely since it was filed more than thirty days after Wiggin received notice of the suit. The thirty-day time limit 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is not, however, jurisdictional. It may be waived, or an assertion of untimeliness may be barred by estoppel. Transport...