Staples v. Schmid

• Decision Date: 25 February 1893
• Citation: 26 A. 193,18 R.I. 224
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: STAPLES v. SCHMID et al.

26 A. 193

18 R.I. 224

STAPLES

v. SCHMID et al.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 25, 1893.

Action by Phoebe A. Staples against John M. Schmid and another to recover for her wrongful arrest, caused by defendants. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendants petition for a new trial. New trial granted, provided plaintiff refused to remit all damages in excess of $100.

George J. West, for plaintiff.

Frederick Rueckert, for defendants.

DOUGLAS, J. The jury have substantially found in this case that the defendants' salesman, erroneously suspecting the plaintiff of having stolen a package of spoons from the store, which was in his charge, detained her, sent for a police officer, and caused her to be sent to the police station, and there searched, and they assessed the damages to the plaintiff in the sum of $750. The defendants bring their petition for a new trial, alleging that the verdict is against the evidence; that, if the facts were as found, the defendants are not liable; and that the damages are excessive. The questions of law involved are raised by exceptions to the refusal of the presiding judge to rule as requested by the defendants, and by exceptions to the charge as given. The proposition upon which these exceptions are based, and which the defendants contend is established by the cases he cites, is that, as matter of law, it is not within the scope of the employment of a salesman left in charge of a store to cause the arrest and search of a person whom he believes to have stolen property from his custody. The general rule defining the liability of a master for the acts of his servant is thus laid down in Wood on Masterand Servant, (section 279:) "For all acts done by the servant under the express orders or direction of the master, as well as for all acts done in the execution of his master's business within the scope of his employment, the master is responsible; but when the act is not within the scope of his employment, or in obedience to the master's orders, it is the act of the servant, and not of the master, and the servant alone is responsible therefor." The principle of the rule is stated by Andrews, J., in Rounds v. Railroad Co., 64 N. Y. 129, as follows: "The master is liable only for the authorized acts of the servant, and the root of his liability for the servant's act is his consent, express or implied, thereto. When the master is to be considered as having authorized the wrongful act of the servant so as to make him liable for his misconduct is the point of difficulty. Where authority is conferred to act for another without special limitation, it carries with it, by implication, authority to do all things necessary to its execution; and, when it involves the discretion of the servant or the use of force towards or against another, the use of such discretion or force is a part of the thing authorized, and, when exercised, becomes, as to third persons, the discretion and act of the master.* * * The master who puts the servant in a place of trust or responsibility, or commits to him the management of his business or the care of his property, is justly held responsible when the servant, through lack of judgment or discretion, or from infirmity of temper, or under the influence of passion, aroused by the circumstances and the occasion, goes beyond the strict line of his duty or authority, and inflicts an unjustifiable injury upon another." It is not contended that this general rule is not settled by reason and authority, but the defendants say that the acts here complained of were not within the scope of their agent's employment. It is obvious that in most cases the question is one of fact. What are the limitations of an agent's or a servant's authority depends generally upon the things he is to do, the object he is set to accomplish, the degree of discretion which the position where he is placed and the exigencies of the occasion reasonably call for. These are matters of common knowledge when they pertain to the ordinary occupations of men, matters of fact, as well known to the jury as to the court, or inferences of fact from well-known or proven facts, which it is as much the province of the jury to draw as it is the province of the court to carry out a principle of law to particular deductions. It is only when the act under consideration is clearly foreign to the scope of the employment that the court can exclude it as a matter of law. Opinion of Denman, J., for a majority of the court in Burns v. Poulson, 42 Law J. C. P. 302, L. R. 8 C. P. 563. "What is or is not within the course of the servant's employment or the course of his authority is, within certain limits, a question of fact; and the decisions of the courts on the subject are not altogether consistent, or easily to be reconciled." Add. Torts, (6th Ed., by H. G. Wood,) *107. Some of these inconsistencies have evidently arisen from attempts to ascertain sharp legal distinctions where the cases presented legitimately only questions of fact. Bearing in mind these considerations, we may now consider the cases cited hy counsel as settling principles by which this case should be decided.

Two principles seem to be recognized by the English cases cited: First. That, when a servant not specially appointed to protect property arrests a person whom he supposes to have stolen his master's goods, the servant must be presumed to have acted in pursuance of his duty as a good citizen, and not in the scope of his employment as a servant. This was strenuously urged by counsel in Edwards v. Railway Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 445, and was adopted by the court as the rule for that case. We doubt its cogency as a rule of universal application. The arrest of a thief is not an ordinary necessity of commercial business. An attempt to steal is an extraordinary event which puts the guardian of the property to an instantaneous election of means to frustrate it. A clerk or salesman in such a case may ex necessitate be invested with duties and powers which are more germane to the scope of employment of an officer. The opinions of the judges, however, are instructive in this connection as showing assent to the converse of the proposition, which is nearer the case at bar. Keating, J., (page 448,) says: "If there is any evidence to fix the defendants, it must be upon an implied authority resulting from Holmes' position as their servant, and that raises, broadly, the question whether a person in the position of Holmes has implied authority to give into custody any one whom he suspects to have stolen his master's goods. I think there is no such implied authority. It is admitted that the point is new, and that there is no case in which such an authority has been assumed to exist. * * * There seems no grounds for saying that what was done was in the ordinary course of the business of the company, nor that it was for their benefit, except in so far as it is for the benefit of all the queen's subjects that a criminal should be convicted. If Holmes acted from a sense of the duty which rests on every one to give in charge a person whom he thinks is committing a felony, his conduct would in no way be connected with the defendants." Montague Smith, J., says: "No doubt, if in furtherance of the particular business of the company it is necessary to arrest a person, the servants of the company have an...