Staples v. United States, No. 92-1441.

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtThomas
PartiesSTAPLES v. UNITED STATES
Docket NumberNo. 92-1441.
Decision Date23 May 1994

511 U.S. 600

STAPLES
v.
UNITED STATES

No. 92-1441.

United States Supreme Court.

Argued November 30, 1993.

Decided May 23, 1994.


511 U.S. 601

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
511 U.S. 602

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which O'Connor, J., joined, post, p. 620. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 624.

Jennifer L. De Angelis argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief was Clark O. Brewster.

511 U.S. 602

James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and John F. De Pue.

Justice Thomas, delivered the opinion of the Court.

The National Firearms Act makes it unlawful for any person to possess a machinegun that is not properly registered with the Federal Government. Petitioner contends that, to convict him under the Act, the Government should have been required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the weapon he possessed had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of a machinegun. We agree and accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

The National Firearms Act (Act), 26 U. S. C. §§ 5801-5872, imposes strict registration requirements on statutorily defined "firearms." The Act includes within the term "firearm" a machinegun, § 5845(a)(6), and further defines a machinegun as "any weapon which shoots, . . . or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger," § 5845(b). Thus, any fully automatic weapon is a "firearm" within the meaning of the Act.1 Under the Act, all firearms must be registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record maintained by the Secretary of the Treasury. § 5841. Section 5861(d) makes it a crime, punishable

511 U.S. 603
by up to 10 years in prison, see § 5871, for any person to possess a firearm that is not properly registered

Upon executing a search warrant at petitioner's home, local police and agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) recovered, among other things, an AR-15 rifle. The AR-15 is the civilian version of the military's M-16 rifle, and is, unless modified, a semiautomatic weapon. The M-16, in contrast, is a selective fire rifle that allows the operator, by rotating a selector switch, to choose semiautomatic or automatic fire. Many M-16 parts are interchangeable with those in the AR-15 and can be used to convert the AR-15 into an automatic weapon. No doubt to inhibit such conversions, the AR-15 is manufactured with a metal stop on its receiver that will prevent an M-16 selector switch, if installed, from rotating to the fully automatic position. The metal stop on petitioner's rifle, however, had been filed away, and the rifle had been assembled with an M-16 selector switch and several other M-16 internal parts, including a hammer, disconnector, and trigger. Suspecting that the AR-15 had been modified to be capable of fully automatic fire, BATF agents seized the weapon. Petitioner subsequently was indicted for unlawful possession of an unregistered machinegun in violation of § 5861(d).

At trial, BATF agents testified that when the AR-15 was tested, it fired more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger. It was undisputed that the weapon was not registered as required by § 5861(d). Petitioner testified that the rifle had never fired automatically when it was in his possession. He insisted that the AR-15 had operated only semiautomatically, and even then imperfectly, often requiring manual ejection of the spent casing and chambering of the next round. According to petitioner, his alleged ignorance of any automatic firing capability should have shielded him from criminal liability for his failure to register the weapon. He requested the District Court to instruct the jury that, to establish a violation of § 5861(d), the Government must prove

511 U.S. 604
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "knew that the gun would fire fully automatically." 1 App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 91-5033 (CA10), p. 42

The District Court rejected petitioner's proposed instruction and instead charged the jury as follows:

"The Government need not prove the defendant knows he's dealing with a weapon possessing every last characteristic which subjects it2 to the regulation. It would be enough to prove he knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation." Tr. 465.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to five years' probation and a $5,000 fine.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying on its decision in United States v. Mittleider, 835 F. 2d 769 (CA10 1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 980 (1988), the court concluded that the Government need not prove a defendant's knowledge of a weapon's physical properties to obtain a conviction under § 5861(d). 971 F. 2d 608, 612-613 (CA10 1992). We granted certiorari, 508 U. S. 939 (1993), to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals concerning the mens rea required under § 5861(d).

II

A

Whether or not § 5861(d) requires proof that a defendant knew of the characteristics of his weapon that made it a "firearm" under the Act is a question of statutory construction. As we observed in Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419 (1985), "the definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute." Id. , at 424 (citing United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32

511 U.S. 605
(1812)). Thus, we have long recognized that determining the mental state required for commission of a federal crime requires "construction of the statute and . . . inference of the intent of Congress." United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 253 (1922). See also Liparota, supra, at 423

The language of the statute, the starting place in our inquiry, see Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-254 (1992), provides little explicit guidance in this case. Section 5861(d) is silent concerning the mens rea required for a violation. It states simply that "it shall be unlawful for any person . . . to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record." 26 U. S. C. § 5861(d). Nevertheless, silence on this point by itself does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea element, which would require that the defendant know the facts that make his conduct illegal. See Balint, supra, at 251 (stating that traditionally, "scienter " was a necessary element in every crime). See also n. 3, infra. On the contrary, we must construe the statute in light of the background rules of the common law, see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 436-437 (1978), in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded. As we have observed, "the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." Id., at 436 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 250 (1952) ("The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil").

There can be no doubt that this established concept has influenced our interpretation of criminal statutes. Indeed, we have noted that the common-law rule requiring mens rea

511 U.S. 606
has been "followed in regard to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it." Balint, supra, at 251-252. Relying on the strength of the traditional rule, we have stated that offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored, Liparota, supra, at 426, and have suggested that some indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime. Cf. United States Gypsum, supra, at 438; Morissette, supra, at 263

According to the Government, however, the nature and purpose of the Act suggest that the presumption favoring mens rea does not apply to this case. The Government argues that Congress intended the Act to regulate and restrict the circulation of dangerous weapons. Consequently, in the Government's view, this case fits in a line of precedent concerning what we have termed "public welfare" or "regulatory" offenses, in which we have understood Congress to impose a form of strict criminal liability through statutes that do not require the defendant to know the facts that make his conduct illegal. In construing such statutes, we have inferred from silence that Congress did not intend to require proof of mens rea to establish an offense.

For example, in Balint, we concluded that the Narcotic Act of 1914, which was intended in part to minimize the spread of addictive drugs by criminalizing undocumented sales of certain narcotics, required proof only that the defendant knew that he was selling drugs, not that he knew the specific items he had sold were "narcotics" within the ambit of the statute. See Balint, supra, at 254. Cf. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277, 281 (1943) (stating in dicta that a statute criminalizing the shipment of adulterated or misbranded drugs did not require knowledge that the items were misbranded or adulterated). As we explained in Dotterweich, Balint dealt with "a now familiar type of legislation whereby...

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1088 practice notes
  • Rehaif v. United States, No. 17-9560
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 21, 2019
    ...requires the Government to prove that the defendant acted knowingly is a question of congressional intent. See Staples v. United States , 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994). In determining Congress' intent, we start from a longstanding presumption, traceable to the co......
  • Welch v. U.S.A, No. 08-3108.
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • May 4, 2010
    ...mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted, brackets and italics in original). When interpreting fe......
  • Cargill v. Barr, No. 1:19-CV-349-DAE
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    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Western District of Texas
    • November 23, 2020
    ...word ‘pull’ when discussing the statutory definition of machinegun." Guedes I, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 130 (citing United States v. Staples, 511 U.S. 600, 602 n.1, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) ; United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 388 (10th Cir. 1977) ). The Supreme Court has describ......
  • Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring, No. 03-1821.
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • May 20, 2008
    ...Further, the presumption of scienter only applies when a criminal statute lacks any intent requirement. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994)(applying presumption when the statute is "silent concerning the mens rea required for a violation")......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1036 cases
  • Rehaif v. United States, No. 17-9560
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 21, 2019
    ...requires the Government to prove that the defendant acted knowingly is a question of congressional intent. See Staples v. United States , 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994). In determining Congress' intent, we start from a longstanding presumption, traceable to the co......
  • Welch v. U.S.A, No. 08-3108.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • May 4, 2010
    ...mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted, brackets and italics in original). When interpreting fe......
  • Cargill v. Barr, No. 1:19-CV-349-DAE
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Western District of Texas
    • November 23, 2020
    ...word ‘pull’ when discussing the statutory definition of machinegun." Guedes I, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 130 (citing United States v. Staples, 511 U.S. 600, 602 n.1, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) ; United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 388 (10th Cir. 1977) ). The Supreme Court has describ......
  • Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring, No. 03-1821.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • May 20, 2008
    ...Further, the presumption of scienter only applies when a criminal statute lacks any intent requirement. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994)(applying presumption when the statute is "silent concerning the mens rea required for a violation")......
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    ...Eric Lipton, Rare White House Accord With Koch Brothers on Sentencing Frays , N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 2015. 23. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994). 24. See id. at 605; see also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922). 25. See Staples , 511 U.S. at 605; United Stat......
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    ...Although X-Citement Video is the Court’s most recent pronouncement on this subject, it is not the irst. In Staples v. United States , 511 U.S. 600, 619-20 (1994), the Court found that the statutes criminalizing knowing possession of a machine gun, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845(a)(6) and 5861(d), requir......
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    ...Compliance , 16 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 311 (1991). 59. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998). See also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). 60. 524 U.S. 184 (1998). 61. Id. at 193. engaging in apparently innocent conduct, there is no requirement that the government prove a......
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