Stapleton v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act

• Decision Date: 23 February 1955
• Citation: 142 Conn. 160,112 A.2d 211
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: William H. STAPLETON v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 211

112 A.2d 211

142 Conn. 160

William H. STAPLETON v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 23, 1955.

Harry Silverstone, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was John J. Bracken, Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).

Daniel Baker, Stamford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ., and ALCORN, Superior Court Judge.

O'SULLIVAN, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Superior Court affirming a decision of a panel of unemployment commissioners in allowing the plaintiff's claim for unemployment compensation.

The panel's finding, as corrected by the court, is not subject to the further additions and deletions sought by the defendant. The finding recites the following facts: From June, 1946, to the time of the hearing before the commissioners, the plaintiff had been the president of a labor union local composed of the production workers of the Armstrong Rubber Company, hereinafter called the company. He had previously been in the employ of the company but had received a leave of absence when he took over his full-time job with the local at the weekly wage of $80. Each year he had been re-elected president of the local. As president, he participated in collective bargaining negotiations with the company, presided at meetings of the local, handled grievances of its members against their employer, assisted in gathering data in connection with claims for workmen's compensation, and in all respects performed the duties usually associated with the business agent of a union.

On December 6, 1950, a labor dispute occurred between the company and its production employees. As a result, the employees went out and remained on strike until the dispute ended early in May, 1951. On December 8, 1950, the local voted to discontinue payment of the plaintiff's weekly wage, and he thereafter received no pay until he was restored to the union's pay roll immediately after the labor dispute terminated. Nevertheless, he occupied himself until January 20, 1951, exclusively with the affairs of the local and for this reason was not, up to that date, available for work elsewhere. From then on his activities on behalf of the local greatly lessened. He continued to serve on a committee which was attempting to negotiate a contract, and, as a member of an eleven-man executive committee, he did some work in and around the headquarters of the local. Although he performed the work just mentioned, some of which was formerly required of him as president, he did so purely on a voluntary basis.

On January 21, 1951, the plaintiff registered for work with the state employment service and filed a claim for unemployment benefits. From that date he was ready at all times to enter other employment. He reported regularly to the employment service but received no referrals. He was of the opinion that, because of his position as an officer of a union in a plant where production employees were on strike, the only possibility of his getting a job in another factory would be through the state agency and not by his own application to individual factories. For this reason he made no attempt, except in one instance, to find, by personal solicitation, the kind of work for which his experience prior to his becoming president of the local had prepared him. The sole exception was when he asked for employment at a shop which manufactured seat covers. He did, however, make several efforts to obtain with other unions work which was comparable to that performed by him as president of his own local, and he also tried on occasions to get a job as bartender on a part-time basis. All of these efforts were unsuccessful. On the basis of the facts recited, the court upheld the panel in concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to unemployment compensation.

The defendant maintains that the court erred in supporting the commissioners because eligibility for unemployment compensation requires, among other essentials, that the applicant be (1) unemployed and (2) available for work. The vital contention of the defendant is that the plaintiff met neither of these requirements and that, consequently, he was ineligible for benefits.

Chapter 374 of the General Statutes, embracing §§ 7495 to 7544, inclusive, deals with the subject of unemployment compensation. Section 7500 provides, in part, that '[b]enefits shall be payable only to individuals who are unemployed * * *.' In the section devoted to definitions, there is no definition of the word 'unemployment.' § 7495. The dictionary says that it is the '[s]tate of being not employed.' Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.). The General Assembly has defined 'employment' to be 'any service * * * performed under any express or implied contract of hire creating the relationship of employer and employee.' § 7495(a)(1).

Reduced to its simplest form, the claim of the defendant is that the plaintiff was not unemployed after January 20, 1951, since he performed services for his employer, the local, under a contract of hire into which he had entered when assuming the office of president. The defendant has overlooked the...