Stapleton v. Grand Trunk R. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 May 1903
• Citation: 133 Mich. 187,94 N.W. 739
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: STAPLETON v. GRAND TRUNK RY. CO.

94 N.W. 739

133 Mich. 187

STAPLETON v. GRAND TRUNK RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

May 12, 1903

Error to Circuit Court, Wayne County; Joseph W. Donovan, Judge.

Action by W. J. Stapleton against the Grand Trunk Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

E. W Meddaugh and L. C. Stanley, for appellant.

Warner & Codd, for appellee.

MOORE J.

This is an action to recover for the value of goods destroyed in a fire which burned the freighthouse of the defendant at Mt Clemens, on Monday, the 30th day of April, 1900, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The plaintiff is the surviving partner of George Norris & Co., of Detroit, manufacturers and dealers in bottled drinks. This concern had been doing business in Mt. Clemens for some 20 years and in the course of business, on the 27th day of April 1900, had shipped a quantity of goods to their agent, Patrick Bogue, at Mt. Clemens. A part of these goods reached there on Friday, April 27th, and a part on Saturday, April 28th. Immediately thereafter the plaintiff's agent receipted for the goods, and took some of them away. The rest he put into what was called the 'jail,' where he had previously put goods by the permission of his son, who was also in the employ of the defendant company. He took one load away Friday, a load on Saturday, and two more on Monday. A fire occurred [94 N.W. 740] at 3 o'clock Monday afternoon, and goods to the value of $144.92, as testified by plaintiff, were destroyed. These were also destroyed in this fire a number of empty bottles and cases belonging to the plaintiff, which the plaintiff claimed were of the value of $379.35. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for both lots of goods. The case is brought here by writ of error. There is no claim the fire was due to the negligence of the defendant.

In relation to the goods shipped from Detroit, the trial judge charged the jury, in part, as follows: 'The consignee (that is, the receiver) has a reasonable time after the arrival of goods at their destination to remove the same. Pending their removal within such reasonable time, the liability of the railroad company is that of a common carrier, and not of a warehouseman. This reasonable time is to be judged by all the circumstances connected with the transaction--former dealings between the parties, and the ability of the consignee to remove these goods; and, if the jury find that the consignee used all reasonable diligence in removing the goods, the defendant is liable in this case, as a common carrier, for the value of the goods sent out, and your verdict should be for the plaintiff. That depends upon the testimony--which side you believe.' We think this an incorrect statement of the law. In Hutchinson on Carriers (2d Ed.) p. 440, it is said: 'In New York the law upon this subject is stated to be that if the consignee is present upon the arrival of the goods, he must take them without unreasonable delay; if he is not present, but lives at or in the immediate vicinity of the place of delivery, the carrier must notify him of the arrival of the goods, and then he must have a reasonable time to remove them; if he is absent, unknown, or cannot be found, the carrier may store them; and if, after notice of the arrival of the goods, the consignee has had a reasonable opportunity to remove them, and does not, he cannot hold the carrier longer as an insurer. This view of the subject has also been taken by the courts of Minnesota and Michigan.' See cases cited in note. In the same authority, at page 445, it is said: 'What length of time will be considered reasonable for the removal of the goods, at the expiration of which the carrier will be regarded as holding them as warehouseman, when such reasonable time is allowed the consignee, it is said, cannot be determined by any fixed or definite rule, but must depend in a great measure upon the circumstances of each case. When the facts are agreed upon or undisputed, it becomes a question to be determined by the court as one of law, but where they are disputed and unsettled the question must be submitted to a jury. It is said, however, that no indulgence will be given to the consignee by reason of the circumstances of his condition or situation, which may make delay in the removal of the goods unavoidable on his part, nor will the distance at which he may reside or have his place of business from the place of their deposit be taken into consideration, but he will be required to remove them with the same expedition as though he lived in the vicinity of the warehouse. In other words, the time within which the consignee is required to remove the goods will not be made to vary with his distance, convenience, or necessities, but only such time will be allowed as would enable him, if living in the vicinity of the place of delivery, to remove them in the ordinary course and in the usual hours of business. He must, moreover, proceed to remove the goods with diligence after he is informed of their arrival, and must provide...