Stapleton v. Huff
Decision Date | 17 October 1946 |
Docket Number | 4934. |
Parties | STAPLETON v. HUFF et al. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Santa Fe County; William J. Barker Judge.
Mandamus proceeding by Ernest Stapleton against Raymond Huff and others to compel respondents to tender petitioner a written contract to teach school in the City of Socorro, N.M. From a judgment quashing the alternative writ and dismissing the petition, the petitioner appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Dailey & Rogers, Jethro S. Vaught, Jr., and N. L Stedman, Jr., all of Albuquerque, for appellant.
Martin A. Threet, of Albuquerque, and Robert W. Ward, Asst. Atty Gen., for appellees.
Petitioner-appellant filed a petition in the lower court seeking a writ of mandamus against the State Board of Education, Socorro Municipal Board of Education, and Rex F. Bell, as Superintendent of the Socorro Public Schools respondents-appellees, to compel them to tender him a written contract to teach school in the City of Socorro, New Mexico for the school year 1945-46, which he claims was renewed by operation of law. The case was tried upon the pleadings, with the result that the trial court quashed the alternative writ theretofore entered and dismissed the petition. Plaintiff appeals.
The record discloses that appellant is the holder of a professional teacher's certificate and that he taught in the city schools of Socorro, New Mexico, continuously for twenty two years prior to the filing of his petition.
The lower court made the following findings of fact:
Applying the law to the facts so found, the court concluded:
The power to employ and discharge teachers and other employees is reposed in municipal boards of education. N.M.S.1941 A. 55-807 and 55-907.
The legislature has recognized the sound public policy of retaining in the public school system teachers who have become increasingly valuably by reason of their experience and has, by statute, assured these public servants an indefinite tenure of position during satisfactory performance of their duties. Ortega et al. v. Otero, 48 N.M. 588, 154 P.2d 252; Reed v. Orleans Parish School Board, La.App., 21 So.2d 895. In order to protect this tenure, the legislature has provided that a teacher who has been properly notified that his services will not be continued for the ensuing year, may, at his own discretion appear before the local board for a hearing.
The purpose of the hearing provided by the Statute is to develop the reasons or grounds which have moved the local board to notice the teacher of its desire to discontinue his services and afford him an opportunity to test the good faith and sufficiency of same. It must be fair and just, conducted in good faith and dominated throughout by a sincere effort to ascertain whether good cause exists for the notice given. If it does not or if the hearing conducted was a mere sham, then justification for the local board's action is lacking.
In 47 A.J., page 398, Section 140, the writer states:
'The purpose of the procedure prescribed by tenure statutes for the dismissal of a teacher or other professional employee is to prevent arbitrary action by school boards, to afford a fair hearing before dismissal, and to provide for full, impartial, and unbiased consideration of the testimony produced. * * *'
Chapter 60, Laws of 1943, in its essential provisions provides as follows:
'Section 1. That Section 55-1111 of the New Mexico Compiled Statutes of 1941 being Section 1, Chapter 202 of the New Mexico Session Laws of 1941 be and the same is hereby amended so as to read as follows:
It will be observed that the foregoing Act grants qualified teachers among other things, three distinct rights:
1. That notice be given to the teacher on or before the closing day of school of the local Board's desire to discontinue his services. This right is given to all teachers certified to teach, whether they have served one or ten years. The court found, and it is agreed by all parties, that the local board complied with this provision of law.
2. The right, upon discharge, to be heard by the local board, if he so desires. This right is not given to all teachers who are entitled to the above provision, but only to teachers who have served a probationary period of two years. The record discloses that appellant was not afforded a fair and legal hearing by the local board, as provided for by law. However, this does not become material in the case at bar, in as much as appellant appealed this action to the State Board of Education. We are of the opinion, that when he appealed he waived the errors committed by the local board.
3. The right of appeal. Under this provision appellant was entitled to a fair and legal hearing before the State Board of Education with an opportunity accorded him to present his evidence in defense of the charges lodged against him and the right to be confronted by witnesses testifying against him and be allowed to cross examine them. If after the hearing, the State Board should find the alleged causes insufficient for termination of his services, then and in that event the teacher shall be considered employed for the following year under the terms of his then existing contract. The record reveals, and the lower court so found, that the State Board of Education did not comply with this provision in that it did not afford appellant a hearing as is provided by law.
Appellant earnestly contends that the written contract which he held at the close of the 1944-45 school term was renewed by operation of law, for the reason that the notice and hearing required by the act are so inextricably inter-related and mutually dependant one upon the other, that the failure to afford appellant a hearing rendered the notice void and an absolute nullity in law. With this contention we do not agree.
If the legislature had intended that failure to afford the teacher a proper hearing should operate automatically to renew the contract of employment, as in the case of failure to serve notice of the local board's desire with reference to continuance or discontinuance of the services of such teacher, it would have been a very simple matter to make known this intention by merely inserting the language 'or afford such hearing' after the phrase 'failure to serve such notice,' followed by the declaration that the omission should be construed as a renewal of the contract of employment for the ensuing year. This it did not do and we should not perform the legislative function of supplying the omission.
The petitioner was entitled to a fair and legal hearing and to know all of the evidence upon which the State Board of Education based its findings and decision. The plain dictates of justice required it to diclose the facts it...
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