Star v. Com.

• Decision Date: 20 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2008-SC-000203-MR.,2008-SC-000203-MR.
• Citation: Star v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 30 (Ky. 2010)
• Parties: William R. STAR, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky

313 S.W.3d 30

William R. STAR, Appellant, v.COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

No. 2008-SC-000203-MR.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

May 20, 2010.

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Emily Holt Rhorer, Department of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, KY, Counsel for Appellant.

Jack Conway, Attorney General, Susan Roncarti Lenz, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, Criminal Appellate Division, Frankfort, KY, Counsel for Appellee.

Opinion of the Court by Justice CUNNINGHAM.

Throughout most of his life, including around the time of the crimes in this case, Appellant, William R. Star, suffered from severe mental illness.He was admitted to a mental treatment facility from February 1997 to April 1999, where he was diagnosed with a paranoid delusional disorder.He checked himself into a mental hospital in July 2004, where he was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.A doctor testified that, in February 2006, Appellant was "severely mentally ill," a description that was documented in his hospital records.

As is common of paranoid schizophrenics, Appellant suffered from recurring delusions.He told people that he was God, or Jesus, or at least that he had their powers.He thought that his grandfather, uncle, and an elementary school teacher could predict the future, and he had auditory hallucinations of them relaying their predictions to him.In addition, Appellant had recurring delusions that he was being poisoned, or that people were otherwise trying to harm him.In early September 2006, Appellant became convinced that he had been poisoned because he had become sick for approximately two weeks.He thought that Jeff Mattox and Geraldine Litton had poisoned him.

On September 18, 2006, after drinking approximately twelve beers, Appellant took his pistol and went to find Mattox and Litton at their home.He shot Mattox in the chest, killing him.He then shot Litton, puncturing her lung.After shooting Litton, Appellant took her towards a house down the road.He was soon followed by the third victim, Billy Proctor, who had come to render aid to Litton.Appellant shot Proctor in the face, killing him.Appellant testified that he did so because he thought Proctor was evil and was going to harm Litton.Litton was later treated at a hospital and survived.

Appellant was found guilty but mentally ill of two murders, one kidnapping, and one assault.He was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 30 years and appeals to this Court as a matter of right.Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).On appeal, Appellant raises six issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's directed verdict on all counts because he was not criminally responsible; (2) whether the verdict of guilty but mentally ill should have been declared unconstitutional by the trial court; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on Appellant's burden of proof for his insanity defense; (4) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after a detective suggested Appellant invoked his right to remain silent; (5) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Appellant to cross-examine a witness about her pending criminal cases; and (6) whether Appellant's right to confront witnesses against him face-to-face was violated.

Directed verdict on all counts

Appellant first argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict on all counts because he was not criminally responsible for his actions.Thus, the issue we address is whether "it would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find against the defendant on the issue of insanity."Port v. Commonwealth,906 S.W.2d 327, 330(Ky.1995)(quotingIce v. Commonwealth,667 S.W.2d 671(Ky.1984)).This, of course, is based on the evidence of record, inclusive or exclusive of expert testimony.

Where one chooses to rely upon insanity as a defense, the burden rests upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that at the time the offense was committed, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

Edwards v. Commonwealth,554 S.W.2d 380, 383(Ky.1977)(citingKRS 504.020).After carefully reviewing the testimony presented herein, we do not believe that it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to find against Appellant on the issue of insanity.

Appellant admitted to shooting three people—killing two of them and seriously injuring the third—under the false impression that at least two of the victims had attempted to poison him.While there was expert testimony offered to show that Appellant could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, there was also ample testimony, some from Appellant himself, which indicated the opposite.Appellant testified that he walked away from the scene of the shooting because he was looking for an escape route.In addition, Appellant told onlookers at the scene to tell the police they could get him in the morning, because he wanted to get some rest before they arrived.

Geraldine Litton also testified that, although Appellant intended to shoot her a second time, she asked him not to do so and he complied with her request.A psychiatrist who interviewed Appellant a few days after the shootings stated that Appellant knew it was wrong and illegal to kill someone.The court-appointed psychiatrist testified that Appellant showed an ability to control his actions, because he did not attempt to murder other people whom he also believed were poisoning him.

We have little doubt concluding that Appellant suffers from a serious mental disease.However, "a mental disease which does not in itself result in a lack of capacity to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct or to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law does not rise to the level of insanity, nor does it, in itself, constitute extreme emotional disturbance."McClellan v. Commonwealth,715 S.W.2d 464, 468(Ky.1986).The burden of proof as to the question of a defendant's sanity at the time of a homicide never shifts from the defendant.Wainscott v. Commonwealth,562 S.W.2d 628(Ky.1978).See alsoEdwards,554 S.W.2d at 383("The introduction of proof of insanity by a defendant does not place a burden on the Commonwealth to prove him sane; rather, it entitles the defendant to an instruction to the jury that they may find him not guilty by reason of insanity, and thus properly makes the issue of insanity a matter for the jury's determination.").

This Court has long held that a motion for a directed verdict in a case involving an insanity defense would be defeated as long as there was "some evidence" indicating that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the crime; i.e., his mental problems did not preclude him from conforming his conduct to the requirements of law.Tunget v. Commonwealth,303 Ky. 834, 198 S.W.2d 785(1947).That threshold is certainly met in this case.Accordingly, we do not believe that it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to find against Appellant on the issue of insanity.As such, there was no error.

Constitutionality of guilty but mentally ill verdict

Appellant's next allegation of error is based on the constitutionality of giving the jury an option to find a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.The crux of Appellant's complaint is that this option confused the jury so that they did not return a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict.Appellant believes that the promise of treatment lured the jury into returning a guilty but mentally ill verdict rather than a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, but contends that such a verdict does not necessarily guarantee that a defendant will receive treatment while in prison.In support of this argument, Appellant introduced the affidavit of Deputy Warden Paige McGuire, who oversees the Correctional Psychiatric Treatment Unit at the Kentucky State Reformatory.In her affidavit, the Deputy Warden stated that the guilty but mentally ill verdict has "no impact on the classification process nor the psychiatric treatment provided."Further, she noted that the Department of Corrections conducts "its own independent evaluation and will provide appropriate psychiatric care."This, Appellant maintains, shows that the guilty but mentally ill verdict is a "charade."Appellant argues that such a verdict violates his due process rights, is unconstitutionally vague, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as it may result in an insane person being found criminally responsible.In addition, Appellant argues that the jury instructions were inadequate.We disagree.

KRS 504.120(4) authorizes the verdict of guilty but mentally ill at the time of the offense.According to KRS 504.130(1), a defendant may be found guilty but mentally ill if "the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offense; and the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally ill at the time of the offense."Once a guilty but mentally ill verdict is reached, "treatment shall be provided the defendant until the treating professional determines that the treatment is no longer necessary or until expiration of his sentence, whichever occurs first."KRS 504.150(1).Thus, the guilty but mentally ill verdict is intended to provide an "in-between" classification whereby a defendant bears the legal responsibility for criminal conduct, but is provided treatment while incarcerated for mental illness.People v. Jackson,80 Mich.App. 244, 263 N.W.2d 44(1977).

Appellant points to no evidence supporting the proposition that guilty but mentally ill verdicts increase the possibility of improper compromises by the trier of fact.Appellant has not cited, and we cannot find, any authority indicating that compromise by the trier of fact is inconsistent with due...