Starbuck v. Starbuck

• Decision Date: 17 February 1903
• Citation: 173 N.Y. 503,66 N.E. 193
• Parties: STARBUCK v. STARBUCK et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

173 N.Y. 503

66 N.E. 193

STARBUCK

v.STARBUCK et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 17, 1903.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Action by Martha H. Starbuck against Matilda E. Starbuck and others. From a judgment on an order of the Appellate Division (71 N. Y. Supp. 104) overruling defendants' exceptions to an interlocutory judgment and denying a motion for new trial, defendants appeal. Reversed.

Artemas H. Holmes, for appellant Matilda E. Starbuck.

William N. Dykman, for appellants William H. Starbuck and others.

Robert D. Benedict and James Emerson Carpenter, for respondent.

HAIGHT, J.

This action was brought by the plaintiff as the widow of William H. Starbuck, deceased, to recover dower in the real estate of which he died seised. The decedent and the plaintiff were married in the commonwealth of Massachusetts on the 14th day of October 1857, he being a resident of this state, where he continued to reside until his death, which occurred on the 29th day of March, 1896. In the year 1868 the plaintiff left her husband's residence and returned to her parents' home in Massachusetts, taking her daughter with her, where she resided until after his death. She then removed to this state and brought this action. Upon the trial the defendants offered in evidence an exemplified record of a decree of divorce obtained by the plaintiff from her husband in the state of Massachusetts on the 4th day of May, 1874, upon the ground of extreme cruelty. The papers in that action were served upon the decedent personally in this state, but he did not appear in the action either personally or by attorney, and did not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts court. This decree was excluded from evidence upon the objection of the plaintiff's attorney, and exceptions were taken to such exclusion by the defendants. After the divorce, Starbuck contracted a marriage with the defendant Matilda Eliza Starbuck in the state of Pennsylvania, and the minor defendants are children of that union. The real estate in which the plaintiff seeks to recover dower is all situated in this state, and was acquired by Starbuck after the divorce.

We are of the opinion that the Massachusetts decree was competent, and that the defendants had the right to have it received in evidence. True, the plaintiff could not avail herself of a void decree, which she had procured to be entered, any more than she could of her own declarations, but it is different with the defendants. They have the right to avail themselves of the declarations, acts, and decrees obtained by their opponent, and the principle is well established that, where a party has procured a judgment or decree to be entered, submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court, he cannot thereafter be heard to question the jurisdiction of the court which entered the judgment or decree. The decree, therefore, if it had been received in evidence, would have operated to defeat her claim that she is now the widow of the decedent and entitled to dower in the real estate acquired by him after the decree. We have recently had under consideration a similar question in Matter of Swales' Estate, 60 App. Div. 599,70 N. Y. Supp. 220, affirmed upon the opinion of the Appellate Division. 172 N. Y. 651, 65 N. E. 1122. In that case Mary E. Swales petitioned the surrogate's court for letters of administration upon the estate of William H Swales, deceased, claiming to be his widow. It appeared that they were married on the 3d day of May, 1869, at Sodus, in this state, and that in December, 1873, they separated; that in the year 1883 the petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from him in the state of Illinois, which purported to dissolve the marriage between the parties upon grounds which are not recognized by the laws of this state as sufficient for that purpose. The summons or process by which the action was commenced was served by publication only, and the decedent did not appear in the action either in person or by counsel. After obtaining the divorce, the petitioner married one David Trobridge, with whom she has since cohabited and resided in this state, and by whom she has a daughter. After the death of Swales she petitioned for letters of administration, as we have seen, claiming to be his widow. In that case Adams, P. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: ‘We think the case justifies the application of a * * * principle which is that, where a party has invoked the jurisdiction of any court and submitted himself thereto, he cannot thereafter be heard to question such jurisdiction.’

In Matter of Morrisson, 52 Hun, 102, 5 N. Y. Supp. 90, the decedent's personal estate was claimed by the legal representatives of her deceased husband, Henry Feyh. He had previously obtained a divorce from her in the state of Ohio while she was domiciled in this state. It was claimed on behalf of the personal representatives of Henry Feyh that the decree of the Ohio court was void in this state. It was held that they were not entitled to the estate. Van Brunt, P. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: ‘Henry Feyh, having invoked the jurisdiction of the court of Ohio and submitted himself thereto, cannot now be heard to question such jurisdiction. And the claimants here occupy precisely the same position that Feyh would have occupied had he been living. This position does not rest upon the doctrine of estoppel, as such term is ordinarily used, but upon a principle, which has been repeatedly recognized by the courts, that, where a party has gone into a court and invoked its jurisdiction, he cannot subsequently attack the decree of the court obtained at his ...