Stark v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.

Decision Date17 May 1926
Docket NumberNo. 74.,74.
Citation133 A. 172
PartiesSTARK v. GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by Emily Stark against the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals, Reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.

Joseph J. Weinberger, of Passaic, for appellant.

John B. Brown, of Newark, for respondent.

CAMPBELL, J. On April 10, 1923, appellant entered the store of respondent at 232 Paterson avenue, East Rutherford, for the purpose of making purchases, and was injured by a fall, which she alleges was caused by a condition of disrepair existing in the flooring of the store. She brought suit against the respondent, and a trial of the cause resulted in a judgment in favor of the respondent upon a verdict directed by the trial court. From such judgment this appeal is taken, and the single ground for reversal is that it was error for the trial court to direct the verdict.

The appellant testified that in the flooring of the store there was a "rotten" board, and that a splinter from it caught her foot and caused her to fall. Appellant's daughter testified that subsequent to the injury to her mother she visited the store of respondent and found that the board was "rotten," and that a splinter about 18 inches in length had come from it, leaving a hole or depression in the floor "big enough for her shoe"; that such hole was about 18 inches long, and "about 1 1/2 inches deep, and then it tapered off." Appellant also testified: "It was a long board, and it was all coming up, splinters and splinters and splinters." This condition of the flooring was denied by respondent's witnesses, and there was testimony that the floor was in good condition, and that the respondent, through its agents and servants, had no knowledge of any defect therein.

The trial court directed the verdict upon the ground that there was no proof that the respondent had knowledge of any defective condition, and that, if there was proof, that it had such knowledge, then there was no proof that it had such knowledge for such length of time before, the happening as to afford it a reasonable opportunity to make repairs. We think the trial court erred, and the question should have been submitted to the jury.

The duty of respondent toward the appellant was to exercise reasonable care to keep the floor of its store, to which it invited appellant, in such condition of repair that it would be reasonably safe for her, in the exercise of reasonable care upon her part, to be upon and about such premises or such parts thereof to which the invitation extended. Such rule is too well established to require any...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Bohn v. Hudson & M. R. Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • 27 Septiembre 1954
    ...a condition of reasonable safety to one not safe, as measured by the rule of reasonable care." Stark v. Great Atlantic, etc., Tea Co., 102 N.J.L. 694, 696-697, 133 A. 172, 173 (E. & A.1926). The duty existing, then, frequently, the result has turned upon the notice of the defective conditio......
  • Anderson v. Winkle, 33175.
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • 17 Julio 1942
    ...care to make the premises safe. But the condition here was not created suddenly. See Stark v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 102 N.J.L. 694, 133 A. 172, distinguishing the Schnatterer case upon this ground. It was the result of wear and tear incident to continual use over a period of many years. Fo......
  • Francisco v. Miller
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 5 Junio 1951
    ...and maintenance a reasonable time to inspect and repair is a matter for the determination of a jury. Stark v. Great Atlantic, &c., Tea Co., 102 N.J.L. 694, 133 A. 172 (E. & A.1926). Yet it is entirely conceivable that in some cases the question of whether the undisputed period of time suffi......
  • Creighan v. City of Pittsburgh
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • 27 Mayo 1957
    ...which he was temporarily disabled, but also for a period of time during which he was permanently disabled. In Kurtz v. Erie, 389 Pa. 557, 133 A. 172, we have recently held that a fireman who is permanently incapacitated or disabled is not entitled to compensation under the "Heart and Lung A......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT