Stark v. Stark

Decision Date02 August 1976
Docket NumberNo. CKD,CKD
Citation539 S.W.2d 779
PartiesMarvin L. STARK, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Evelyn C. STARK, Respondent-Appellant. 27879.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

C. john Forge, Jr., Hencke & Forge, Independence, for petitioner-appellee.

Robert M. Hill, David H. Miller, Hill, Hill & Busch, Charles H. Sloan, Richmond, for respondent-appellant.

Before SHANGLER, P.J., and SWOFFORD and SOMERVILLE, JJ.

SHANGLER, Presiding Judge.

This appeal comes from Evelyn C. Stark from a decree which dissolved her marriage to Marvin Stark. The judgment also made division of the marital property, allowed the wife maintenance, awarded her custody of the two minor children, money for their support and attorney fee. The wife challenges here the reasonableness of the distribution of the marital property and the adequacy of the maintenance and child support awards.

The parties were married on April 23, 1961, and about a year later removed to an 85 acre farm which the husband had purchased in 1957 for $15,000. At that time be borrowed $10,000 to apply to the purchase price and still owed $6,000 at the time of marriage. Title to the farm was taken in his name and so retained throughout the marriage. The husband also brought tools and machinery worth $2170 to the marriage. He has been employed since 1954 as a supervisor at Armco Steel Co., earning a gross salary of $19,455 the year immediately preceding the dissolution action.

After the parties removed to the farm, they began to build a new home, and in 1965 incurred joint liability on a $18,000 loan and mortgage. This money was used to discharge all his old debts (and included, presumably, the prior mortgage encumbrance which had stood in the name of the husband alone) and also to finance construction of the new home on the farm. The husband contended that his wife was of little help in the enterprise and that he did most of the work himself. She insisted that she was a co-worker at every phase of construction, and thus made a significant contribution to the undertaking. The house was completed and served as the family residence until they separated in 1974.

It was the contention of the husband that the marriage failed because she constantly berated him in front of the children and eventually turned them against him. The wife complained of physical abuse by the husband and of nocturnal forays from which he did not return until early morning.

The wife raises four points of trial error on this appeal: (1) failure to make and enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the four factors constituted by § 452.330(1), RSMo Supp.1975, as relevant on the judicial disposition of marital property; (2) the unjust allocation to her of marital property; (3) the inadequacy of the maintenance award; (4) the inadequacy of the child support award.

As to the first issue, neither party requested findings of fact nor conclusions of law, and none were provided. The wife here contends that § 452.330, which directs the judicial disposition of marital property upon dissolution, impliedly requires such findings. That section directs the trial court at the division of marital property to consider all relevant factors, to include

1. The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property;

2. The value of the property set aside to each spouse;

3. The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of the property is to become effective;

4. The conduct of the parties during marriage.

While we exhort the trial bench, as an aid to appellate review, to explain the facts upon which the adjudication directed by § 452.330(1) rests, Rule 73.01(d) (then in effect) and current Rule 73.01(2)(a) impose no duty for findings of fact or conclusions of law in the absence of specific request by counsel. In that event, all fact issues are considered found in accordance with the result reached by the court. Noland v. Noland, 527 S.W.2d 696, 698(1) (Mo.App.1975). Nor can the prescription of § 452.330 that the court consider all relevant factors in the allocation of marital property be understood to imply a requirement--even in the absence of request--that a judge give a statement of reasons for the adjudication. The power of the supreme court to establish rules of practice and procedure is conferred by constitution. A rule so promulgated may be annulled or amended by the Legislature only by an enactment limited to that purpose. Article 5, § 5, Missouri Constitution of 1945. It is not the design of § 452.330 to amend or annul Rule 73.01. The point is denied.

The wife next contends that the marital property was unjustly allocated. In particular, she argues that the 85 acre farm on which they dwelt had become, by their common understanding, marital property and should have been dealt with accordingly. The court awarded the wife

1. $15,000 in cash

2. household furniture valued at $4145

3. a 1973 Oldsmobile valued at $3200

and to the husband

1. the 85 acre farm valued at $42,000 and subject to a $5229 encumbrance

2. all the cattle of the value of $1500 and subject to a $4160 encumbrance

3. farm machinery and tools valued at $4585

4. three antique automobiles valued at $2100

5. a pickup truck valued at $1925

6. all (269) shares of stock in Armco Steel valued at $5111.

The new divorce Reform Act provides that in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage the court shall first set apart to the spouses the separate property of each and then divide the marital property as the court determines just after consideration of all relevant factors. § 452.330(1). The act defines marital property to mean all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage, with certain exceptions. § 452.330(2). The act also presumes that property acquired by either spouse subsequent to marriage to be marital property regardless of how title is held. § 452.330(3). This presumption may be overcome by proof that the property was acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage. § 452.330 2. (2).

The order of property division entered by the trial court did not differentiate between separate property and marital property within the definitions of the act.

It is the contention of the wife that the house and farm should be considered marital property to the full market value ($42,000 less the encumbrance), and when so considered, the allocation to her of 38% of the total property is so disproportionate as to result in an abuse of discretion.

The husband replies that the farm represents property acquired by him prior to the marriage and the dwelling house--a replacement of the original structure--represents property acquired in exchange for property acquired by him prior to marriage, and as such neither the farm nor house constitutes marital property within the definition of §§ 452.330 and 452.330 2. (2).

The contention of the wife that the acreage became marital property by common understanding with the husband comes unadorned and unproved except for the effect to be given the evidence that the property was encumbered after the marriage, the mortgage and note of indebtedness given in the names of both spouses, and repayment made from community property. Fur purposes of the division of marital property under § 452.330, all property acquired by a spouse prior to the marriage and which remains titled in that spouse after marriage is, in the absence of clear intention to contribute that property to the community or to the other spouse, the separate property of that spouse and will not be regarded as marital property. Conrad v. Bowers, 533...

To continue reading

Request your trial
45 cases
  • Harper v. Harper
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • July 23, 1982
    ...marriage by the expenditure of community funds and efforts. E.g., Null v. Null, 608 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo.App.1980); Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Mo.App.1976). Courts in at least one community property state, California, have rejected the inception of title theory. In California, when......
  • Hoffmann v. Hoffmann
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 11, 1984
    ...in Missouri have followed the principles of the inception of title theory. Busby v. Busby, supra; Davis v. Davis, supra; Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo.App.1976); Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo.App.1976). This approach classifies property as separate or marital at the moment title is ......
  • Marriage of Herr, In re
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • February 13, 1986
    ...does not constitute acquisition by the use of marital funds. Mothershed v. Mothershed, 701 P.2d 405 (Okl.1985). Cf. Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo.App.1976). The trial court found the creation of the joint tenancy was in the nature of a testamentary gift and the husband's interest so cr......
  • Marriage of Schulte, In re
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • January 11, 1977
    ...announced finding but of course no specific, written finding was required by § 452.330 in the absence of a request. Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779, 781(1) (Mo.App.1976). Neither party requested findings pursuant to Rule 73.01, V.A.M.R.4 The parties' estimates of value varied, e.g., J. C.'s ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT