Stark v. U.S.A
| Decision Date | 23 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 08-cv-0852-MJR |
| Parties | DANIEL W. STARK, SR., Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
A. Introduction and Background
Before the Court is Daniel Stark's December 2008 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Analysis of Stark's petition begins with an overview of the procedural history of the underlying criminal case, United States v. Stark (Case No. 03-cr-30190-MJR).
In September 2003, the authorities executed a search warrant for firearms and stolen vehicles at Stark's residence and at his business. They discovered stolen vehicles, a stolen trailer, and fourteen guns. On September 17, 2003, an indictment was filed against Stark. That indictment was twice superseded; Stark was ultimately charged on thirty counts in January 20, 2005. Among other charges, the government claimed Stark stole tractors and all-terrain vehicles from Illinois and Missouri, then transported them across state lines to sell near Bowling Green, Kentucky.
Stark filed a series of motions to dismiss the charges, to exclude certain evidence against him, to strike or amend certain counts in the indictment, to continue the trial, and to be released from custody. Stark was first represented by attorney Charles Stegmeyer, Jr., whom Ted Barylske joined as co-counsel in September 2004. By June 2005 Judge William D. Stiehl had ruled on each of Stark's motions. Judge Stiehl recused himself, and the case was reassigned to the undersigned judge in late June 2005. Counsel Stegmeyer withdrew from the case. On August 19, 2005, the Court held a final pre-trial conference, where Stark's oral motion to exclude certain witnesses was granted.
Stark's trial stretched from August 29 to September 23, 2005, when a jury found him guilty of twenty-seven of the thirty counts arrayed against him. Stark's convictions included: being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)), conspiracy to possess and sell stolen motor vehicles (18 U.S.C. § 371), possession of stolen property (18 U.S.C. § 2315), possession and sale of stolen motor vehicles (18 U.S.C. § 2313), conspiracy to engage in monetary transactions in criminally derived property (18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)), and engaging in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property (18 U.S.C. § 1957).
Stark filed a Motion for New Trial in January 2006. On February 22, 2006, this Court heard oral argument on the motion, plus several hours of testimony presented by both parties. The motion was denied.
The undersigned Judge sentenced Stark to a total of 292 months in prison, three years of supervised release, a $2,700 assessment, and restitution totaling $522,506.17. Judgment was entered accordingly on March 31, 2006.
Stark appealed. He challenged the fairness of his trial on three grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel. See United States v. Stark, 507 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2007). On October 17, 2007, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Stark's conviction on all counts. Id. at 522.
On December 1, 2008, Stark moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The pro se motion survived threshold review, the Court set a briefing schedule, and the motion became ripe when Stark filed a reply brief on October 29, 2009. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Stark's request for relief and dismisses his § 2255 petition.
An evidentiary hearing is not warranted. Stark attacks his conviction on theories stemming from ineffective assistance of counsel. Ineffective assistance claims often require evidentiary hearings because they "frequently allege facts that the record does not fully disclose." Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 408 (7th Cir. 2008). But the issues raised here can be resolved on the existing record, which conclusively demonstrates Stark is entitled to no relief. See Rule 8(a) of Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings; Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1132 (2007); Gallo-Vasquez v. United States, 402 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2005); Galbraith v. United States, 313 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002). In other words, Stark has not alleged facts that, if proven, would entitle him to relief. See Sandoval v. United States, 574 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2009).
B. Analysis of § 2255 Petition
28 U.S.C. § 2255 authorizes a federal prisoner to ask the court which sentenced him to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence if "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,... the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or... the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law."
Relief under § 2255 is limited. Unlike a direct appeal, where a defendant may complain of nearly any error, § 2255 proceedings may be used only to correct errors that vitiate the sentencing court's jurisdiction or are otherwise of constitutional magnitude. See, e.g., Corcoran v. Sullivan, 112 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1997) (). As the Seventh Circuit has declared, § 2255 relief is "appropriate only for an error of law that is jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Harris v. United States, 366 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 2004). Accord Prewitt v. United States, 83 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996) ().
Nor can § 2255 be used to re-litigate issues already raised, or that could have been raised, on direct appeal. Coleman v. United States, 318 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 926 (2003). Accord Sandoval v. United States, 574 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2009) (). Section 2255 has instead been described as the "federal-prisoner substitute for habeas corpus." United States v. Boyd, 591 F.3d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 2010). Accord Washington v. Smith, 564 F.3d 1350, 1351 (7th Cir. 2009) ().
When construing Stark's motion liberally, as this Court must, see, e.g., Donald v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996), Stark's claims potentially raise a constitutional issue. Specifically, Stark enumerates four grounds for relief, each premised on ineffective assistance of counsel:
(1) At trial, counsel failed to object when the Government "constructively amended" Count 1 against Stark (felon in possession of a firearm), thereby depriving him of the right to be tried only on charges presented by a grand jury's indictment (Doc. 1-1, pp. 19-21).
(2) At trial, counsel failed to object to Count 2 against Stark (conspiracy to possess and sell stolen motor vehicles), a frivolous count that should have been dismissed (Doc. 1-1, pp. 21-26).
(3) Post-trial, counsel failed to file a notice of appeal regarding this Court's dismissal of his motion for a new trial, and failed to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari (Doc. 1-1, pp. 27-30).
(4) At trial, counsel failed to adequately present evidence that would have led to a lighter sentence for Stark (Doc. 1-1, pp.31-34).
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution accords criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. Wyatt v. United States, 574 F.3d 455, 457 (7th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 1925 (2010), citing Watson v. Anglin, 560 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2009). To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must prove two things: (1) his attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable, and (2) that the defendant/petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of the attorney's constitutionally deficient performance. Wyatt, 574 F.3d at 457-58; United States v. Peleti, 576 F.3d 377, 383 (7th Cir. 2009); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
The first requirement of this dual test is referred to as the "performance prong" and the second as the "prejudice prong." As to the performance prong, a § 2255 petitioner must overcome a "strong presumption that [his] counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Wyatt, 574 F.3d at 458, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. He must establish the specific acts or omissions he claims constitute ineffective assistance, and the Court then assesses whether those acts/omissions are outside the scope of reasonable legal assistance. Wyatt, 574 F.3d at 458. See also United States v. Acox, 595 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2010) ().
Evaluation of counsel's performance is highly deferential. The reviewing court presumes reasonable judgment by counsel and must not second-guess counsel's strategic choices or "tactical decisions." Valenzuela v. United States, 261 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the court must Id.
As to the prejudice prong, the defendant/petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 384 (7th Cir. 2010). The inquiry focuses on whether the counsel's errors rendered the...
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