Starks v. State
Decision Date | 20 September 1991 |
Docket Number | 4 Div. 381 |
Citation | 594 So.2d 187 |
Parties | Henry STARKS, alias Henry Russaw v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Joel Lee Williams and Timothy J. Magee, Troy, for appellant.
Don Siegelman, Atty., and Martha Gail Ingram and Sandra J. Stewart, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Henry Starks, was indicted and convicted for the capital offense of murder during a robbery, as defined in Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(2). At the penalty stage, the jury, by a vote of eight to four, recommended imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. The trial judge declined to accept this recommendation and sentenced the appellant to death.
On the evening of March 17, 1988, Gerald Benton was robbed and killed at his place of business, Tri-County Grocery, in Pike County, Alabama. The pathologist testified that Benton's death was caused by "multiple blunt force injuries to the back of the head and massive damage to the brain." Five young men were indicted for the capital murder of Benton. Only two of the five, the appellant and his uncle, Willie Louis Russaw, were actually tried for the capital offense. The other three, Timmy Adams, Ronald Grey, and Stacey Grey, agreed to testify against the appellant and Russaw in exchange for a reduction in the charges against them. (See Part III below.)
Adams testified at the appellant's trial that the five men went to Benton's store with the avowed intention "to steal something." Adams, Ronald Grey, Russaw, and the appellant went up to the store, while Stacey Grey remained in the car. According to Adams, the appellant entered the store first, then "Willie [Russaw] ran in and went around the counter and throwed Mr. Benton down on a sack of potatoes." The appellant then "went to the corner and got an ax handle" with which he hit Benton. Adams stated on cross-examination that he saw the appellant hit Benton only once.
Ronald Grey testified that he heard a "racket" after the others 1 had entered the store. He then looked through the glass door and saw Benton lying on the floor. The appellant was standing over Benton with an ax handle in his hand, but Ronald did not see him strike Benton with it. Both Adams and Ronald testified that the appellant left the store with the ax handle. Both witnesses also testified that Russaw brought to the car a money bag or pouch belonging to Benton 2 and the ax.
The appellant did not testify at trial, although he did present an alibi defense through the testimony of others.
The appellant raises two issues in which he contends that the trial court committed plain error in charging the jury during the guilt phase of his trial. He argues that the trial court (1) failed to properly instruct the jury on the intent required to convict him of capital murder and (2) inadequately instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses of intentional noncapital murder and felony murder. Because these issues are interwoven, we will discuss them together.
During the charge conference, the trial judge stated that he would give the appellant's requested charge number 6. 3 The prosecutor objected to this requested charge and the following occurred:
R. 981-83 (emphasis added).
There was no further discussion of requested charge number 6 per se. However, at the end of the charge conference, the following occurred:
R. 990-91 (emphasis added).
In charging the jury, the trial judge made a few introductory remarks, then read the indictment. After informing the jury that the appellant pleaded not guilty to this indictment and that a capital offense is one for which the defendant is to be punished by death or by imprisonment for life without parole, the trial judge stated:
Immediately thereafter, the trial judge charged the jury on the general legal principles applicable in criminal cases, such as the presumption of innocence, expert testimony, circumstantial evidence, the burden of proof, and reasonable doubt. The trial court then stated:
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