Starks v. State
Decision Date | 14 December 2021 |
Docket Number | No. ED 109555,ED 109555 |
Parties | John R. STARKS III, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Maleaner R. Harvey, MO. Public Defender Office, 1010 Market Street, Ste. 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101, for appellant.
Evan J. Buchheim, P.O. Box 899, Asst. Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for respondent.
John R. Starks III appeals from the circuit court's judgment overruling his motion for postconviction relief under Rule 24.035 without an evidentiary hearing.1 Starks argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his counsel erroneously assured him that the court would sentence him to probation if he pleaded guilty to twelve counts of second-degree burglary without a plea agreement in place. Starks asserts that, had he known the court would sentence him to ten years of imprisonment, he would have taken his case to trial, rather than entering a blind plea. Because Starks's allegations are conclusively refuted by the record, the circuit court did not clearly err in overruling Starks's motion without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment is affirmed.
On December 22, 2017, Starks pleaded guilty to twelve counts of second-degree burglary. At the outset of Starks's plea hearing, defense counsel informed the circuit court that Starks wished to plead guilty but had no prior agreement with the prosecutor. The circuit court then conducted an inquiry into the voluntariness of Starks's plea. During that inquiry, Starks testified as follows:
The circuit court also informed Starks that the State charged him as a prior and persistent offender, which subjected Starks to an enhanced range of punishment. The prosecutor read Starks's prior convictions into the record without opposition from defense counsel, and the court made a finding that Starks was a prior and persistent offender. The court then informed Starks that the sentencing range was up to ten years in prison and a $10,000 fine for each of the twelve burglary counts. Starks testified that he understood the range of punishment for each count and the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, including the right to a trial by jury, the right of assistance of counsel at trial, and the presumption of innocence. Starks then testified as follows:
Starks entered his guilty plea and admitted that between January 20, 2017, and June 11, 2017, he committed the crime of second-degree burglary on twelve separate occasions. The court accepted Starks's plea as "made voluntarily and intelligently with a full understanding of the charges, the range of punishment on each charge and the consequences of the guilty plea, with a full understanding of his rights in a jury trial and effect of a plea on those rights." After the court's acceptance of the plea, the court asked Starks another series of questions confirming his understanding:
On January 26, 2018, the circuit court sentenced Starks as a prior and persistent offender to concurrent sentences of ten years of imprisonment on each count. The court found no probable cause to believe that Starks received ineffective assistance of counsel.
On March 5, 2018, Starks timely filed his pro se motion pursuant to Rule 24.035. On December 20, 2018, counsel from the Missouri Public Defender's Office filed an amended motion and request for evidentiary hearing. Starks's amended motion alleged that his guilty plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made because his counsel led him to believe that if he entered a blind plea on all counts the court would sentence him to probation. Starks claims that had he known the court would sentence him to imprisonment he would not have pleaded guilty.
On February 3, 2021, the circuit court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order overruling Starks's motion without an evidentiary hearing. The court found that Starks failed to allege grounds that would entitle him to relief that were not refuted by the record because the record conclusively demonstrated that Starks was not promised a particular sentence. This appeal follows.
We review the denial of post-conviction relief to determine "whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous." Anderson v. State , 564 S.W.3d 592, 600 (Mo. banc 2018). This Court begins with the presumption that the findings and conclusions of the circuit court are correct. Wilson v. State , 813 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. banc 1991). "The motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if, after review of the record, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Cooper v. State , 356 S.W.3d 148, 152 (Mo. banc 2011).
In Starks's sole point on appeal, he asserts that the circuit court erred in overruling his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing. Starks argues that the circuit court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing to allow him an opportunity to prove that he had a reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief about the sentence he would receive if he pleaded guilty. In response, the State argues that the record clearly and specifically refutes Starks's allegations because Starks's testimony at the plea hearing demonstrates he understood that his sentence was entirely up to the court and no one had promised him he would receive any particular sentence in exchange for his plea. We agree with the State.
To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 24.035 motion, the movant must (1) allege facts, not conclusions, warranting relief; (2) that are not refuted by the record; and (3) result in prejudice to the movant. Stanley v. State , 420 S.W.3d 532, 544 (Mo. banc 2014). A hearing is not required when the motion, files, and record conclusively show the movant is not entitled to relief. Id. ; Rule 24.035(h).
When the movant claims ineffective assistance of counsel, the movant must allege facts, not refuted by the record, that show "counsel's performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney," resulting in prejudice to the movant. Matthews v. State , 175 S.W.3d 110, 113 (Mo. banc 2005). After a guilty plea, review is limited to determining whether the movant knowingly and voluntarily entered the plea. Gales v. State , 533 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). Counsel's performance is only material to the extent that it impacts the voluntariness and knowledge with which the movant pleaded guilty. Hagan v. State , 836 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Mo. banc 1992) ; Hayes v. State , 466 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015). Prejudice exists where the movant shows that, but for counsel's ineffective assistance, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on taking his case to trial. Taylor v. State , 456 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).
"When a movant claims to have [pleaded] guilty based on a mistaken belief about a sentence, the test is whether a reasonable basis exists in the record for such belief." Bates v. State , 421 S.W.3d 547, 553 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). "A plea does not become involuntary because a movant expects a lighter sentence than that actually received." Id. (quoting Cope v. State , 989 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999) ). If an examination of the guilty plea proceedings directly refutes the claim that movant's plea was involuntary, the movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Cain v. State , 859 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993).
"To justify the denial of an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the record must be specific enough to refute conclusively the movant's allegation[s]." Whitehead v. State , 481 S.W.3d 116, 126 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (quoting Mitchell v. State , 439 S.W.3d...
To continue reading
Request your trial