Starnes v. United States

• Decision Date: 07 May 1926
• Docket Number: No. 2690.,2690.
• Citation: 13 F.2d 212
• Parties: STARNES v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

13 F.2d 212 (1926)

STARNES v. UNITED STATES.

No. 2690.

District Court, E. D. Texas, Tyler Division.

May 7, 1926.

David Wuntch, of Tyler, Tex., Lyle Saxon, of Dallas, Tex., and Winfree & Weslow, of Houston, Tex., for plaintiff.

Randolph Bryant, of Sherman, Tex., for the United States.

ESTES, District Judge.

The plaintiff here enlisted in the navy on January 7, 1918, and was discharged on June 22 thereafter. During that time he procured war risk insurance to the extent of $10,000, for which he, through his father as next friend, sues. It is claimed that during the life of this insurance contract he became a psychopathic type to an extent that he was, and still is, and will continue to be, an irresponsible person, and was thereafter, and is now, totally and permanently disabled. A claim for compensation is set up in the petition, but that has been abandoned by the plaintiff, and the suit is for the value of the policy.

The government denies that he was totally disabled. Among other things it alleges that such disability as now exists is due to a constitutional defect or congenital condition; that his trouble, therefore, did not originate during his service, and, furthermore, is not of a type that will prevent him from pursuing a gainful occupation.

There is much testimony on the issue thus raised. I shall not undertake, in this memorandum, to review it in detail. Speaking in general terms, it is shown that the plaintiff, after a physical examination, was considered acceptable for service in the navy, and that his discharge was on account of his mental condition. At first full compensation, under the provisions of the statute, was allowed him; subsequently, half compensation; and, finally, payments were discontinued. During that time unsuccessful attempts at vocational training were made. The reports were not only that vocational training was not "feasible," but that the degree of his vocational handicap is "major." The plaintiff, since his discharge, has attempted work on his own account, but his efforts proved to be failures; that is, his work was inefficiently done, and was continued but a relatively short while. The members of his family and others acquainted with the plaintiff during his boyhood have attested his normal mentality and physical fitness prior to his enlistment, and have described the symptoms he has manifested since then as disqualifying him for almost any occupation.

I infer from the evidence that his mental ailment cannot properly be denominated insanity. The idiosyncrasies or peculiarities of conduct he has displayed are due, according to the physicians who testified for the government, and whose judgment, in my opinion, is correct, to a constitutional defect. They entertain the belief that he is capable of pursuing such occupations as he could have followed prior to his enlistment. They think, in other words, that his mental condition is such as would likely have developed, in the natural order of things, when he matured into manhood, and that it does not entirely destroy his ability to work.

I think it is immaterial, as regards the disposition to be made of the case, whether the cause of the...