Staron v. McDonald's Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 April 1995
• Docket Number: Nos. 493,674,D,s. 493
• Parties: , 4 A.D. Cases 353, 9 A.D.D. 481, 6 NDLR P 267 Matthew STARON, Jennifer Champagne, Brandon Naples, and Linda Ravenell, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. McDONALD'S CORPORATION and Burger King Corporation, Defendants-Appellees. ockets 94-7395, 94-7399.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 353

51 F.3d 353

63 USLW 2627, 4 A.D. Cases 353, 9

A.D.D. 481, 6 NDLR P 267

Matthew STARON, Jennifer Champagne, Brandon Naples, and Linda Ravenell, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. McDONALD'S CORPORATION and Burger King Corporation Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 493, 674, Dockets 94-7395, 94-7399.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Oct. 13, 1994.

Decided April 4, 1995.

Robert Farr, Heffernan, Farr, McChord & Morelli, Hartford, CT, for appellants.

Carter K. Combe, Joel L. Finger, Roberts & Finger, New York City, for defendant-appellee McDonald's Corp.

Lewis G. Schwartz, David W. Rubin, Schatz & Schatz, Rivicoff & Kotkin, Stamford, CT, for defendant-appellee Burger King Corp.

Before: NEWMAN, Chief Judge, WALKER and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges.

WALKER, Circuit Judge:

These actions are brought by three children with asthma and a woman with lupus against two popular fast-food restaurant chains, McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's") and Burger King Corporation ("Burger King"). Plaintiffs claim that defendants' policies of permitting smoking in their restaurants violate Sec. 302 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12182 (the "ADA" or "Act"). Plaintiffs appeal judgments of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (T.F. Gilroy Daly, Judge ) granting defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

For the reasons stated below, we reverse the judgments of the district court and remand the cases for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

The facts alleged in plaintiffs' complaints are rather straightforward. During one week in February, 1993, each plaintiff entered both a McDonald's and a Burger King restaurant in Connecticut. Each plaintiff found the air in each restaurant to be full of tobacco smoke, and, because of his or her condition, was unable to enter the restaurant without experiencing breathing problems. Each plaintiff has also encountered similar difficulties at other times in other restaurants owned by McDonald's and Burger King.

After registering complaints with the defendants and the State of Connecticut Human Rights Commission without satisfactory results, plaintiffs filed separate suits against McDonald's and Burger King on March 30 On May 24, 1993, each defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court referred both motions to Magistrate Judge Joan G. Margolis. After concluding that plaintiffs' request for a blanket ban on smoking in all of defendants' restaurants was not a reasonable modification under the Act as a matter of law, the magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the motions be granted. The district court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendation and dismissed plaintiffs' claims on March 9, 1994. Plaintiffs appealed.

1993. Their complaints alleged that the defendants' policies of permitting smoking in their restaurants constituted discrimination under the Act. Each complaint requested a declaratory judgment that such policies are discriminatory under the ADA, as well as an injunction to prohibit defendants from maintaining any policy which interfered with plaintiffs' rights under the Act, "and more specifically to require [defendants and their franchisees] to establish a policy of prohibiting smoking in all of the facilities they own, lease, or operate."

On the same day that the district court granted the motions to dismiss, McDonald's announced a new policy prohibiting smoking in all of its corporate owned-and-operated restaurants. The smoking ban did not extend to its franchised restaurants. McDonald's then submitted a motion to this court to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal as moot. This court denied the motion on June 21, 1994.

DISCUSSION

When deciding a motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court "must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true." Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir.1994). Dismissal is only appropriate where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1065 (2d Cir.1985). Because we find that plaintiffs' complaints do on their face state a cognizable claim against the defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act, we reverse the district court's orders of dismissal.

The ADA was promulgated "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities," as well as to establish "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards" for scrutinizing such discrimination. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101(b)(1)-(2). Consistent with these goals, Sec. 302 of the ADA provides that

[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 12182(a). "Discrimination" under this section includes the failure of an owner, operator, lessee, or lessor of public accommodations

to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, [or] facilities ... to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, [or] facilities....

42 U.S.C. Sec. 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).

For the purposes of these motions, defendants do not dispute that the section applies to them as owners and operators of public accommodations. They also concede at this point that plaintiffs qualify as "individuals with disabilities" under the ADA. The basis of the magistrate judge's Recommended Ruling, and the principal contention of McDonald's and Burger King on appeal, is that a total ban on smoking does not constitute a "reasonable modification" under the ADA.

The ADA and cases interpreting it do not articulate a precise test for determining whether a particular modification is "reasonable." However, because the Rehabilitation Act, which applies to recipients of federal funding, uses the same "reasonableness" analysis, cases interpreting that act provide some guidance. See Vande Zande v. State of Wisc. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir.1995); Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir.1994); Harmer v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 831 F.Supp. 1300, 1306-07 (E.D.Va.1993) ("the legislative history of the ADA indicates that reasonable accommodation is to be interpreted consistently with the regulations implemented under ... the Rehabilitation Act"); cf. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3rd Cir.1995) (noting that the ADA provisions applicable to state and local governments incorporate the non-discrimination principles of the Rehabilitation Act and that ADA regulations implementing those provisions are patterned after those promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act); Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067, 1071 (3rd Cir.1993) (explaining that Congress intended that regulations under the ADA be consistent with Rehabilitation Act regulations), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1545, 128 L.Ed.2d 196 (1994).

The Supreme Court, addressing the issue of the reasonableness of accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act in the employment context, stated that "[a]ccommodation is not reasonable if it either imposes 'undue financial and administrative burdens' ... or requires 'a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program.' " School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1130 n. 17, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987) (citations omitted); see also Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930-31 (evaluating age requirements for high school athletics under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act). Other courts have articulated factors that they consider relevant to the determination, including the nature and extent of plaintiff's disability. See D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 813 F.Supp. 217, 221 (W.D.N.Y.1993).

Although neither the ADA nor the courts have defined the precise contours of the test for reasonableness, it is clear that the determination of whether a particular modification is "reasonable" involves a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry that considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of the modification in light of the nature of the disability in question and the cost to the organization that would implement it. See D'Amico, 813 F.Supp. at 221-22 (holding that allowing a law student with a vision disorder four days to take the bar exam was a reasonable accommodation); cf. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542 (stating that, to be "reasonable," the cost of an accommodation should not be disproportionate to the benefit); Tuck v. HCA Health Servs. of Tennessee, Inc., 7 F.3d 465, 471 (6th Cir.1993) ("Issues involving ... reasonable accommodation [under the Rehabilitation Act] are primarily factual issues.").

While there may be claims requesting modification under the ADA that warrant dismissal as unreasonable as a matter of law, in the cases before us a fact-specific inquiry was required. None has occurred at this early stage of the suits. The magistrate judge instead concluded--and the district court agreed--that plaintiffs' request for a ban on smoking in all of defendants' restaurants was unreasonable as a matter of law. The magistrate judge offered two grounds for this conclusion: first, that "the ADA, by itself, does not mandate a 'blanket ban' on smoke in 'fast food' restaurants," and second, that "[i]t is not reasonable, under the ADA, to impose a blanket ban on every McDonald's [and...