Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
| Decision Date | 18 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-0725 |
| Parties | STARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
This case is one of three related cases currently pending before this Court.1 The case is currently before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 6] filed by Defendant Exxon Mobil Corporation ("Exxon"), to which Plaintiff Starr Indemnity & Liability Company ("Starr") filed a Response [Doc. # 10]. Exxon neither filed a reply nor requested additional time to do so. Having considered the full record and relevant legal authorities, the Court denies the Motion to Dismiss.
In January 2013, Kevin Roberts and Arturo Munoz, employees of Savage Refinery Services, LLC ("Savage"), were injured while working at Exxon's BaytownRefinery. Roberts filed a personal injury lawsuit ("Roberts Lawsuit") against Exxon, which has now been settled. Munoz also asserted a personal injury claim against Exxon in connection with his injuries, but he has not filed a lawsuit.
Savage is the insured under an insurance policy, known as a "bumbershoot" policy, issued by Starr.2 Following the accident in which Roberts and Munoz were insured, Exxon claimed that it is an additional insured under the Starr bumbershoot policy. Starr denied Exxon's status as an additional insured, and filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that Exxon is not entitled to coverage under the policy. Exxon filed its Motion to Dismiss, which is now ripe for decision.
Exxon argues that there is no subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Exxon argues also that the Court should dismiss the declaratory judgment action because the Roberts Lawsuit remains pending in Texas state court.3 Starr responds that this Court has admiralty/maritime jurisdiction because the bumbershoot policy under which Exxon claims to be an additional insured is a marine contract, and thatthe Roberts Lawsuit is not a parallel lawsuit that could form the basis for dismissal or abstention.
Starr argues that this Court has admiralty/maritime jurisdiction because the insurance policy under which Exxon claims to be an additional insured is a marine contract. Exxon argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the lawsuit has "no 'salty flavor'." See Motion, p. 2. It is undisputed that the Starr insurance policy is a "bumbershoot" policy that provides excess coverage for traditional marine risks as well as non-marine risks. It provides excess coverage for multiple vessels, and lists a Marine General Liability/Terminal Operators Liability/Charterer's Legal Liability policy among the underlying insurance policies for which the "bumbershoot" policy provides excess coverage. The United States Supreme Court has held that admiralty jurisdiction applies to contracts that combine marine and land-based elements if the marine elements not "insubstantial." See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 27 (2004). The Fifth Circuit, applying Kirby, has held that such "bumbershoot" policies "are widely recognized as common marine insurance policies." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Port of New Orleans, 418 F. App'x 305, 308 (5th Cir. Mar. 15, 2011) (citing The St. Paul Travelers Cos. v. Corn Island Shipyard, Inc., 495 F.3d 376, 379 n.1 (7th Cir. 2007)).The fact that the underlying injury occurred during land-based activities does not require a different result. See, e.g., Kirby, 543 U.S. at 18, 27 (); Alleman v. Omni Energy Servs. Corp., 580 F.3d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 2009) (). Indeed, the underlying claim in St. Paul Fire & Marine arose on land when a top loader fell into a pothole, injuring the driver. See St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Port of New Orleans, 646 F. Supp. 2d 813, 816 (E.D. La. 2009), aff'd, 418 F. App'x 305, 308 (5th Cir. Mar. 15, 2011). As a result, pursuant to Kirby, Alleman, and St. Paul, the Starr-issued policy is a marine insurance policy, and this Court has admiralty/maritime jurisdiction.
Exxon argues that the Court should dismiss or abstain from deciding Starr's declaratory judgment claim pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Anti-Injunction Act, and principles of comity, federalism and abstention.4 Each of thesearguments is based on Exxon's position that the Roberts Lawsuit, which has now been settled, is "parallel litigation pending in state court."5 See Motion to Dismiss Original Complaint [Doc. # 11], p. 3 (); p. 4 (). Exxon's premise is faulty.
Suits are parallel if they "involv[e] the same parties and the same issues." Brown v. Pacific Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384, 395 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting RepublicBank Dallas, Nat'l Ass'n v. McIntosh, 828 F.2d 1120, 1121 (5th Cir. 1987)). Starr is not a party to the Roberts Lawsuit against Exxon, and Roberts is not a party to this case. It is undisputed that the Roberts Lawsuit does not involve claims regarding whether Exxon is an additional insured under Starr's bumbershoot policy. Additionally, although it technically remains pending in state court, the RobertsLawsuit has been settled and the settlement has been partially funded. Exxon has not demonstrated that the Roberts Lawsuit is parallel litigation that would render non-justiciable Starr's claim for declaratory judgment that Exxon is not an additional insured. Because the Court can decide the declaratory judgment claim in this case without enjoining or otherwise interfering with the Roberts Lawsuit, Exxon has not demonstrated that this Court lacks authority to decide the issues in this case without violating the Anti-Injunction Act. Moreover, as noted above, Exxon has a pending lawsuit before this Court seeking a declaratory judgment that it is an additional insured under the Starr insurance policy. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Starr Indem. and Liability Co., Civil Action No. H-14-1147.
Based on the foregoing, the...
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