Starrett v. City of Richardson
| Decision Date | 27 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-0191-L |
| Parties | WILLIAM HENRY STARRETT, JR., Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF RICHARDSON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
By Order of Reference filed March 1, 2018 (doc. 10), this pro se case has been referred for full case management. Before the Court for recommendation is Defendant City of Richardson, Texas' Motion to Dismiss for Improper Service of Process and Failure to State a Claim or Alternatively a Motion to Quash Service and Brief in Support, filed February 16, 2018 (doc. 7). Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the motion should be GRANTED, and the plaintiff's remaining claims should be dismissed sua sponte.
On January 25, 2018, William Henry Starrett, Jr., (Plaintiff) filed this pro se lawsuit against the City of Richardson (Defendant) asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §§§ 1983, 1985, and 14141, and "under [the] law of agency or the [d]octrines of [r]espondeat [s]uperior or [c]ommand [r]esponsibility each where so applicable" for violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as state law claims for violations of sections 24 and 30 of Article 1 of the Texas Constitution, libel and defamation, negligence, negligent employment practices, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. (doc. 3 at 1-2, 10-17 (italics added).)1 He"brings his action to obtain relief from the negligent and wrongful acts and omissions of Richardson Police Department [(RPD)] acting as civil authority under Defendant." (Id. at 2.) He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, "compensatory, assumed, statutory, and punitive damages, including trebling to be proven," and "reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and other expenses as permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988." (Id. at 2, 17-18.)
Plaintiff alleges that on November 8, 2015, he became aware "that he had been remotely involved in training, operations, research, and development employing technologies that combine tracking, surveillance, communications, and weapons systems without his knowledge or consent." (Id. at 4.) "[T]hese systems and software offer capability for remotely interacting with or maintaining communications with a human subject . . . ." (Id.) He alleges that his remote involvement continues to this day. (Id. at 7.) Before he could "fully articulate details relating to these conditions and conduct . . . a family member contacted [RPD] and officers were dispatched to [his] home." (Id. at 4-5.)2 When RPD officers visited Plaintiff's home, he explained that he was suffering electronic harassment and stated that "individuals remotely identified themselves and their involvement in the 'Jade Helm' exercises," and an officer then "said something very near to: 'we [are not] a part of that but if you need help, let us know.'" (Id. at 5.)
In August 2016, Plaintiff provided a 31-page report that "documented the ongoing harassment and business services theft" to RPD "investigation team members by electronic mail." (Id.) It "described the conduct and conditions that Plaintiff had been required to endure" and included information such as operation names, names of individuals, and a vehicle description withthe license plate number. (Id.) He subsequently received an email from an RPD staff member informing him that he was working on the investigation and wanted to meet. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff informed the staff member that he could not answer questions in person or by phone, but "was available upon request for written comment." (Id.) Plaintiff routinely followed up "[o]ver the following days, weeks, then months" but received no further response. (Id.) He claims he has notified the RPD of the "ongoing crimes involving military" a number of times between 2015 and 2017. (Id.)
On September 12, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an "Open Records Request" to RPD and received only two incident reports detailing the phone calls from his family member and subsequent police visits in November 2015. (Id. at 3-4, 7.)3 Plaintiff alleges that each call to RPD "was incorrectly recorded as if health problems were the primary factor in the need for a report," and the first call report did not include his explanations and statements to officers regarding the electronic harassment against him. (Id. at 5.)4 According to the call logs, "both call histories were immediately closed and . . . it seems that no further investigation has taken place in any way." (Id.) It was only through the information received from his request that he discovered:
1) how these error-filled call histories are being negligently maintained; 2) that an investigation into the electronic harassment brought by military exercises as reported at the time and months after was not conducted; and 3) how these factually incorrect and obviously damaging assumptions related to characterizations of any health diagnosis, where there are none, have apparently impeded vital further investigation by [RPD] and other civilian authorities after Plaintiff's many subsequent comprehensive attempts to report, by postal and electronic mail, conditions and conduct remotely involving his person and property against his consent.
(Id. at 3-4.) On January 5, 2018, Plaintiff received notice from the RPD regarding a report made by him on November 16, 2017, that was "also logged with critical inaccuracies . . . and contained no reassurances of an investigation, questions, or requests for clarification." (Id. at 7.) He alleges that these "records are presumably to also be maintained and either have been or will be negligently acted upon." (Id.)
Plaintiff asserts that the lack of assistance from the RPD led him to contact "the Texas Military Department, Lockheed Martin Corporation, and the United States Department of Defense . . . ." (Id.) The Office of the Inspector General for the defense department allegedly admitted knowledge and awareness of the past and ongoing conduct involving Plaintiff, and affirmed that it was not going to investigate the issue, "effectively deferr[ing] any investigation . . . back to [the] local city and state police. (Id. at 7-8.)
On April 7, 2017, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against multiple defendants, including the Lockheed Martin Corporation and various departments of the United States government, alleging "73 distinct causes of action based on allegations that [the defendants] conspired to forcefully use him as a test subject for military exercises and mind experiments." Starrett v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 3:17-CV-00988-D-BT, 2018 WL 1399177, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2018), adopted by, 2018 WL 1383398 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2018). He hoped to "end this protracted ordeal and initiate recovery from injury and loss." (doc. 3 at 8.) Plaintiff's claims in that action were eventually dismissed without prejudice, and his appeal from that decision remains pending. See Starrett v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 3:17-CV-00988-D, 2018 WL 1383398, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2018).
Plaintiff alleges that the violations of law against him "have been (and continue to be)remotely perpetrated against [him] while he is at home and out on errands," and "[a]s a direct and proximate result of the conditions, conduct, and correlative crimes that have gone without investigation, corrective action, and due process of law by civil and military authority, [he] has and continues to endure pain, suffering, injury, risk, and monumental personal and professional loss." (doc. 3 at 8-9.)
On February 16, 2018, Defendant filed its motion seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for improper service of process and failure to state a claim, or alternatively, to quash service. (doc. 7.) Plaintiff filed his response on February 20, 2018. (doc. 9.) The motion is now ripe for recommendation.
Defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5) on grounds that Plaintiff "served his summons on 'City of Richardson'" and failed to properly prove service by properly signed affidavit, and the record does not "reflect that the person who sign[ed] the receipt of delivery is the addressee or an agent otherwise capable of receiving service." (doc. 7 at 1-2.)
Rule 12(b)(5) permits a challenge to the method of service attempted by the plaintiff, or to the lack of delivery of the summons and complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5); Coleman, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 745. Unless the defendant has been served with process in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, a federal court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Omni Capital Intern., Ltd. v.Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Pavlov v. Parsons, 574 F. Supp. 393, 399 (S.D. Tex. 1983). The plaintiff has the burden to ensure that the defendants are properly served with a summons and a copy of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1); Carimi v. Royal Carribean Cruise Line, Inc., 959 F.2d 1344, 1346 (5th Cir. 1992). "[A] plaintiff's pro se status does not excuse any failure to properly effect service of process." Webb v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. 3:17-CV-878-M-BN, 2017 WL 4082445, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2017), adopted by, 2017 WL 4023100 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2017) (citing Sys. Signs Supplies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 903 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1990)).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a state or local government is properly served by either "delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer," or by "serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state's law for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2). Under Texas law, any person authorized by Rule 1036 may serve process by "mailing to the defendant by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, a true copy of the citation with a copy of the petition attached thereto." Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(2). The return receipt must be signed by the addressee for service to be effective....
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