Starte v. Goode, 10554

Citation171 N.W.2d 733,84 S.D. 369
Decision Date05 November 1969
Docket NumberNo. 10554,10554
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ronnie O. GOODE, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of South Dakota

James Abourezk, Rapid City, William M. Kunstler, New York City, for defendant and appellant.

Gordon Mydland, Atty. Gen., Edward M. Blando, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, James Wilson, Pennington County State's Atty., Rapid City, for plaintiff and respondent.

HANSON, Judge.

Following the death of Donna Jean Austin's infant son in Rapid City on October 6, 1966, Mrs. Austin and the defendant, Ronnie O. Goode, were separately charged with the crime of Manslaughter In The First Degree. On arraignment both defendants were determined to be indigent and the same attorney was appointed as counsel for their defense. Separate trials were held and both defendants were found guilty as principals of the crime charged. Goode was sentenced to serve twenty-five years in the State Penitentiary. He appeals.

The dominant issue is whether Goode was denied a fair trial by assigned counsel's conflict of interest arising from representation of dual defendants charged with the same crime. The competency, ability, and diligence of assigned counsel is not otherwise seriously challenged.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the assistance of counsel for his defense'. This right to counsel is now extended to and made obligatory upon all the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733; Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, reh. den. 388 U.S. 924, 87 S.Ct. 2094, 18 L.Ed.2d 1377; and State v. Buffalo Chief, S.D., 155 N.W.2d 914. As this court explained in State ex rel. Burns v. Erickson, 80 S.D. 639, 129 N.W.2d 712, the constitutional right of an accused to defend with the assistance of counsel 'means adequate and effective assistance and the trial court has the duty to appoint competent counsel to represent and advise an indegent accused. A mere perfunctory and casual representation does not satisfy the constitutional guaranty. State ex rel. Parker v. Jameson, 75 S.D. 196, 61 N.W.2d 832. The attorney's obligation and duty to his client is, and must be, the same whether he is paid much or little or nothing at all.'

In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680, defendant Glasser's conviction was reversed because his retained counsel was assigned by the court over Glasser's objection to represent an indigent codefendant. The court said the assistance of counsel guar anteed by the 'Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests. * * * Of equal importance with the duty of the court to see that an accused has the assistance of counsel is its duty to refrain from embarrassing counsel in the defense of an accused by insisting, or indeed, even suggesting, that counsel undertake to concurrently represent interests which might diverge from those of his first client, when the possibility of that divergence is brought home to the court.'

The rule forbidding an attorney to represent conflicting interests is not new. It is based on the ancient admonition that 'No man can serve two masters.' Individual lawyers, therefore, as well as courts, have a duty to avoid such conflicting relationships and representations. According to Canon 6 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics 'It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.' Also see Canon 5 of the New Code of Professional Responsibility enacted at the 1969 meeting of the American Bar Association to become effective January 1, 1970.

The mere fact one attorney is assigned or retained to represent multiple defendants is not, in itself, a denial of effective assistance of counsel. This is especially true with reference to counsel retained by an accused. Our constitution guarantees an accused 'the right to defend in person and by counsel.' Art. VI, § 7. We have construed this to mean an accused has a constitutional right to defend by counsel of his own choice, State ex rel. Pekarek v. Erickson, S.D., 155 N.W.2d 313, and it is not the responsibility of the court to exercise any control over the selection of counsel by an accused. The present day quandary of our courts in this respect is illustrated in the recent case of State v. Buffalo Chief, S.D., 155 N.W.2d 914, in which defendants Buffalo Chief, Little, and Gayton were charged with the crime of murder. Gayton retained a prominent attorney for his defense. At the request of Buffalo Chief and Little the trial court appointed separate counsel to conduct their defenses. Before the preliminary hearing Buffalo Chief and Little elected to and did employ the same counsel previously retained by Gayton. The two court-appointed counsel were then discharged and released from their assignments. Defendant Little later retained another lawyer of his choice. Buffalo Chief was found guilty of manslaughter. On appeal, among other things, he contended he was denied effective assistance of his retained counsel because of conflict of interest arising from his representation of a codefendant. We denied relief. 1

When a single attorney is assigned to represent codefendants in a criminal prosecution there must be an actual conflict of interest arising from the dual representation in order to constitute a denial of an accused's right to the effective assistance of counsel. However, the right of an accused to have the assistance of effective counsel 'is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.' Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; Baker v. State, Fla., 202 So.2d 563.

In the present action it appears that Donna Jean Austin was a white woman about thirty-one years of age who had been married five times. Her last husband was James Austin. Her fourth husband was Robert Doty and they had a son, William L. Doty, born March 31, 1964. During September and October, 1966, Mrs. Austin lived separate and apart from her husband in a unit of the Rosebud Motel in Rapid City with her infant son, William. She was employed by the owners of the motel as a cleaning maid. The defendant, Goode, was a twenty-year-old Negro air force policeman. During September...

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14 cases
  • United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • June 5, 1970
    ...ex rel. Pekarek v. Erickson, 155 N.W.2d 313, 314 (S.D.1967); State v. Buffalo Chief, 155 N.W.2d 914, 917 n. 1 (S.D.1968); State v. Goode, 171 N.W.2d 733, 734 (S.D.1969). The right to counsel may be waived, of course, if the waiver is "made voluntarily and intelligently by a competent mind."......
  • State v. Winckler
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • December 16, 1977
    ...to an actual conflict of interest arising in this case which impaired the effective assistance of appointed counsel. State v. Goode, 84 S.D. 369, 171 N.W.2d 733 (1969). There has been no showing of an actual conflict arising from the dual representation in this case. What defendants really ......
  • Berman v. Rubin, 51940
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • May 13, 1976
    ...209 S.E.2d 242. As to particular examples, see generally Arey v. Davis, 233 Ga. 951, 213 S.E.2d 837 (retained counsel); State v. Goode, 84 S.D. 369, 171 N.W.2d 733 (court-appointed counsel); Young v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 346 F.2d 793 (legal aid society counsel); American Emp......
  • State v. Grosh
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • January 15, 1986
    ...provision as meaning the accused has a constitutional right to defend by counsel of his own choice. See State v. Goode, 84 S.D. 369, 372, 171 N.W.2d 733, 734 (1969); State v. Buffalo Chief, 83 S.D. 131, 138, 155 N.W.2d 914, 918 (1968); and State v. Erickson, 83 S.D. 79, 81, 155 N.W.2d 313, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Confidentiality and conflicts of interest: a guide for South Dakota lawyers.
    • United States
    • South Dakota Law Review Vol. 59 No. 3, September - September 2014
    • September 22, 2014
    ...Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2004). (162.) See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 161-62 (1988). (163.) State v. Goode, 171 N.W.2d 733, 736 (S.D. 1969); but see State v. Austin, 172 N.W.2d 284, 289 (S.D. (164.) Goode, 171 N.W.2d at 736 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel Whitling v. R......

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