State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoyle
Decision Date | 05 May 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 9114SC441,9114SC441 |
Citation | 415 S.E.2d 764,106 N.C.App. 199 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Michael W. HOYLE, Elizabeth Hoyle, Cynthia Thomas McAbee, James B. McAbee, and Thomas Walker McAbee. |
Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, by John A. Tomei, Raleigh, for plaintiff-appellant.
Haywood, Denny, Miller, Johnson, Sessoms & Patrick, by Robert E. Levin, Durham, for defendant-appellees Michael W. Hoyle and Elizabeth Hoyle.
Poe, Hoof and Reinhardt, by Martha A. New, Durham, for defendant-appellees Cynthia Thomas McAbee and Thomas Walker McAbee.
Plaintiff appeals from an order filed 5 March 1991, denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's declaratory judgment action, and entering summary judgment in favor of defendants.
The evidence established that on 13 April 1990, Will Hoyle (Will), son of defendants Michael W. and Elizabeth D. Hoyle (the Hoyles), was driving his go-cart approximately two and one half blocks from his home in Durham, North Carolina. Generally speaking, a go-cart is a recreational device made out of some type of tubing and generally about four to five feet long, with four small tires, a steering wheel, a lawnmower-type engine, and gas and brake pedals, but usually without lights, directional signals, a rearview mirror, a horn, or a proper breaking system. See Zapp v. Ross Pontiac, Inc., 39 A.D.2d 739, 332 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1972); Sentry Ins. Co. v. Castillo, 574 A.2d 138 (R.I.1990). Go-carts are not designed for use on public highways. At the intersection of Falkirt Road and Farintosh Court, Will's go-cart struck defendant Thomas Walker McAbee (Thomas), causing injury to Thomas' left leg. At the time of the incident, the Hoyles were insured under a homeowner's policy with plaintiff. The policy provides coverage for personal liability and medical payments to others due to bodily injury. The policy also contains the following exclusionary clause:
1. Coverage E--Personal Liability and Coverage F--Medical Payments to Others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage:
. . . . .
e. arising out of:
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of motor vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances, including trailers, owned or operated by or rented or loaned to an insured.
The policy does not provide a definition of the terms "motor vehicle" or "motorized land conveyance." However, the policy states that the above exclusion does not apply to "a motorized land conveyance designed for recreational use off public roads, not subject to motor vehicle registration and (a) not owned by an insured; or (b) owned by an insured and on an insured location." It is undisputed that the go-cart was owned by an insured, and that the go-cart accident did not occur on an insured location.
On 22 May 1990, plaintiff instituted an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the insurance policy at issue provides no coverage for personal liability or medical payments to others for Thomas' injuries resulting from the go-cart accident. On 17 January 1991, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On 5 March 1991, the trial court determined that the insurance policy provides coverage for the accident, and accordingly denied plaintiff's motion and granted defendants' oral motion for summary judgment.
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The issues presented are whether (I) the undefined term "motor vehicle" as used in the exclusionary clause of a homeowner's insurance policy encompasses a go-cart; and (II) the undefined term "motorized land conveyance" as used in the same exclusionary clause encompasses a go-cart.
The general rule applicable to insurance contracts is that, in the absence of an ambiguity, the language used must be given its plain, ordinary, and accepted meaning. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 100 N.C.App. 64, 68, 394 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1990). However, where an ambiguity or uncertainty as to the meaning of words exists, the insurance contract must be construed in favor of the insured. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970). A word is ambiguous when it is reasonably capable of more than one meaning. Chadwick v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 N.C.App. 446, 447, 176 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1970). When included in an insurance contract, exclusionary clauses are to be strictly construed in favor of coverage. Wachovia, 276 N.C. at 355, 172 S.E.2d at 522-23. However, if such exclusions are plainly expressed, "insurers are entitled to have them construed and enforced as expressed." 43 Am Jur 2d Insurance § 291 (1982).
"Motor Vehicle"
Plaintiff argues that a go-cart is "obviously" a "motor vehicle." Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the term is ambiguous since it is not defined in the policy.
When an insurance policy contains no definition of a non-technical term, the ordinary meaning of the term controls. Wachovia, 276 N.C. at 354, 172 S.E.2d at 522. The dictionary defines "motor vehicle" as "a vehicle on wheels having its own motor and not running on rails or tracks, for use on streets or highways; especially, an automobile, truck or bus." Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition (1970) (hereinafter Webster's ) (emphasis added). A "vehicle" is "any device or contrivance for carrying or conveying persons or objects, including land conveyances...." Id.; see also 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 1 (1969) ( ). North Carolina's motor vehicle statutes define a "motor vehicle" as "every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle designed to run upon the highways which is pulled by a self-propelled vehicle," excluding mopeds. N.C.G.S. § 20-4.01(23) (1989). A "vehicle" is defined as "every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon fixed rails or tracks ...," and including bicycles. N.C.G.S. § 20-4.01(49) (1989) (emphasis added).
Thus, the...
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