STATE BANK OF WATERLOO v. City of Waterloo
| Citation | 275 Ill.Dec. 98,792 N.E.2d 329,339 Ill. App.3d 767 |
| Decision Date | 30 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 5-01-0942.,5-01-0942. |
| Parties | STATE BANK OF WATERLOO, Tom D. Adams, Joan M. Adams, Market Street Development, Inc., Jay M. Huetsch, and Robert W. Hawkins, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CITY OF WATERLOO, Illinois and Paul McNamara, Building Inspector of the City of Waterloo, Illinois, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Tom D. Adams, Adams and Huetsch, Columbia; Thomas A. Le Chien, Law Offices of Le Chien & Le Chien, Ltd., Belleville, for Appellants.
Floyd E. Crowder, Crowder & Scoggins, Ltd., Columbia, for Appellees.
In 1995, as partial compensation in an eminent domain proceeding, the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) granted the plaintiffs a series of permits for access to the planned Illinois State Route 3 bypass around the City of Waterloo, Illinois (City). After the construction of the bypass was complete, the plaintiffs applied to the city council for approval of a subdivision plat that proposed utilizing two of the access points previously granted by IDOT. The city council denied the plat based on its failure to meet standards for access to Route 3 contained in the City's comprehensive plan and subdivision ordinances enacted after IDOT had granted the plaintiffs the permits. Ruling on the plaintiffs' motion for a summary determination of major issues, the trial court held that IDOT's jurisdiction over Route 3 does not preempt all local control over access to the highway. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill.2d R. 308), the plaintiffs requested the trial court to certify to this court the question of whether IDOT's authority to regulate access to state highways preempts the City's authority to deny a proposed subdivision plat based on its proposed accesses to Route 3. The trial court certified the question, and the plaintiffs filed the instant interlocutory appeal. We answer the certified question in the negative and affirm the trial court's ruling.
In July 1995, plaintiffs Tom and Joan Adams, Jay Huetsch, Robert Hawkins, and Market Street Development, Inc., entered into a settlement agreement with IDOT in an eminent domain proceeding. Under the agreement, the plaintiffs sold IDOT a highway right-of-way for the construction of a portion of Route 3, which IDOT planned to reroute from its previous location to bypass the city. IDOT compensated the plaintiffs for the taking both by providing monetary compensation and by granting the plaintiffs permits for access to Route 3 from their property. At that time, the property was agricultural.
In the winter of 1996, while the construction of the Route 3 bypass was ongoing, the City adopted a comprehensive plan. That plan recommended, in relevant part, as follows:
On July 20, 1998, the City amended the chapter of its code of ordinances governing subdivisions to implement the comprehensive plan. As amended, the City's revised code of ordinances provides, in relevant part, as follows:
In 1999, the Route 3 bypass was completed and opened to the public. The plaintiffs thereafter applied to the City's city council for approval of a subdivision plat for the North Pointe West Subdivision, a proposed commercial development along relocated Route 3. The proposed subdivision consists of three commercial lots with a shared parking lot that has two access driveways to Route 3. The Waterloo Planning Commission recommended that the city council deny the plat; however, the planning commission stated that it would recommend approval if the plat included only one driveway accessing Route 3.
On November 1, 1999, the city council voted to deny the plat. On September 21, 2000, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit court of Monroe County seeking (1) a declaratory judgment holding that the subdivision plat for the North Pointe West Subdivision meets all legal requirements and that, therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to approval, (2) a mandamus order compelling the City to approve the North Pointe West Subdivision plat, and (3) a permanent injunction barring the City from refusing to issue building permits or approve subdivision plats for the remainder of the plaintiffs' property abutting Route 3 on the basis of proposed Route 3 access points for which IDOT had already granted permits.
On February 21, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a summary judgment or, in the alternative, a summary determination of major issues. On October 11, 2001, the court denied the motion for a summary judgment, finding such relief precluded by the existence of genuine issues of material fact. The court ruled that IDOT's jurisdiction over Route 3 does not preempt the City's authority to regulate access to the highway. The court, however, declined to rule summarily on the five additional issues raised in the plaintiffs' motion for a summary determination. On October 24, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 requesting the trial court to certify to this court the following question: "Does the Illinois Department of Transportation's jurisdiction [preempt] control by the City of Waterloo over private access to Illinois State Route 3 * * *?" On November 26, 2001, the trial court certified the question to this court, and on January 9, 2002, we granted the plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal.
The plaintiffs contend that the City is preempted from regulating access to Route 3 from subdivisions within its jurisdiction by IDOT's authority to regulate state highway access. We disagree.
The Illinois Highway Code authorizes IDOT to "adopt and to amend reasonable and necessary rules, regulations[,] and specifications" covering access to state highways from private property abutting them. 605 ILCS 5/4-210 (West 2000). The legislature's only limit on IDOT's authority to regulate state highway access is as follows: "Except where the right of access has been limited by or pursuant to law," all property adjoining state highways must have "reasonable means of ingress from and egress to" the highway. 605 ILCS 5/4-210 (West 2000). The City argues that the phrase "Except where the right of access has been limited by or pursuant to law" includes limitations on access pursuant to municipal law and that, therefore, the legislature intended municipalities to have the authority to regulate access concurrently with IDOT.
Municipalities are neither expressly granted nor expressly denied the authority to impose additional limitations on state highway access. They are, however, granted the authority to establish design standards for subdivisions, including those located on state highways, and to determine the location, width, course, and surfacing of public streets, including those that intersect with state highways. 65 ILCS 5/11-12-5(1) (West 2000). Logically, the authority to determine the location of municipal streets that intersect with state highways gives municipalities some control over where state highways may be accessed. Similarly, because the design of a proposed subdivision includes the placement of driveways, the authority to regulate design standards of commercial subdivisions located on state highways gives municipalities some control over where such properties may access the highways. The plaintiffs contend, however, that the legislature intended IDOT to have exclusive authority to regulate access to state highways and that, therefore, municipalities are preempted from considering highway safety in deciding the locations of streets and driveways. We agree with the City.
Whether municipal regulation is preempted by state authority is a question of legislative intent. A comprehensive scheme of state regulation implies that the legislature intended to leave no room for local regulation. Pesticide Public Policy Foundation v. Village of Wauconda, 117 Ill.2d 107, 115, 109 Ill.Dec. 790, 510 N.E.2d 858, 862 (1987). An express legislative intent that an act achieve statewide uniformity is similarly indicative that the legislature intended for state regulation to preempt local control. Pesticide Public Policy Foundation, 117 Ill.2d at 116,109 Ill.Dec. 790,510 N.E.2d at 863. By contrast, where authority is expressly delegated to local governments to regulate in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Vill. of NORTHFIELD v. BP America INC.
...a local ordinance is preempted by state authority is a question of legislative intent. State Bank of Waterloo v. City of Waterloo, 339 Ill.App.3d 767, 771, 275 Ill.Dec. 98, 792 N.E.2d 329 (2003). As it did before the circuit court, BP maintains that the Village's ordinance defining an aband......
-
Affordable Recovery Housing v. City of Blue Island
...State regulation and licensure.” See Pesticide Pub. Policy Found., 622 F.Supp. at 430.Defendants cite Village of Carpentersville and State Bank of Waterloo in support of their concurrent regulation argument. Both cases are distinguishable. Unlike the regulations and statutes in this case, t......