State Bar of Mich. v. Kupris

• Decision Date: 02 July 1962
• Docket Number: No. 50,50
• Citation: 116 N.W.2d 341,366 Mich. 688
• Parties: STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN, a Public Body Corporate, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William R. KUPRIS, Individually and d/b/a Williams Realty Company, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 341

116 N.W.2d 341

366 Mich. 688

STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN, a Public Body Corporate, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William R. KUPRIS, Individually and d/b/a Williams Realty Company, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 50.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 2, 1962.

J. Cameron Hall, Gen. Counsel, State Bar of Michigan, Detroit, for appellant.

Earl Waring Dunn, Grand Rapids, for William R. Kupris.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Chief Justice.

The defendant in this case is a real estate broker maintaining an office in the city of Grand Rapids and carrying on business under the name of Williams Realty Company. He was licensed as such broker by the Michigan corporation and securities commission in September, 1948. Inferentially he has been conducting the business in question since that time.

Claiming that defendant has improperly engaged in the practice of law, the State Bar of Michigan filed the instant suit in the circuit court of Kent county for injunctive relief. It was alleged in the bill of complaint that in September of 1960 defendant acted as a real estate broker in the sale of a restaurant at Cedar Springs, Michigan. In connection with the transaction a chattel mortgage was executed to the sellers of the property. Shortly after such transaction the purchasers undertook to resell the establishment and negotiated with parties desiring to purchase. The concent of the chattel mortgagees was deemed necessary and defendant agreed to prepare and obtain the execution of an instrument to evidence such consent. It was alleged further that defendant did not prepare a proper instrument for execution but that he charged the sum of $100 for his services and advice, for which amount a promissory note was given to him. In the resale of the restaurant business defendant did not act as a broker, another real estate operator or broker having been retained to act in such capacity.

Plaintiff charged in its pleading that defendant's acts in the premises constituted the attempted practice of law, and that the procedure by which he undertook to assist the party contacting him was not such as to accomplish the desired result. Plaintiff alleged generally that such conduct on the part of defendant injured members of the public and if repeated would perhaps cause further injury. Relief by way of injunction was sought against defendant, restraining him 'both temporarily and permanently, from drafting any legal documents, and from filling in forms of instruments, affecting or purporting to affect any rights or claims as between Sellers and Purchasers of businesses or pertaining to real estate transactions, and from giving any advice or opinion relative to such documents, and from engaging in the practice of law in the State of Michigan.'

On the filing of the bill of complaint an order was issued requiring defendant to show cause why the relief sought should not be granted. Defendant made answer asserting that his acts in connection with the transaction referred to in plaintiff's bill of complaint were performed in an attempt to assist the broker handling the sale and purchase of behalf of the parties thereto. He further admitted that his attorney had advised him that such acts 'probably did constitute the practice of law' and stated that he had returned to the owner of the property the sum of $100 received from him by way of compensation for services. While admitting that he had not handled properly the matter entrusted to him, he denied that any damage had resulted in consequence. He expressly consented that an injunction might issue in accordance with the holding of this Court in Ingham County Bar Association v. Walter Neller Company, 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713, 53 A.L.R.2d 777, restraining him from practicing law and from conveyancing or filling out forms except when incidental to the business transactions being conducted by him and for which no extra charge should be made.

On the hearing in circuit court counsel for plaintiff contended that an injunction should be granted in accordance with the prayer of the bill of complaint as above quoted. The circuit judge before whom the matter was heard rejected the claim of plaintiff's counsel that a broader restraint than was imposed in Ingham County Bar Association v. Walter Neller Company, supra, should be imposed on defendant. A decree was entered enjoining defendant:

'* * * from performing legal services for, and from giving legal advice to, any persons in the State of Michigan, except that the respondent may engage in conveyancing, limited to the filling out of standard printed forms as printed by stationers, when such action is incidental to the items of business he is transacting, no extra charge is made therefor, and no advice or counsel is given as to legal effect and validity of such instruments.'

From the decree entered plaintiff has appealed, insisting that this Court should review and modify its holding in Ingham County Bar Association v. Walter Neller Company, supra, such claim being predicated on the theory that the protection of the public, as a practical proposition, requires that licensed real estate brokers should be restrained from drafting legal documents and from filling in forms of instruments in transactions between sellers and purchasers of businesses or real estate. It will be noted that the injunction granted in circuit court limited defendant to the filling out of standard printed forms when incidental to the business being transacted, no extra charge therefor being made and no legal advice given. The question now before us on this appeal is, in consequence, whether such decree should forbid the filling out of forms in customary use in property transactions and, in effect, limit the acts of the real estate broker to bringing the prospective seller and purchaser together, leaving to an attorney the completion of the transaction.

The bill of complaint filed by plaintiff sought injunctive relief against defendant on the basis of a single transaction into which he had entered and in which he was not the acting broker. Rather, he undertook to give advice, and to prepare a proper instrument that would grant the consent of the chattel mortgagees to the sale of the property by the mortgagors. Admittedly he at the time made a charge for his services. It is undisputed that defendant's action as taken did not accomplish the desired result. The decree granted injunctive relief with reference to conduct on the part of defendant with reference to which specific complaint was made in plaintiff's pleading. This case does not involve the handling of an ordinary transaction by a licensed real estate broker retained by one or both of the parties to a contemplated purchase and sale. We think it must be said that the decree properly disposed of the issues raised by the pleadings.

The case as it has been presented to this Court on appeal indicates differences of opinion as to the scope of the expression 'practice law or to engage in the law business' as used in C.L.1948, § 601.61 (...