State Bar v. Langert

• Citation: 43 Cal.2d 636,276 P.2d 596
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 16 November 1954
• Parties: The STATE BAR of California, Petitioner, v. Ell David LANGERT, Respondent. S. F. 18981.

Page 596

276 P.2d 596

43 Cal.2d 636

The STATE BAR of California, Petitioner, v. Ell David LANGERT, Respondent.

S. F. 18981.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

Nov. 16, 1954.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 15, 1954.

Garrett H. Elmore, Jack A. Hayes, San Francisco, for petitioner.

Fitz-Gerald Ames, Sr., Jack H. Werchick, Harold A. Galloway, San Francisco, for respondent.

EDMONDS, Presiding Justice.

This original proceeding was brought by The State Bar to revoke an order admitting Eli David Langert to practice as an attorney at law. The petition alleges that Langert, with intent to conceal from the Committee of Bar Examiners certain material facts relating to his moral qualifications, knowingly falsified in answering certain questions bearing upon his eligibility to become a member of the bar of this state.

More specifically, The State Bar pleads the following facts:

In 1944, in his verified application to take the bar examination, Langert stated that he had never previously been examined for admission to practice law except in this state in 1943; that he had never held a license, the procurement of which required proof of good character; that he had never been reprimanded, censured or otherwise disciplined as an attorney or member of any profession or organization and that no charges had ever been made or filed or proceedings instituted against him. Other answers made by him were that his various address from 1927 to 1938 were Chicago, Illinois; Peoria, Illinois; and Henry, Illinois. During the same period, he said, he had worked in several capacities, none of which was the practice of law.

Langert took the bar examination and received a passing grade. Thereafter, the committee certified to this court that he had met the requirements for admission to practice, and recommended that he be admitted. The order admitting him to practice was entered in December, 1944.

Upon information and belief, The State Bar alleges that, contrary to the statements in the application, Langert, upon an examination in Illinois, was admitted to the practice of law in that state in 1927: that his only address from 1927 to 1938 was Rock Island, Illinois, in which city for the same period he was actively engaged in the practice of law. It is also said that five charges of unprofessional conduct as an attorney were made against him before the Grievance Committee of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Illinois prior to August, 1938, to which Langert had filed written answers. A further statement in the petition is that subsequent to August, 1938, after Langert had left Rock Island, three additional charges were filed.

In 1941, the petition continues, the Committee on Grievances of the Illinois State Bar Association, acting as commissioners of the Illinois Supreme Court, held a hearing on the eight charges. The committee found that three of these charges, all of which were filed before August, 1938, and of which he had actual knowledge, were true and recommended that Langert be disbarred. Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Illinois State Bar Association referred the matter back to the committee on grievances to prepare a more complete record. There were no further proceedings in the State of Illinois.

It was Langert's plain duty to truly reply to the questions asked by the Committee of Bar Examiners. In re Jacobsen, 105 Cal.App. 236, 287 P. 131; In re Lasley, 61 Cal.App. 59, 60, 214 P. 284. The facts with respect to his prior conduct in the practice of the law in Illinois, might have justified an order refusing to allow him to take the bar examination in this state. Truthful answers to questions bearing upon his conduct in the communities in which he had lived before coming to California, at the least, would have justified further investigation of his record. The only reasonable inference which may be drawn from the record is that the committee's approval of Langert as an applicant for the bar examination and its subsequent certification of him as one who had met the requirements for admission to practice law were based upon the admittedly false answers in his application.

A deliberate concealment of charges of misconduct in another state has consistently been held grounds for revocation of a license by the courts of California. Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697, 72 A.L.R. 923; In re Jacobsen, 105 Cal.App. 236, 287 P. 131; In re Lasley, 61 Cal.App. 59, 214 P. 284; In re Wells, 36 Cal.App. 785, 172 P. 93; In re Mash, 28 Cal.App. 692, 153 P. 961.

Langert relies upon In re Hovey, 7 Cal. Unrep. 203, 81 P. 1019, as authority to the contrary. But Hovey made no false affidavit and was admitted upon motion. The question here is whether a deliberate concealment of a material fact in a verified application to the Committee of Bar Examiners justifies revocation of the order admitting one to practice.

Langert argues that he is entitled to have the issue of his moral character redetermined by this court. He contends that the order admitting him to practice should stand unless this court finds that at the present time he is not of good character. He contends that In re Wells, 174 Cal. 467, 163 P. 657, justifies such procedure.

In that case, it was alleged that Wells twice withdrew an application to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, because objections to his character had been filed. He then went to Nevada, was admitted to the bar of that state and returned immediately to California. He applied to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, and was admitted to practice under the provisions of section 279 of the Code of Civil Procedure as then in effect. Thereafter, the Bar Association of Orange County filed a petition to vacate the order admitting him to practice upon the ground that it had been obtained by the fraudulent concealment of his prior applications.

When the matter reached this court it said: 'If the allegations are true they tend to show that he was conscious of the fact that he could not gain admission in any forum where he would be met by evidence regarding his character, and that to avoid this necessity and evade the efforts of the bar association to prevent his admission he resorted to the circuitous method above detailed, took advantage of the lack of knowledge by the Justices of the Third District concerning his case, and thus procured the order, notwithstanding his unworthiness. His conduct in this respect not only constituted a fraud upon the court, but it affords additional proof that he is not a fit person for admission to the bar.' In re Wells, 174 Cal. 467, 477, 163 P. 657, 661.

Upon a further hearing in the District Court of Appeal to determine the truthfulness of the allegations of the petition in regard to the conduct of Wells, it held: '(W)e are not required, under the view we now take of this proceeding, to pass upon or undertake to determine the merits of the several charges upon which objection to the admission of Wells to practice law by the Second District Court of Appeal was predicated. * * * It is enough, to justify this court in revoking its order admitting him to practice in the courts of California under the circumstances alleged in the petition, to know, as we do know, that when he applied here for admission he failed to apprise this court of the fact that he had previously applied on two different occasions to another court of coordinate general jurisdiction with this court to be admitted to practice, and had withdrawn said applications when confronted with an objection by the bar association of the county in which he resided to his admission founded upon charges impeaching his personal character for those traits which are justly...